

CHAPTER 6*

THE MARATHAS AND THE ENGLISH

EARLY RELATIONS.

THE ENGLISH CAME TO INDIA AS TRADERS. The profits of the eastern trade were enormous and had always attracted the more adventurous people of Europe. For about a hundred years after the opening of the sea-route to India, Portugal enjoyed absolute monopoly of this trade, but since the beginning of the 17th century their prosperity was on the decline. The rising maritime powers of Holland and Great Britain dealt severe blows to the naval supremacy of Portugal and challenged its monopoly of Asiatic commerce. The Dutch concentrated on the spice islands and the seizure of Malacca in 1641, signalled their triumph over the Portuguese in that region. They also squeezed the English out of the Malay Archipelago and in a way were responsible for turning the attention of the English to the mainland of India.

The victories of Capt. Best (1612) and Capt. Downton (1614) over Portuguese fleets off the mouth of Tapi river cleared the way for the English for opening of trade with India. A *farman* obtained from Emperor Jehangir in 1613, gave them permission to establish a factory at Surat and with it secured them the only key to open all the rich and best trade of the Indies'. The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe (1615-1618), made excellent impression at the Moghal court and soon subordinate agencies sprang up at Ahmadabad, Burhanpur, Ajmer and Agra. The story of the progress of the East India Company in the 17th century and the establishment of factories clustering round Bombay, Madras and Calcutta has been told earlier. The rivalry of the East India Company with the Marathas in the 18th century for supremacy in India forms the theme of this chapter.

The Marathas and the English were not strangers when they met in the political arena at the opening of the century. The English were essentially traders seeking concessions from native rulers for

* This Chapter is contributed by Dr. V. G. Dighe.

exchanging their merchandise. They had faithfully followed the advice of their first ambassador in India. "Let this be received as a rule that if you will profit, seek it at sea, and in quiet trade ; for without controversy it is an error to affect garrisons and land wars in India".¹ In pursuance of this advice the English had confined themselves to trade and had set up a number of factories along the West Coast and in the interior. If they watched political events in the country they watched them for the safety and security of their business.

From 1650, the English factors witnessed the rise of the Marathas under the leadership of Sivaji. The hardy mountaineers and peasants dwelling in the Western corner of India defied the power first of the Adilsahi Sultanate and later of the Moghal empire and the English followed their progress with considerable interest. What the Marathas thought of these foreign traders it is difficult to surmise. They treated them with suspicion, but showed little curiosity to know about their country, their way of life or their form of Government. For their navies, they had respect, but on land held them as altogether despicable.

SHIVAJI AND THE ENGLISH.

The earliest political contact between the Marathas and the English occurred in January 1660, when Sivaji's troops came upto Rajapur in pursuit of three junks of Afzal Khan in which Afzal's agent had fled there with his master's property, on the capture of Dabhol by the enemy. The English prevented the seizure of these boats and the goods contained in them. A year later in retaliation for the aid given by the English to Siddi Johar at the siege of fort Panhala, Sivaji surprised Rajapur and plundered the English factory carrying away with him as prisoners the four factors, Henry Revington, Richard Taylor, Randolph Taylor and Philip Gyffard. The factors were released in March 1663, but apparently no compensation was paid to the English in spite of protracted negotiations. In 1664 and 1670 Sivaji marched on Surat and stripped the city of its fabulous wealth. Though the entire populace suffered at the hands of the invaders, the English defended their factory and warehouse, and were left unmolested. In the years following when Sivaji attacked Karvar and Hubli, the English factors had to contribute their share of the fine levied on the towns.

Sivaji's revolt in the Deccan and the disturbance caused by it hampered trade and were therefore distasteful to the English merchants. But their trading interests on the mainland, the vicinity of the island of Bombay—their chief seat of authority on the west coast—to the Maratha country and its dependence on it for food and fuel, slowly but inevitably drew the English in the vortex of Maratha politics.

¹ *The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe*, ed. by W. Foster (Hakluyat Society), vol. II, 344.

The rise of the Maratha State claiming to unite the country of Maharashtra under its rule was a threat to the security of foreign settlements on the west coast. The Siddi and the Portuguese who held between them most of the Konkan littoral were naturally hostile to the new power. The English though they yet avowed no territorial ambitions, looked askance at the irruption of this novel element. They always made a merit of their being traders with no inclination to take part in the struggle that waged round them.

The Siddi's stronghold of Janjira lay only 45 miles from Bombay, the seat of the English settlement on the west coast. He found Bombay a convenient point from which to descend on the mainland, sack and burn villages, seize Sivaji's subjects and capture his shipping in the Pen river. The geographical position of the Siddi State marked its ruler as the natural enemy of the Marathas and his atrocities and barbarous treatment of Maratha prisoners inflamed Maratha temper. The Siddi however was a tough fighter; his long experience of sea-faring, his powerful navy, his possession of the island castle of Janjira and his connection with the Moghal Court, balked Sivaji of his prey. The Maratha ruler and his successors greatly desired English aid to bring the Siddi to his knees, which the English with large stakes in the Moghal country could ill afford to grant; at the same time they were anxious to appease and keep fair with the Maratha ruler. In 1674, at the time of Raja's coronation they sent an embassy under Henry Oxenden to congratulate him and conclude a treaty to trade in his country. After a fruitless attempt on the part of Sivaji's ministers to engage the English in a treaty of alliance against the Siddi, a commercial treaty granting them facilities to trade in the Raja's dominions was signed. This treaty governed the relations between the Marathas and the English for over half a century.

The treaty of Rayagad though hailed as very advantageous to both parties, did not lull mutual suspicions. Within two years of its ratification the Bombay Council was complaining that "so long as that pirate and universal robber lives, that hath no regard to friend nor foe, God nor man, there can be no security in any trade in his country."¹ The occupation of the island of Khanderi, lying at the mouth of Bombay harbour, by Sivaji in 1679, brought about a collision. When Sivaji found that the English would not or could not restrain the Siddi from entering the Panvel creek and molesting his territory, he sent his marines to occupy the island of Khanderi (Kenry) which commands the entry into the harbour of Bombay.

The English became apprehensive that 'Sivaji's designs could not be otherwise than to have check on the whole trade of Bombay and adjacent parts keeping there always a fleet of small brigantines to cruise up and down'² The Deputy Governor of Bombay

¹ F. R., Surat, vol. 89, pp. 69-70.

² F. R., Bombay, vol. 8, p. 28.

requested the Maratha Commander to quit the place as it belonged to the island of Bombay. The request was declined and the work on fortifications went ahead. The expedition sent to dislodge the inmates (September 1679) failed miserably. At the end of November, the Siddi joined the English in blockading the island of Khan-deri. Sivaji in retaliation threatened to invade Bombay and collected a large army at Kalyan at which the inhabitants of Bombay became greatly alarmed. The Surat Council dreading a protracted struggle climbed down, withdrew its ships and made peace (January 1680). Khanderi remained in the hands of the Marathas.

Dr. Fryer who then passed through Bombay has left in his journal the popular impression of the episode. He observes, " amongst these wars, and rumours of wars, we quietly lay down our Arms and leave Seva Gi and Syddy alone to contend for our stony piece of ground on Henry Kenry; how much to our Honour or Reproach 'Why be gathered from the language daily cast in our Teeth. ' Why vaunt your Nation ? What Victories have you achieved ? What has your sword done ? Who ever felt your power ? What do you possess ?.....everyone runs you down; you can scarce keep Bombain,winch you got not by your Valour, but compact; And will you pretend to be Men of War or cope with our Princes ? It's fitter for you to live on Merchandise and submit to us."¹

The period following Sivaji's demise, till the end of the century was one of peace between the Marathas and the English. The war-fare between the Moghal and the Marathas was quickened in 1681 by the arrival in the Deccan of Aurangzeb himself and engrossed the entire energies of the Maratha nation. The coastal districts were overrun by Moghal armies and the Siddi was once more put in charge of places he had lost to Sivaji before. He now became very active and attacked Maratha shipping in Bombay waters. Sambhaji's protest against his sheltering in the harbour went unheeded. The nascent Maratha navy was swept off the sea.

