MAHARASHTRA STATE
GAZETTEERS

Government of Maharashtra

SATARA DISTRICT
(REVISED EDITION)

BOMBAY
DIRECTORATE OF GOVERNMENT PRINTING, STATIONARY
AND PUBLICATION, MAHARASHTRA STATE
1963
PROLOGUE

I am very glad to bring out the e-Book Edition (CD version) of the Satara District Gazetteer published by the Gazetteers Department. This CD version is a part of a scheme of preparing compact discs of earlier published District Gazetteers.

Satara District Gazetteer was published in 1963. It contains authentic and useful information on several aspects of the district and is considered to be of great value to administrators, scholars and general readers. The copies of this edition are now out of stock. Considering its utility, therefore, need was felt to preserve this treasure of knowledge. In this age of modernization, information and technology have become key words. To keep pace with the changing need of hour, I have decided to bring out CD version of this edition with little statistical supplementary and some photographs. It is also made available on the website of the state government www.maharashtra.gov.in. I am sure, scholars and studious persons across the world will find this CD immensely beneficial.

I am thankful to the Honourable Minister, Shri. Ashokrao Chavan (Industries and Mines, Cultural Affairs and Protocol), and the Minister of State, Shri. Rana Jagjitsinh Patil (Agriculture, Industries and Cultural Affairs), Shri. Bhushan Gagriani (Secretary, Cultural Affairs), Government of Maharashtra for being constant source of inspiration.

Place: Mumbai
Date: 25th December, 2006

DR. ARUNCHANDRA S. PATHAK
Executive Editor and Secretary
PREFACE

THE GAZETTEER of the Bombay Presidency was originally compiled between 1874 and 1884, though the actual publication of the volumes was spread over a period of 27 years. The Satara District Gazetteer was published in 1885. The core of the district was supplied by the Satara principality after its lapse in the year 1848. Several boundary and sub-divisional adjustments were later on made with the neighbouring districts and with the lands of the neighbouring Indian Princes. With the merger of the Princes' territories in 1947, the district was enlarged and divided into North Satara and South Satara. In 1960, the North Satara reverted to its original name Satara, and South Satara was designated as Sangli district. This Volume deals with the present Satara district.

This revised edition has been prepared under the orders of the Government of Maharashtra by an Editorial Board, specially created for that purpose in 1949. The following are the present members of the Editorial Board:—

Chief Secretary to Government (Shri N. T. Mone, I.C.S.).

Dr. S. G. Panandikar, retired Principal, Sydenham College of Commerce and Economics, Bombay.

Mahamahopadhyaya Dr. V. V. Mirashi, Nagpur.

Dr. S. M. Katre, Director, Deccan College Post-Graduate and Research Institute, Poona.

Shri S. L. Karandikar, Poona.

Director of Archives, Bombay (Dr. P. M. Joshi).

Executive Editor and Secretary (Shri P. Setu Madhava Rao, M.A., I.A.S.).

The Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961, enacted with the object of decentralization of democracy and administration, came into effect in the district, as in all the districts of Maharashtra, from 1st May 1962. As the manuscript of this volume was already in the press the salient features and the changes that have emerged with the introduction of the Act have been given at the end of the volume as an appendix.

Diacritical marks to explain the pronunciation of names of places and of words in Indian languages have been used only in three chapters, namely, Chapter 2—History, Chapter 3—People and Chapter 19—Places of Interest and also in the Directory of Villages and Towns. In other chapters the current spellings have been retained. A key to the diacritical marks used is given at page-939.

This office has published so far (1) Poona, (2) Dharwar, (3) Kolhapur, (4) Jalgaon, and (5) Ratnagiri District Gazetteers. Of these, the press copy of Poona Volume was prepared under the direction of Prof. D. G. Karve, the first Executive Editor and Secretary (1949-52), Dharwar Volume was published by Prof. M. R. Palande (1952-1960), who succeeded Prof. Karve as Executive Editor and Secretary. Much of the compilation of Kolhapur, Jalgaon and Ratnagiri Volumes was done under the direction of Prof. Palande. However the volumes were published by the present Executive Editor and Secretary who took charge on 1st May 1960.
My thanks are due to Dr. B. G. Kunte, M.A., Ph.D., Assistant Editor, Shri K V. Yohannan, B.A., LL.B., Superintendent, Prof. A. N. Weling, M.A., Sarvashri D. C. Deo, M.A., and K. K. Chaudhari, M.A., Research Assistants and other members of the staff for their valuable assistance in the preparation of this volume.