RISE OF KANHOJI ANGRE.

At the end of the century however there was a turn of fortune.Kanhoji Angre by his daring and enterprise raised himself to the position of Admiral of the Maratha fleet (1698) and claimed tribute from all vessels sailing along the west coast. Angre's activities formed a part of the general struggle of the Maratha people against Moghal conquest of their homeland. The chief objective to which his policy was directed was to recover Maratha territory occupied by the Siddi and other foreign powers. The Western seas were to be Maratha waters and all who visited ports established in them,were to be taught to respect Maratha sovereignty and secure his permission for trading in those waters by buying his passes. Whatever power refused to conform to his orders would do it at the peril of bringing on its merchantmen his strong hand. His claim was challenged by the Siddi as well as the European powers, the Portuguese, the Dutch and the English, who on account of important

¹ John Fryer, *A new account of the East Indies and Persia*, vol. 3, pp. 163-165.

trading interests on the Malbar coast, found such a demand most galling and injurious to their commerce. They preferred to look on Angre as a pirate, as an enemy of peaceful commerce and made light of his high-sounding demands. Confident of their superiority at sea with their large ocean-sailing vessels and with their greater fire-power the Europeans refused to submit to Angre's claims and preferred to fight out the issue. Angre's fleet though inferior in weight and number, could always seek the shelter of forts which lined the coast. So long as his rear remained secure, Angre could laugh at the efforts of his enemies to destroy his naval power. A state of perpetual warfare, punctuated by short periods of peace, therefore, existed on the coast between the Maratha Admiral and his neighbours.

The English at Bombay watched Angre's activities with great anxiety. Small ships belonging to the country merchants plying between Bombay and Cochin were seized by him and hardly any shipping could pass or repass Bombay. In 1699 they expressed their fears "of Sevajees and Sanganians grown strong and impudent so that scare any boats can pass to and from the island without convoys."¹ The Bombay Consultation, dated 6 February 1699 reports "the *Subhedar* of Kanhoji Angre having agreed to the release of two Bombay merchants and requesting salt boats to visit his country."² In the fighting that broke out between the Siddi and Angre at the end of 1700 the Siddi accused the English with supplying the Sevajees with ammunition.³ In 1702 a small trading vessel from Calicut with six Englishmen on board fell in Kanhoji's hands. A year later his galivats were worrying the fishermen of Worlee.⁴ In September of that year the English seized a *grab* sailing under Angre's colour as "Conajee Angre and his people were at sundry times committing many injurious and piratical actions on the inhabitants of this island". In 1704 November Kanhoji Angre boldly rode into the bay of Bombay and anchoring his vessels at the mouth of the Pen river threatened to starve the island. Mr. Reynolds was deputed to find him and tell him that "he could not be permitted searching, molesting or seizing vessels without breach of the existing friendship."⁵ Angre returned a defiant answer saying that "The Sevajees had done many services for the English that never kept their word with him;that they lived now by their sword and would seize what boats or other vessels belonging either to the Mogulls vessels from any of his ports or Mallabarr, excepting such as had Conajee Angre's passports ; the English being at liberty acting as they please."⁶

¹ O. C. vol. 55, No. 6642

² F. R., Bombay, vol. 5, p. 8.

³ O. C, vol. 56, No. 7506.

⁴ F. R., Bombay, vol. 5, p. 9.

⁵ *Bombay Public Proceedings*, vol. 2, pp. 15, 17, 21.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

Surat letters to the Directors, of the period, are full of lament for losses suffered by them at hands of Angre. In February 1707 Kanhoji captured the Company's *Machva* cruising off the Mahim river. In the same year the *Bombay* frigate was blown up in an encounter with his ships. In 1710, a Dutch sloop of war was captured and the *Godolphin* narrowly escaped the same fate. In 1711 the Directors were told that Angre could take any ship except the largest ones : " along the coast from Surat to Dabul he takes all private merchant vessels he meets". The next year he captured the Governor of Bombay's armed Yacht and the *Anne* Karvar and attacked the *Somers* and the *Grantham* East Indiamen.¹

While thus at war with his maritime neighbours Kanhoji Angre as a partisan of Tara Bai, found himself involved in civil war. On the advice of Balaji Visvanath he soon came to an understanding with Sahu and was confirmed in the command of the fleet, was put in charge of several forts in Konkan and promised support in the contest with the Sidhi.²

Kanhoji about this time also made up his differences with the English. In February 1713 he agreed that "in future English ships should be free from molestation, that no ships of any nation coming into Bombay harbour should be interfered with between Mahim and Kennery (Khanderi), that English merchants should have liberty of trade in Angre's ports on payment of the usual dues and that Angre should be responsible for any damages done in future by the ships belonging to his Maratha superiors. In return the Governor engaged to give passes only to ships belonging to the subjects of the English nation and to allow Angre's people full facilities in Bombay."³

The treaty concluded with the English proved but a temporary truce. The town of Bombay was then unwallled and the factory had no marine to protect its interests. The island was in a declining posture when Charles Boone arrived as Governor at the end of 1713. With his arrival the settlement began to show great activity in equipping its fighting marine. Within two years it had built and equipped a fleet—consisting of " nineteen frigates, grabs, ketches, gallivats and rowing galleys, carrying two hundred and twenty guns besides a bomb-vessel and a fireship". This naturally alarmed Kanhoji and when he found the English engaged in war with the Sounda Raja he recommenced attacks on Bombay shipping.

The immediate cause of hostilities was the capture of their merchantmen, *The Success*, the *Robert* and the *Otter* by Angre. Angre contended that these vessels belonged to foreign merchants

¹ *Malbar Pirates*, by Biddulph, pp. 77, 78.

² *Treaties, Agreements and Sanads*, edited by Mawjee and Parasnis, p 197.

³ *Bombay Public Consultations Range*, ecc XLI, No. 4, (Consultation, 12th February 1713).

and though laden with the goods of the Company could claim no exemption from his passes. The English retaliated by the seizure of one of Angre's Sibar that visited Mahim and attack on his coastal towns. War was formally declared on 17 June 1718.

On the close of the monsoon on 2nd November a formidable expedition consisting of two East Indiamen, the *Victoria* frigate, the *Revenge* and *Defiance* grabs, the *Fame* galley, the *Hunter Ketch* and fifty gallivats sailed against the island of Khanderi. Boone led the expedition in person in the *Addison*. Two more ships the *Morrice* and *Stanhope* joined the expedition a week later. A distant cannonade having produced little effect it was decided to take the fort by assault. Two attempts at landing were made on 6th and 7th November but both failed, the landing party was driven to the water and many were drowned. The fleet then proceeded to Kolaba, threw in a few shots and then sailed southward to do what damage it could to Angre's forts and ships. They found a grab at Vijaydurg but the fire vessel of the fleet was blown up by a shot from the enemy before she could board the grab. Going to Karvar they came across Angre's fleet and took four of their prizes but the grabs got away. On the return voyage the fleet once more looked into Vijaydurg creek, found none of Angre's fighting vessels, cast in a few cowhorns setting fire to some houses and then resumed its voyage to Bombay (December 1718).¹

Attempts were made about this time by Sahu *Raja* to intervene and stop the fighting. The terms proposed by the English were not acceptable and the treaty was not ratified. In consequence another expedition consisting of nine vessels and several fishing boats for landing troops and a strong detachment of troops was sent against Vijaydurg (Gheria) in September of 1720 under Walter Brown. Angre's fleet retired up the river and the cannonading had little effect on the fort. After burning a few boats the English commander retired.² The Government of Bombay celebrated this as a victory and fired salutes, but Angre affirmed it was an inglorious defeat and demonstrated the little regard in which he held the enemy's threats he attacked the English ship *Charlotte* (April 1720) and carried her into Gheria.³

Angre's career was unchecked. He continued to defy the efforts of the Portuguese and the English to bring him to book. However common danger made the two European rivals forget their old animosities and join hands in an alliance to destroy their enemy. A treaty providing for a joint attack on Kolaba was concluded on 20th August 1721.

¹ The failure of the expedition against Khanderi is attributed to the treachery of Rama Kamat, a Hindu inhabitant of Bombay. More correctly, it should be attributed to a Portuguese renegade Manuel de Castro : see Downing's History of the Indian Wars, Introduction, p. xvi and pp. 33-39.

² *Bombay Abstracts*, vol. J, p. 376 and the *Bombay Gazetteer*, vol. xxvi, Part I, p. 152 ; *History of the Indian Navy* by Low, vol. I, p. .100.

³ *Ibid.*

The arrival of a royal squadron in Bombay in September (1721) under Commodore Mathews further added to the strength of the allies. On 29th November the expedition sailed from Bombay and joined the Portuguese force at Caul. Alibag was bombarded on the 12th December and two days later an assault was made on the fort. No breach had been made and the walls were twenty feet high. The attack was repulsed with heavy losses, the Portuguese showing little spirit. The Viceroy of Goa being taken ill retired to his ship and the Portuguese contingent broke as soon as they saw the enemy advancing. Commodore Mathews watching the rout flew into a rage and roughly handled the Portuguese Captain. *Pesva* Biji Rav and Pilaji Jadhav on behalf of Sahu *Raja* arrived at the head of six thousand cavalry, seized the field guns and ammunition of the enemy and threatened to wipe out his entire force.

The entry of Sahu in the war immediately turned the scales against the allies. The Portuguese were not prepared to antagonise the entire Maratha nation and as soon as the *Pesva* offered to mediate in the dispute, they accepted his mediation. The insolent behaviour of the English Commodore towards the Portuguese Viceroy and General was not calculated to restore amity among the allies. The Portuguese accepted the liberal terms offered to them by the *Pesva* in the name of Sahu *Raja* (9th January 1722) and the English withdrew to Bombay. The alliance that had been heralded with so much eclat broke up without achieving anything.¹

The war with the English continued with pauses at intervals. When pressed in other quarters Angre would wave the olive branch and express willingness to make peace. When the pressure eased, his ships would be once more active. In 1723 Angre was engaged in hostilities with the Savant of Vadi and was threatened by the Dutch. He offered to discuss peace terms with William Phipps, the new Governor of Bombay. Phipps haughtily turned down the proposal charging Angre with piracy ; before he could hear of any terms he asked the Maratha Commander to renounce war and as proof of his sincerity demanded immediate release of prisoners. This called forth Kanhoji's ire, he replied that " it little behoved merchants to say that his government was supported by violence, insults and piracies ; for the great Sivaji founded his kingdom by making war against four kings; and that he himself was but his humble disciple; that he was ever willing to favour the merchants trading according to the laws of his country", and offered to release the English prisoners if his men imprisoned by the English were set at liberty.² Though the negotiations did not bring peace an exchange of prisoners was effected in 1725. Kanhoji's last act of hostility against the English was the seizure of the Company's galley King *William* in 1728. He died on 4th July 1729.

¹ Downing, *History of the Indian Wars*, pp. 53-57 and F. N. on p. 56; Biddulph, *Malabar Pirates*, pp. 174-180.

² Forest, Home Series, vol. II, pp. 37-41.

DEATH OF KANHOJI ANGRE.

The death of Kanhoji Angre forms a turning point in Anglo-Maratha relations which were all along marked with the greatest acerbity on both sides. Angre's restless energy, resourcefulness and daring had brought the Maratha Navy to a high pitch of efficiency and developed it into a powerful striking force. His authority was supreme in Kohkan and his exclusive writ ran in that region. Though his rivals affected to speak of him as a "Corsair", they saw in him the representative of Maratha authority, the symbol of a mighty nation that appeared to be destined to take the place of the Moghal. If they dreaded his ships, they dreaded more the might of the Maratha state that stood behind them.

DISPUTES IN ANGRE'S FAMILY.

Kanhoji's death brought about a change in the situation and resulted in new alignments. The Angre family was riven with disputes. Kanhoji's immediate successor Sekhoji, the most capable and sanes among his sons, died within a short period of his appointment (1733 August). His remaining family, Sambhaji, Manaji, and Tulaji and others, were all self-willed obstinate youths who quarrelled violently among themselves and invited outside intervention. The intemperate behaviour of Sambhaji Angre towards the King and his powerful *Pesva*, the grasping and domineering attitude of the latter with his subtle intrigues brought about the downfall of the Angre family and with it the ruin of the Maratha navy and gave the English the opportunity to deliver its first deadly blow against Maratha power.

Sambhaji Angre succeeded to the Admiralty in 1733, September. A very capable man, he was rough of speech and rough of manners. Manaji soon fell foul with him and opened negotiations with the Portuguese and the English to support his claim against his brother. The English naturally welcomed the opportunity of weakening the Angre and despatched Capt. Inchbird to Caul (December 1734), to encourage Manaji in his evil designs. It was very advantageous to them to keep up the dissensions between the brothers and thereby divide their force; they therefore authorised their agent to offer Manaji money and military stores and instructed him "to spirit up Manaji to carry on his resentments against his brother."¹

Manaji Angre's agents also met *Pesva* Baji Rav, whom Sambhaji had greatly offended by his recalcitrance. The *Pesva* saw in the family discord an opportunity to humiliate his opponent, reduce the Angre power and make it subservient to his authority. He decided that the fleet and territories of Kanhoji Angre should be divided between his protege Manaji and Sambhaji; that Manaji should hold independent charge of Kolaba² and Sambhaji that of Suvarnadurg. The arrangement ousted Sambhaji permanently from his northern posses-

¹ *Kavyetihās Sangraha Patre Yadi*, 23(1930, Ed.), S. P. D. III, 112 and xxxiii, 147, 159, 165, 245, 264, 274, 437. Also *Public Dept Diary*, vol. VII, Consultations, dated 22nd November 1734 and December.

² Rajwade— *Marathyanca Itihasaci Sadhane*, II, pp. 71-72.

sions and confined him to the barren tract of the Ratnagiri district. Sambhaji retained his father's title of *Sarkhel*, but it no longer stood for the principal command of the navy. Sambhaji naturally resented this decision and was never reconciled to the partition.¹ As the more daring and active among the brothers his removal from the vicinity of Bombay, gave satisfaction to the English. They had all these years meekly submitted to the insults of Angre and were now happy at the turn of events. They accepted Manaji as lesser of the two evils and readily assisted him to keep the feud alive. The *Pesva* had humbled not only the pride of the Angre house but had the Angre's fief in his grip. A new English-*Pesva*-Manaji axis was established to curb Sambhaji Angre and keep him away from Kolaba. This friendly understanding was the note of the next two decades and lasted till Angre's power was completely overthrown in 1756.