My thanks are also due to the Director, Government Printing, Stationery and Publications, Bombay, and the Manager, Government Central Press, Bombay, for the execution of printing work of this Volume.

BOMBAY: P. SETU MADHAVA RAO,
May 1963. Executive Editor and Secretary.
ABOUT SATARA

Satara, the seat of Chhatrapati dynasty of Maharashtra, is the highest sugar-producing district in the State, catering to the 12 cooperative sugar factories functioning in its jurisdiction. The district has taken a quantum leap in dairy production and development. The massive Koyna hydroelectric project or the dams at Dhom, Kanheri, Urmodi and Tarali have made the district fertile though some talukas are still awaiting irrigation. Satara is called the District of Power due to a chain of windmills, which dot its mountain ranges. It has won laurels at the national level for attaining high adult literacy. Mahableshwar is a hill station that is still unparalleled owing to its pristine beauty and restorative weather. No wonder, this is the first choice of tourists. Maharashtra’s doyen Y.B.Chavan made this district well known.

1. District
Satara

2. Area
10475 sq. kms.

3. Sub-divisions
4 (Satara, Phaltan, Wai, Karad)

4. Talukas
11 (Satara, Karad, Wai, Mahableshwar, Phaltan, Mann, Khatav, Javli, Koregaon, Patan and Khandala)

5. Distance from Mumbai
250 kms.

6. Means of Transport
Main Airport-Karad
Railway Stations -Satara, Karad, etc.

7. Population
Total-27,96,906
Male-14,02,301
Female-13,94,605

8. Literacy
Per cent-78.52
Total-19,20,176
Male-10,75,247
Female-8,44,929

9. Area under Irrigation
1,89,000 hectares

10. Irrigation Projects
Major-10
Medium-13
Minor-80

Imp. Projs.-6
1. Veer
2. Krishna-Dhom
3. Krishna Kanher
4. Urmodi
5. Ghom Balakwadi
6. Koyna

11. Industries
Big and Medium-2842

12. Languages/Dialects
Marathi

13. Folk-Arts
Lavani, Gondhli, Dhangar songs

14. Weather
Temperature-
Max.-37.5 Deg.C.
Min.-11.6 Deg. C.
Rainfall- 2643 mm (Average)

15. Main Crops
Sugarcane, jowar, vegetables

16. Area under Horticulture
33000 hect.

17. Health Infrastructure
PHCs-71
Rural Hosp.-10
Dist. Hosp.-1
Big Hosp.-1

Contents
18. Tourist Places
Mahableshwar, Panchgani, Koynanagar

19. Educational Institutions
Colleges - 48
Prim. Schools - 2579
Sec. Schools – 523

SOURCE: CENSUS OF INDIA 2001
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

As EARLY AS 1843 an attempt was made to arrange for the preparation of Statistical Accounts of the different districts of the Bombay Presidency. The following extract [Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency, Vol. I, Part I (History of Gujarat), pp. iii and iv.] will be found interesting as giving an idea of the intention of those who desired to have such Accounts compiled: —

Government called on the Revenue Commissioner to obtain from all the Collectors as part of their next Annual Report, the fullest available information regarding their districts .......Government remarked that, as Collectors and their Assistants during the large portion of the year moved about the district in constant and intimate communication with all classes, they possessed advantages which no other public officers enjoyed of acquiring a full knowledge of the condition of the country, the causes of progress or retrogradation, the good measures which require to be fostered and extended, the evil measures which call for abandonment, the defects in existing institutions which require to be remedied, and the nature of the remedies to be applied. Collectors also, it was observed, have an opportunity of judging of the effect of British rule on the condition and character of the people, and their caste prejudices, and on their superstitious observances. They can trace any alteration for the better or worse in dwellings, clothing and diet, and can observe the use of improved implements of husbandry or other crafts, the habits of locomotion, the state of education, particularly among the higher classes whose decaying means and energy under our most levelling system compared with that of preceding governments will attract their attention. Finally they can learn how far existing village institutions are effectual to their end, and may be made available for self-government and in the management of local taxation for local purposes.