With the conquest of Salsette and Bassein by Cimaji Appa in 1739, the *Pesva* and the English became near neighbours and found it necessary to know each other intimately and cultivate a closer understanding. They despatched two embassies, one to Sahu *Raja* at Satara and the other to Cimaji Appa at Bassein, to acquaint themselves with the aims and working of the Maratha Court and assess the strength of their new neighbour.

EMBASSIES OF GORDON AND INCHBIRD.

The first embassy was headed by Capt. Gordon. The object of the embassy as Capt. Gordon's letter of instructions informed him, was to gain information and insight into the Government interests and designs of the Maratha Court. The envoy was to obtain knowledge of the state of Sahu *Rajas* Government and to discover who were Baji Rav's enemies at the Court and how much they were to be depended on. "It will not be amiss," the Board writes, "if you see a proper occasion and opening to instill a jealousy of his ambition and growing power by the accession of his conquests". Gordon left Bombay on the 12th May 1739 and arrived in Sahu *Rajas* camp near Miraj on 1st June. He found the atmosphere at the Court not unfriendly and the *Raja* willing to do the English good offices; but his good offices counted for little as the *Pesva* was all powerful and made small account of the *Raja*. Gordon was not able to discover the real intentions of Baji Rav, but the general view was that he had no designs of molesting Bombay as it was esteemed useful for advancing the prosperity of his new acquisitions.

Capt. Inchbird's embassy to Cimaji Appa was much more successful. Inchbird's mission was meant to disarm Maratha jealousy for having aided the Siddi and the Portuguese in their late wars against

¹ Br. Ch. 326-328 and Rajwade, III, 272, 278.

² The accounts of the two embassies are given by Forrest in *The Selections from the Letters, Despatches and other State papers, Maratha Series*, vol. I, Part I, pp. 67-84.

the Marathas, to discourage any demand for tribute and yet to impress the Maratha General with the sincere desire of the English to cultivate a good understanding with their new neighbours. Inchebird spoke to the Maratha Council of the importance of encouraging foreign trade to make their country prosperous. He succeeded in arranging the terms of a treaty, dated 12th July 1739 which was ratified at Bombay. It was not the first engagement of its kind as alleged by Forrest and Aitchison, but marks a land-mark in Anglo-Maratha relations. It regulated trade between Bombay and the Maratha Country and navigation of the Mahim River. By it the *Pesva* conceded to the English free trade in his dominions.¹

ANGLO PESHVA AMITY.

A year after the conclusion of the treaty, *Pesva* Baji Rav died. He was succeeded by his eldest son Balaji Baji Rav more commonly called Nana Saheb. The policy of his father on the west coast remained unchanged. The new *Pesvas* servants in Konkan pursued their master's interests with great vehemence and continued to squeeze Angres—Manaji, Sambhaji and their successors—out of their land possessions, contributing materially to the success of the English navy at sea over their rival. The position of the Angres grew more and more precarious. In spite of the exhortations of the great Sivaji that the navy should meet its upkeep from the central exchequer and not depend on its earnings at sea for its sustenance,² it was driven to a course of indiscriminate plunder by its necessities. Sahu unable to aid the fleet with money, had shown wisdom in accepting the advice of his Minister Balaji Visvanath to sustain the fleet by marking Konkan as Angre's sphere of influence and giving him a free rein in that field. The advent of *Pesvas* power in the Angre's field—the domineering views of Baji Rav and his son and the failure of the Angre brothers in coming to an understanding among themselves and their neighbours, upset the arrangement, isolated the naval command and dried up the resources of the Maratha fleet. The destruction of Angre's navy in 1756, was not a sudden catastrophe but the culmination of the policy initiated and worked out by the *Pesva* since 1735.

In the discussion over the Portuguese treaty, Cimaji Appa conveyed to the English envoy that “both the Angres were pirates, robbers, senseless impolitic fellows”. Inchebird agreed, saying “they were past all cure and it was labour in vain to reclaim them”. Cimaji told the envoy that “if the English were ready to act in co-operation with a Maratha force to destroy the pirate next season he would himself come down, and join the English in taking all Angre's forts and country.”³ The treaty ending the war with the Portuguese contained an article which provided for joint action for destroying the Angre.

¹ *Forrest, Maratha Series*, Ed. by Forrest, pp. 71-74, *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, ed. by Aitchison, vol. II, pp. 9-13, (1931, Ed.).]

² *Adnyapatra*, p. 34 (1826, Ed.).

³ *Pub. Dept. Diary*, XIII, pp. 330-339.

In 1740 March, Sambhaji Angre suddenly appeared before Kolaba, landed troops and with little opposition “ seized all the ports and strong places in consequence of secret understanding with Manaji’s officers, only Kolaba and one small out-fort holding out for Manaji”. Sambhaji sent a message to his brother that he was visiting Alibag to pay respects to his father’s *samadhi*. The prospect of Sambhaji establishing himself at Kolaba and obliging the Company to increase their Marine force (the expense of which is already intolerant) to secure the navigation of the coast” was altogether unpalatable to the Bombay Council. They immediately despatched relief to Manaji under Captain Inchbird and anxiously watched the issue of the contest. In the meanwhile a large force under Cimaji Appa also arrived at Kolaba to support Manaji in the struggle. Caught between two fires Sambhaji Angre had little chance of escaping. He was fortunately aided out of the impasse by Manaji himself who to his dismay found his ally and patron occupying his forts of Karanja, Elephanta, Pali Mirgad and making himself free with his territory round these strongholds. Sambhaji, surrendering the places seized by him, quickly slipped away and repaired to the *Rajas* court to lodge a complaint against the *Pesva*’s high handed action. Nothing apparently came out of the visit, Sambhaji returning a disappointed man.¹

The Kolaba incident served to cement further the union between the English and the Marathas (the *Pesva*). “ Acting on Capt. Inchbird’s report that the Marathas were too jealous of Sambhaji’s power and so many hostilities had already past between them, that they were bent to reducing him and would attack him as soon as a proper season would allow of their entering upon the action and were very pressing to gain a declaration of the Company’s intention”, the Bombay Council decided “that it could not do better than embrace the Maratha. (the *Pesva*’s) party and assist them in any expedition against him, so far as its forces would permit. By such a step it felt it would contribute to the humbling of a resolute bold enemy and also benefit by such events as their enmity might present it.”² Cimaji Appa who had conducted these negotiations died in December 1740, and Sambhaji’s annual incursions remained unchecked. He seized the *Resolution* returning to Bombay from Surat and caused quite a panic. He died a year later on 12th January 1742.

TULAJI ANGRE

Manaji Angre ended with becoming a satellite of the *Pesva*. Tulaji his half-brother and successor to Sambhaji Angre’s title, fleet and the barren kingdom of South Konkan—suffered worse fate. Tulaji was active and brave but haughty and altogether lacking in political foresight. His reckless courage and daring seamanship proved his

¹ Br. Ch. 56, *Pub. Dept. Diary*, XIII, B. 218-238, 253-260.

² *Pub. Dept. Diary*, XIII, B. pp. 305-306.

undoing. Claiming that he was a servant of the Crown he looked on himself as a peer of the *Pesva* and refused to bend his knee before the latter. The *Pesva* had usurped the authority of the crown; his hostility placed Tulaji in the position of a rebel against the State. The *Sarkhel* while feigning allegiance to the puppet monarch at Satara, followed a line of action dictated by his personal needs and selfish interests. To subsist his army he entered into a war with the Savant of Vadi at the end of 1746 and gained successes in the initial stages. But in 1748, the Savant with the *Pesva's* aid defeated him with heavy loss at Kudal, and drove him out.¹ A third raid by Tulaji about 1750, was also successfully beaten back. His attempt against the chiefs of Visalgad and Bavda met with a similar fate.² To keep alive his fleet he raided Malabar ports and preyed on merchant shipping. His activities on land and at sea made him repugnant to all his neighbours—Maratha chiefs of Visalgad, Bavda, Kolhapur and Vadi and the foreign maritime powers—the English, the Portuguese and the Dutch. The *Pesva* in his capacity as the head of the State and the supreme law-giver, took it upon himself to champion the cause of the smaller chieftains and entered into alliance with the English ‘to subdue and demolish Tulaji Angre’.

Tulaji Angre was not unaware of the clouds gathering over his head. In October 1754, he sent his agents to the Bombay Council with a proposal for accommodating their long standing differences. The terms he offered were liberal enough to be acceptable. But the English would hear none of it. They flatly refused to recognise Angre's right to issue passes for their trading vessels, insisted on the restoration of all the ships seized by him and called on him to send them men of consequence to treat of peace.³ The reply clearly indicated that the English were in no mood to accommodate and Angre could expect no quarter from them.

The *Pesva* by 1754, had made himself master of the Konkan with the exception of the coastline. If Angre would not go before him as a suppliant, would not respect his flag, there was no place for him in the Maratha confederacy. With the *Pesva* and Ramaji Mahadev, his *Subhedar* of Salsette, destruction of Angre and his navy became an obsession. All the objections and fears of the English, Ramaji Pant overcame by his arguments and by making them large concessions.⁴ On 19th March 1755, was concluded the agreement for

¹ S. P. D., XXIV, Nos. 86, 101, 98, 103, 99, 110, 115, 30, 113, 41, XXXIV, 34, Count of Aloma's report, pp. 203-206; History of Savantvadi, *Ratnagiri Gazetteer*, 1880, p. 441.

² S. P. D. XXIV, 20 25, *Pant Pratinidhi Bakhar in Bharat Varsa*, Vol. I, p. 56 ; *Gode Family Bakhar and Battle of Mudagad*, J. U. B., Vol. V, Part IV, *Gode Family Bakhar and Battle of Mudagad*, J. U. B., vol. V, Part IV, *sahu Roznisi*, 225-229, 236 and 240.

³ *Pub. Dept. Diary*, Volume 27 (1754), pp. 309-315.

⁴ S. P. D., XIL, 115.

making a joint assault on Angre's strongholds. The English squadron sailed out of Bombay under Commodore James and at Caul was joined by the Maratha fleet. On 29th, they arrived before Suvarnadurga and opening a terrific bombardment carried the place on 4th April. The lateness of the season held up operations for another year. Gheria and Vijayadurg were assaulted by the fleet under Admiral Watson on 11th February 1756. A chance shell fell among Angre's fleet which had been drawn up in the river and set on fire the *Restoration* grab. It spread to other ships and before long the whole of Angre's fleet was on fire and was completely burnt out. At right the Admiral landed his troops to get between the town and the Maratha camp. About four in the afternoon of the 13th, the attack was renewed and the garrison flung out the flag of truce. The English troops marched in, took possession of the place and hoisted their flag. The destruction of Angre's power was complete. His entire fleet, which had been the terror of the coast for half a century's had gone up in a blaze. Angre became a prisoner in his enemy's hands, was sent to Poona and remained in custody till his death in 1786. The fort of Vijayadurg was plundered of all its accumulated treasure by the English and handed over to the *Pesva* six months later after tedious negotiations. The *Pesva* crushed his rival on the coast but in doing so lost the navy.

GROWING ANGLO-MARATHA TENSION.

The extermination of Tulaji Angre closed the chapter of Anglo- Maratha friendship. Though a new treaty concluded in the October of 1756, gave exclusive commercial advantages to the British in addition to a few villages round about Bankot or Fort Victoria, the English could not be persuaded to accede to the *Pesvas* request for help in his Karnatak and Hindustan projects. The all-round expansion of Maratha power was viewed by the British with greatest anxiety and if they did not pursue active measures to prevent it, they refused to be a party to it. The relations between the *Pesva* and the English became less and less cordial. The acquisition of Surat by the English in 1759 and their support of the Siddi of Janjira in his struggle against the *Pesvas* navy so infuriated the Poona Government that it refused to transact business with the mission sent to Poona under Price in the August of 1759.¹

A year and half after the visit of the mission a terrible disaster overtook the *Pesva* in Hindustan. At the battle of Panipat in 1761, the *Pesva's* main army led by his cousin and his son was annihilated by the Afghan marauder Ahmad Sah Abdali aided by Najib Khan Rohilia and other Indian Muslim chieftains. Maratha power in Northern India was destroyed and Maratha prestige received a fatal blow. The defeat at Panipat was followed by the death of Balaji Rav *Pesva* and the outbreak of civil war between his minor son Madhav Rav and his brother Raghoba. The *Pesva's* neighbours became restless and seized large parts of his dominions.

¹ Forrest, *Maratha Series*, Vol. I, pp. 125-138.

While Maratha affairs were thus in a declining posture the fortunes of the East India Company were on the ascendant. The end of the Anglo-French struggle in January 1761, had left the British without a foreign rival on the Indian continent. Their victory over the *Navab* of Bengal (1757) and subsequent revolutions engineered by them had put the richest Indian province at their command and provided them with a convenient base from which to march to the heart of Hindustan. From a trading concern the Company had risen to the position of a first-rate power and was now competing with the Marathas for the political leadership of India, Nothing could have suited their ambitious views better than to see their opponents weakened by losses and riven by civil war. Growing coolness marked the next phase of Anglo-Maratha relations which lasted from 1756 to 1774.

The difficulties of Poona Government encouraged ambitious views in the Bombay Council. When envoys arrived at Bombay from Raghoba during the monsoon of 1761, the Bombay Council welcomed the mission as giving them an opportunity for acquiring the islands of Salsette and Bassein, “not so much for advantages expected from revenue, as advanced positions necessary to the security of the island and harbour of Bombay”. Raghoba offered to make cessions in Gujarat for British aid in arms, but as Salsette did not find a place in the cessions the talks ended inconclusively.

Madhav Rav *Pesva* during his short regime showed wonderful resourcefulness and under his leadership the Marathas recovered rapidly. By 1767, the embers of civil war laid low, the *Nizam* was humbled and professed friendship ; Janoji Bhosle who had been a source of great trouble was brought to book and made to disgorge his ill-gotten gains; above all Haidar Ali the most active enemy of the Marathas was soundly beaten in several campaigns and abandoned much of the territory seized by him and agreed to pay a tribute of 33 lakhs of rupees. The President of the Bombay Council writing in November 1767 “lamented the growing power of the Marathas and felt that nothing should be left undone to check it as much as possible”. An embassy was sent to Poona under Thomas Mostyn to learn the designs and sound the disposition of the Maratha Court and persuade it to join the English against Haider Ali. Mostyn soon discovered that there was little possibility of the Marathas making common cause with Haidar Ali and did not press for a closer alliance.

The embassy sent its agent, Charles Brome, to Raghoba at Nasik to discover what advantages he was prepared to make to the English. Raghoba expressed his resentment that his nephew did not leave him any share in the administration but had no definite proposals to offer.¹

¹ *op. cit.*, pp. 140-176.

Mostyn once more visited Poona in 1772, September under instructions of the Home authorities “to negotiate for certain advantages for the settlement in the Malabar and also for the cession of the island and peninsula of Salsette and Bassein which added so much to the security and value of Bombay and penetrate Maratha designs which might affect the Company’s possessions in Bengal or Carnatic”. The period of Mostyn’s third embassy lasted till the December of 1774 and was full of momentous events at Poona—the death of Madhav Rav *Pesva*, murder of Narayan Rav and the revolutions in the Poona Government. Mostyn’s reports convinced his masters that the time had come to strike the blow for the possession of Salsette and that the seizure of the island amidst the confusion that reigned at the Maratha capital, would pass unnoticed. An expedition under General Gordon and Superintendent Watson suddenly appeared before Thana, assaulted the fort and occupied the island on 23rd December 1774. Rumours of a Portuguese fleet threatening Salsette was given as the excuse for the English attack.

The seizure of Salsette was an act of wanton aggression and formed one of the causes of Anglo-Maratha hostilities that ensued in the year following. But the main reason for the outbreak was Raghoba’s invitation to the Bombay Council to support his claim to the *Pesvaship* against the Barbhais or the council of Poona ministers. Raghoba was neither a diplomat nor a soldier and never popular at Poona Court. The defeat of Panipat and the consequent death of Balaji Rav *Pesva* had dragged this small man from obscurity and put him in a position of command. As the sole surviving elderly member of the *Peava*’s house he looked upon himself as the guardian of his young nephews and in that capacity proposed to keep the reins of administration in his hands. This was resented and led to friction and open war between the uncle and the nephew.

AFFAIRS AT THE MARATHA COURT.

Madhav Rav *Pesva* died in November 1772 and was succeeded by his younger brother Narayan Rav. Differences soon appeared between the new *Pesva* and his uncle and led to the murder of the between by the adherents of Raghoba. Raghoba now became the *Pesva*. Though he denied complicity in the crime his action in rewarding the ring-leaders and putting them in positions of trust belied Raghoba’s word and combined with his general unpopularity, to draw on him the odium of the entire Maratha *Darbar* and Maratha people. The repulsion felt for the perpetrator of such a heinous crime took the form of a plot to oust him from the *Pesvaship* and run it in the name of a son of Narayan Rav, natural born or adopted. Raghoba’s old friend and chief adviser Sakharam Bapu, inspired the main idea and took the lead in the formation of the league of the *Barbhais*. Maratha chieftains were informed by letters of Raghoba having been

dismissed from the *Pesvaship* and of the Council of ministers having taken over the administration in the name of the widow of the murdered *Pesva*.¹

Large desertion in his army and the reports of the plot brought by his spies roused Raghoba to the danger that was threatening him. He had gone to Karnatak to deal with Haidar Ali's aggressions. But the danger at home now required his attention. Patching up a treaty with Haidar Ali he turned towards Pooana. At Kaseganv near Pandharpur on 26th March 1774, he defeated an army of the ministerial party led by Trimbak Rav Pethe. Other armies barred his path to Pooana. Raghoba broke his ground and fled northward to seek support from Sinde and Holkar.

The birth of a male child to the widow of Narayan Rav *Pesva*, who was pregnant at the time of her husband's death, in April 1774, put an end to Raghoba's hopes of ever regaining the *Pesvaship*. Sinde whom he had approached (May 1774), to mediate in the dispute suggested that Raghoba should receive a *jagir* worth ten lakhs of rupees and two forts, that he should be helped to pay off his troops to enable him to dismiss them and that the two ministers, Sakharam Bapu and Nana Phadnis, should come to Burhanpur to discuss further details in a personal meeting. The ministers agreed and moved towards Burhanpur in November. Raghoba was not prepared to accept any compromise that left him no share in the administration. His talks with the ministerial party convinced him he could expect no further concessions from them. On 10th December, he bolted and fled towards Gujarat, where he was joined by Govind Rav Gaikvad.

FIRST ANGLO-MARATHA WAR.

Negotiations for Military aid had been opened with the English at Surat by Raghoba's agents quite a year back; a draft treaty making large concessions to them in Gujarat had been drawn up in September 1774. With Haripant Phadke threatening to encircle him in Gujarat, Raghoba renewed his solicitations. He was defeated on 17th February 1775 in the battle of Mahi (near Arras), and fled by way of Cambay and Bhavnagar to Surat. On 6th March, was concluded the treaty by which the English agreed to support his cause with a force of 2500 troops with a due proportion of artillery. Raghoba among other things agreed to cede to the Company in perpetuity Bassein with its dependencies, the island of Salsette and other islands adjacent to Bombay, Jambusar and Olpad *parganas* in Gujarat and the *Pesvas* share of revenue of Ankalesvar. For the expenses of the troops he was to pay a lakh and a half of rupees monthly and by way of security deposited with the Company jewellery worth six lakhs.²

¹ S. P. D., V, pp. 12, 20, 24, 26, etc.

² Forrest, Maratha Series, I, pp. 211-215. The first Maratha war can be followed in detail in Forrest's Selections Maratha Series and Khare's *Aitihāsik Lekha Sangraha*, vol. VII and Historical papers on Mahadji Sinde.

The Bombay Council as remarked previously was anxious to emulate the example of Bengal and Madras to obtain political ascendancy at Poona and make the presidency pay its way by means of increased revenue. But its plans were very badly laid, the means adopted proved quite inadequate for the ends in view and Maratha resistance proved far more stubborn than what had been imagined from English experience in Bengal and Kanatak.

Colonel Keating who had arrived at Surat about the end of February at the head of the British detachment, joined Raghoba on the conclusion of the treaty of Surat and both sailed to Cambay for the purpose of forming a junction with Raghoba's defeated army that had fallen back on Kapadvanj. The season had advanced and Raghoba wanted to remain in Gujarat during the monsoon. The British were however anxious to push south in the direction of Poona at once. The march of the confederate army southward was challenged and impeded at every stage by the forces under the command of Haripant Phadke. Several inconclusive actions were fought of which the battle of Arras, claimed as a victory by the British, cost them two hundred and twenty men of whom eighty-six were Europeans and eleven of them officers. The allies could make little progress after the battle and went into cantonment at Dabhoi for the rainy season.

TREATY OF PURANDAR.

While both parties were preparing for renewal of hostilities after the rains the Supreme Government in Calcutta intervened disapproving in strongest terms the policy and measures of the Bombay Council in supporting Raghoba. They declared the war as "impolitic, dangerous, unauthorised and unjust". "you have imposed on yourself", they wrote, "the charge of conquering the whole Maratha empire for a man who appears incapable of affording you any effectual assistance in it."¹ They sent Col. Upton to Purandar near Poona to negotiate a treaty with the minister and put, an end to hostilities. Upton was in Maratha camp for three months and concluded an agreement on 1st March 1776, which dissolved the British alliance with Raghoba, Provided for the retention of Salsette by them, secured them Broach and the surrounding territory and promised a subsidy of twelve lakhs of rupees for the expenditure incurred on the troops. Raghoba was to disband his troops and reside at Koparganv on the Godavari; expenditure of his household to the amount of ten lakhs was guaranteed.²

The treaty of Purandar was in no way dishonourable to either party. For the Marathas the chief gain was the dissolution of the British alliance with Raghoba. Once the English abandoned his cause, Raghoba would be isolated and cease to be the source of

¹ *op. cit.*, p. 238.

² *op. cit.*, pp. 277-280.

infinite trouble that he had proved so far. The English had gained their main objective—Salsette and the islands adjacent to Bombay— which they had always held as of great strategic value. If both parties had been sincere in their professions peace would have followed the conclusion of the treaty. But in Raghoba the Bombay Council had found a pliable instrument to increase their influence in the Maratha Court. To surrender him to the ministerial party and abandon their recent gains in territory worth twenty-lakhs of rupees was for the Bombay Council too bitter a pill to swallow. Despatches received from the Court of Directors about this time encouraged the Council in its recalcitrant attitude. Instead of abandoning Raghoba's cause it sheltered him first at Surat and then at Bombay, allowed his troops to remain in the city of Surat, afforded asylum to the partisans of the imposter of Sadasiv Rav Bhau and secret encouragement to intrigues at Poona. The Poona ministers retaliated by refusing to fulfil their part of the treaty. They declined payment of the twelve lakhs that had been stipulated, nor would they surrender any territory near Broach. As counterpoise to the British they pretended to entertain seriously proposals presented to them by a Frenchman Mons de St. Lubin on behalf of his Government.

England's colonies in America were at this time in revolt against the mother country. France looked on this as an excellent opportunity of retaliating for the injuries suffered during the seven years war and freely gave her assistance to the colonists. The appearance of a French agent at Poona greatly alarmed the Supreme Government at Calcutta and it readily fell in with the views of the Bombay Council to support the cause of Raghoba; setting aside the treaty of Purandar a force was despatched from Bengal and another march upon Poona in support of Raghoba was sanctioned.

RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES—BRITISH DEFEAT AT VADGAON.

Elated at the success of its views the Bombay Council immediately fitted an expedition to take Raghoba to Poona. It would not wait for the Bengal detachment to arrive in the Deccan. Reports of dissensions among the Poona ministers and the appearance of a party supposed to favour Raghoba's cause hastened its preparations. An army consisting of five hundred Europeans, three thousand sepoy and three hundred gun lascars attended by Raghoba and a party of irregular horse set out on the road to Poona on 25th November 1778. By 20th December the force had ascended the Bhor Ghat, but saw no sign of Maratha allies that were to join Raghoba. By painful marches it pushed forward to Taleganv in another three weeks. This however proved the limit.

“ The hopes which the Bombay Council had formed of a general rising in favour of Raghoba were grievously disappointed. The scheme of pushing into the heart of the Maratha empire, the British discovered was a difficult one to accomplish.”. Nana Phadnis with Mahadjis aid had put down the faction that had invited Raghoba to

Poona and impeded the progress of the English army with fifty thousand seasoned troops. The small British force was sniped at on its march and cut off from its rear. When it reached the village of Taleghav it found the place completely reduced to ashes. The English Commander realising his mistake attempted withdrawal. But retreat was now too late and no longer practicable. On 17th January 1779 was signed the convention of Vadgahv, by which the English Commander accepted to surrender Raghoba, abandon Salsette and all territory acquired since 1772 and countermand the march of the Bengal Detachment. The convention was to be later ratified by the Bombay Government.

The convention of Vadgahv was at once repudiated by the Bombay Government and the Supreme Government supported their action. The Bombay Council realized its mistake in underrating the strength of the Maratha empire and the need of retrieving its mistake immediately if further disaster was to be avoided. But its army had returned defeated, its treasury was exhausted, its credit gone and its reputation tarnished. The Council's hope lay in obtaining reinforcements from Bengal. Fortunately for it Col. Goddard who had replaced Leslie in command of the Bengal Detachment in October 1778, received information of the disaster that had befallen the Bombay force while he lay encamped at Burhanpur (30th January 1779) and pushing with all possible haste, reached Surat on 26th February. Raghoba who had surrendered at Vadgahv and was being escorted to Jhansi eluded his guard and reached Surat in June. Bengal also sent other detachments to strike at the north-east corner of Malva and create a powerful diversion in favour of Goddard.

QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE AGAINST THE BRITISH.

Nana Phadnis who had now become the sole authority in the Poona Government prepared to meet the situation. He formed a grand coalition of almost, all Indian powers against the British. The native princes, the *Nizam*, Haidar Ali, the *Navab* of Oudh and others all had become painfully alive to the aggressive designs of the British and the *Nizam* mooted the idea of a general alliance against them. Nana Phadnis immediately accepted the idea and by large cessions in Karnatak to Haidar Ali won him over to the design. While the Marathas would engage the English in the Western part of the peninsula, Haidar Ali was to attack the English in South Karnatak, the *Nizam* was to send an army to the Northern *Sarkars* and the Bhosle of Nagpur to invade Bengal.¹ In the end though the *Nizam* remained supine and Bhosle was bribed into inactivity, the Marathas and Haider Ali waged war so bitterly as to bring the British to the verge of ruin.

Goddard made a half-hearted attempt to end hostilities on the basis of the treaty of Purandar with an additional stipulation for the exclusion of the French from Maratha dominions. Nana Phadnis insisted on the fulfilment of the Vadgahv engagement and surrender

¹ Hist. Papers of Mahadji Sinde, pp. 83, 92-96.

of Raghoba and war was renewed at the end of the year. To make the war pay for itself Fateh Singh Gaikwad was lured into an alliance (26th January 1780) on condition of ceding to the Company his districts south of the Tapi and aiding the British with three thousand horses. Dabhoi surrendered on 20th January and Ahmadabad was captured on 15th February after severe fighting. Sinde and Holkar had by now arrived in Gujarat and Goddard turned southward to meet them. The superiority of the British in artillery prevented close engagements ; the Maratha horse, hovered round the enemy's camp hanging on his flanks, cutting off his supplies and attacking his lines of communications. Goddard was not prepared for this war of attrition and tried to surprise the Maratha camp under cover of night twice (3 April and 19 April) but the results were indecisive. The Bombay Government which was impatient for results recalled the Bombay Detachment and heavy fighting took place in Konkan. Kalyan, Parsik, Belapur, were seized by Capt. Campbell in May. Malanggad was threatened. An attempt made by Nana Phadnis to recover Kalyan was foiled by Capt. Hartley.

As soon as the rains ceased Goddard arrived at Bombay and marched his troops to the siege of Bassein. The fort was assaulted on 11th December and on the next day a force under Ramcandra Canes that attempted relief was defeated by Hartley. Pressed to force a decision Goddard attempted a march on Poona. His advance guard reached Khandala on 8th February (1781) and Goddard himself followed it with the main force. Nana Phadnis showed no inclination to yield to the threat and treat with the English ; a large army took up a menacing position in the Maval hills and another pouring through other Konkan passes began to harass Goddard's supply columns. To avoid another Vadganv, Goddard hastily retired at the end of April suffering heavy losses in men and stores.

The diversion created by Hastings in the north-east corner of Sinde's possessions succeeded but partially. Mahadji Sinde withdrew from Gujarat to Ujjain for the defence of his dominion, but was too late to save Gwalior which was carried by a brilliant night escalade on 3rd August 1780. This fortress was of great strategic value and its loss naturally dismayed Mahadji Sinde. The Rana of Gohad and the Bundela chief of Narvar joined the British and negotiations were opened with other Jat and Rajput princes to join the British standard. Another and a still larger force under Col. Camac invaded Malva and with the aid of its allies advanced by way of Sipri to Sironj. Its further progress was halted here and Camac finding himself in a difficult corner, decided to fall back. The retreat was marked with daily losses and Camac's force stood in danger of being cut off. On the night of 24th March however, Camac surprised Sinde's camp and took away his main standard and a number of guns. Col. Muir now joined Camac with reinforcements and took the command. No further advantage could be obtained by the

British; they were frequently straitened for supplies by numerous bodies of horse from Sinde's camp which continued to hover round. Fighting ceased as the north Indian summer advanced.

TREATY OF SALBYE.

Both parties were now weary of the war. Haidar Ali who had invaded Karnatak carried everything before him and appeared at the gates of Madras. The English troops sent to oppose him were surrounded and almost annihilated. A French squadron under Suffren appeared on the Coromandel coast. Distracted by difficulties Hastings appealed to Sinde to make peace. A truce was concluded by Col. Muir on 13th October 1781 and the final treaty was signed at Salbye on 17th May 1782.

The treaty of Salbye consisted of seventeen articles; the main articles provided for the withdrawal of British support to Raghoba and restoration of all British conquests in Gujarat and Malva subsequent to the treaty of Purandar; Haidar Ali was to restore the territories he had taken from the British; all Europeans, except the English and the Portuguese, were to be excluded from the Maratha dominions. Sinde was given Broach and he stood guarantee for the due fulfilment of the terms of the treaty.¹

The treaty of Salbye was indeed a triumph for the diplomatic genius of Nana Phadnis. The British object of putting their nominee on the *Pesvaship* and gaining control of Maratha politics was frustrated. Marathas at this period as Lyall puts it, "proved too strong and too well united to be shaken or overawed by such forces as the British could despatch against them."² Lt. Col. Luard when he writes in the Cambridge History "that the treaty established the dominance of the British as controlling factor in Indian Politics" is anticipating events.

INTERLUDE OF UNEASY PEACE.

The twenty years following the conclusion of the treaty of Salbye formed an interlude of uneasy peace. The Court of Directors declared in a pontifical manner "that they were completely satisfied with the possessions they already had and would engage in no war for the purpose of further acquisition and that they would never depart from that principle either in the condition then obtaining of the native powers or in any future revolutions amongst them. They allowed it to be known that peace was their primary object and that they would refrain from all interference in the contentions which might arise among the native princes unless called for by the stipulations of any existing treaty or by a threat of French interference."³ These were admirable sentiments and perhaps the Directors were sincere in their professions. But with the bitter experience of British diplomacy and of the activities of the Company's servants on the scene of action the native princes of India, least of all the Maratha Government, could bring themselves to believe in the pacific disposition of the Company.

¹ Aitchison, *Treaties*, etc., vol. VII, pp. 39-43.

² Lyall, Sir Alfred, *British Dominion in India*, p. 191.

³ Poona Residency Correspondence Series, vol. II, p. 13.

Lord Cornwallis' refusal to aid the Poona Government against Tipu Sultan in 1786 caused much heartburning and led to coolness between the two Governments. The Governor General's unwillingness, however, to take advantage of Sinde's difficulties in his war with the Rajputs in 1787 and the strict neutral policy that he followed in the crisis of his affairs next year went a long way to improve mutual relations. In 1790 the Poona Government entered into an alliance with the British to reduce Tipu's overgrown power. The remarks of Malet reflect correctly if somewhat uncharitably Maratha attitude in this war. "The grand object of our allies (the Marathas) is to reap as much benefit as possible from the war and to stimulate Tipu's and our exertions to the exhaustion of our mutual force so that they may become the arbiter of future negotiations."¹ At the conclusion of the peace, however, the statesmanship of Lord Cornwallis did not fail to take care to see that "British enemies were crippled without making their friends formidable."

"The *Pesva* is our rival in power" remarks Malet in another place² and British diplomacy was cleverly directed to spread disaffection towards the Marathas among neighbouring princes, encourage mutual jealousies among the members of Maratha Confederacy and thus undermine Maratha power. The strength of the confederacy united under Nana Phadnis appeared irresistible to the Governor General in 1794 and deterred him from supporting the Nizam in his arrogant assumption of independence and rejection of Maratha claims on him. The result was the triumph of Maratha arms at Kharda and the reduction of the *Nizam* to the position of a subordinate.

OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR AMONG MARATHAS.

The fact of the matter was that so long as the two great Maratha leaders, Mahadji Sinde and Nana Phadnis lived and wielded authority, the Maratha Empire had a semblance of unity and pursued a common vigorous policy which kept its enemies in awe. But after the death of Mahadji Sinde in 1794 and that of Savai Madhav Rav in 1795 the Maratha State became a house divided against itself. Baji Rav Raghunath who succeeded to the *Pesvaship* in 1796, had imbibed such violent hatred for the minister who had sent his father into exile that he could never bring himself to trust him or feel himself safe while the Minister lived. Baji Rav intrigued and plotted to ruin Nana Phadnis and his partisans with the support of Daulat Rav Sinde (Mahadji's successor). Sinde's trained battalions brought the new *Pesva* success in the initial stages of the contest. Nana Phadnis was seized, thrown into prison and died in March 1800. But soon there was violent reaction against the imbecile conduct of the two unworthy chiefs. The Minister's partisans received unexpected aid from Yesvant Rav Holkar who rose against Daulat Rav's tyranny and his interference in Holkar's succession. In the battle of Hadapsar fought on 25th October 1802, the joint armies of the *Pesva* and Sinde were routed, the *Pesva* fled from Poona and there were prospects that Nana's partisans headed by Yesvant Rav Holkar would gain control at Poona.

¹ P. R. C, vol. III, p. vi, 168.

² P. R. C, vol. II, p. 118.

TREATY OF BASSEIN AND AFTER.

Circumstances however shaped differently. The British now intervened and intervened much more effectively than in 1775. Lord Wellesley who had come to India as Governor-General abandoned the policy of neutrality and was determined to make British authority supreme in India. He had already crushed Tipu Sultan of Mysore and forced the *Nizam*, the *Navabs* of Oudh and Arcot into subordinate alliances with the Company. He had offered the subsidiary treaty to the *Pesva* four years back and now when the *Pesva* turned to him for aid it was readily granted. On 31st December 1802 was concluded the treaty of Bassein. The *Pesva* was to receive a subsidiary force of six battalions and to cede to the Company for their maintenance districts yielding twenty-six lakhs of rupees. He bound himself not to engage in hostilities, nor even to negotiate with other States without the permission of the British Government, and that Government was also to arbitrate his claims upon the Nizam and the Gaikvad. British troops reinstated the *Pesva* in his capital in May 1803.

The treaty of Bassein was the most disgraceful compact the Marathas ever concluded. It degraded the *Pesva* to the position of a vassal of the Company. It broke up for ever the Maratha confederacy which though loose and jarring, had a living sense of unity and a genuine, national sentiment behind it. The treaty gave the British control of the *Pesva's* country and resources. It ended once for all the contest for the sovereignty fought between the Marathas and the British. As Sidney Owen remarks "while previously to the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein there existed a British Empire in India the treaty by its direct and indirect operation, gave the Company the Empire of India".

The *Pesva's* action in signing the treaty and inviting the British for his protection shocked his friends much more than it surprised his enemies. Sinde, Bhosle, Holkar and other Maratha leaders would not tolerate the surrender of national independence by the idiotic *Pesva*. They prepared to sink their differences and make a common cause to resist the British threat. Wellesley's diplomacy however succeed in keeping alive the rift between Sinde and Holkar. In two swift campaigns very skilfully organized the armies of Sinde and Holkar were defeated and dispersed and the Maratha confederacy ceased to exist. The Maratha chiefs were left in a sullen mood but were helpless against the tide of the new forces. Their attempt to revive the on-federacy was effectively defeated by Hastings fifteen years later when the *Pesva* was sent into exile, his kingdom annexed and Sinde and Holkar accepted the position of tributary princes.