"In obedience to these orders, reports were received from the Collectors of Ahmedabad, Broach, Kaira, Thana and Khandesh. Some of the reports contained much interesting information. These five northern reports were practically the only result of the Circular Letter of 1843."

The matter does not seem to have been pursued any further.

In October 1867, the Secretary of State for India desired the Bombay Government to take concrete steps for the compilation of a Gazetteer of the Presidency on the model of the Gazetteer prepared during that year for the Central Provinces. The Government of Bombay then requested some of its responsible officials to submit a scheme for carrying into effect the orders of Secretary of State, and in 1868, appointed the Bombay Gazetteer Committee to supervise and direct the preparation of the Gazetteer. After a few organizational experiments the responsibility was finally entrusted to Mr. James M. Campbell of the Bombay Civil Service, who commenced the compilation in 1874 and completed the series in 1884. The actual publication, however, of these volumes was spread over a period of 27 years between 1877 and 1904 in which year the last General Index volume was published.

Though a Gezetteer literally means only a geographical index or a geographical dictionary, the scope of this particular compilation was much wider. It included not only a description of the physical and natural features of a region but also a broad narrative of the social, political, economic and cultural life of the people living in that region. The purpose which the Gazetteer was intended to serve was made clear in the following remarks of Sir William Hunter, Director-General of Statistics to the Government of India, when his opinion was sought on a draft article on Dharwar District in 1871. He said—

"My own conception of the work is that, in return for a couple of days' reading, the Account should give a new Collector, a comprehensive, and, at the same time, a distinct idea of the district
which he has been sent to administer. Mere reading can never supersede practical experience in the district administration. But a succinct and well conceived district account is capable of antedating the acquisition of such personal experience by many months and of both facilitating and systematising a Collector's personal enquiries............But in all cases a District Account besides dealing with local specialities should furnish a historical narration of its revenue and expenditure since it passed under the British rule, of the sums which we have taken from it in taxes, and of the amount which we have returned to it in the protection of property and person and the other charges of civil Government.” [Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, Vol. I, Part I (History of Gujarat), p. vii.]

The Gazetteer was thus intended to give a complete picture of the district to men who were entire strangers to India and its people but who as members of the ruling race carried on their shoulders the responsibility of conducting its administration.

The Gazetteer had 27 Volumes, some split up into two or three Parts, making a total of 35 books including the General Index which was published in 1904. Some of the Volumes were of a general nature and were not confined to the limits of a particular district. For example, Volume I dealt with history and was split up into two Parts, one dealing with Gujarat and the other with Konkan, Dekhan and Southern Maratha Country; Volume IX was devoted to the Population of Gujarat and contained two parts, one describing Hindus and the other Mussalmans and Parsis, but there was no corresponding Volume devoted to the population of Maharashtra or Karnatak; Volume XXV gave an account of the Botany of the area covered in the whole Presidency. The remaining volumes dealt with various districts of the Presidency and with what were then known as Native States attached to the Bombay Presidency. Some of the District Volumes had two or three parts, for example, those of Thana, Kanara, Poona and Bombay. On the other hand, there was only one combined volume for some districts, as for example, Surat and Broach, and Kaira and Panch Mahals.

The scheme of the contents was more or less the same for all the District Volumes though the accounts of particular items varied considerably from district to district. Information was collected from Government offices and, in respect of social and religious practices, from responsible citizens. Eminent scholars, experts and administrators contributed articles on special subjects.

This Gazetteer compiled over eighty years ago had long become scarce and entirely out of print. It contained authentic and useful information on several aspects of life in a district and was considered to be of great value to the administrator, and scholar and the general reader. There was a general desire that there should be a new and revised edition of this monumental work. The then Government of Bombay, therefore, decided that the old Gazetteer should be revised and republished, and entrusted the work of revision to an Editorial Board specially created for that purpose in 1949. This new edition has been prepared under the direction of that Editorial Board. In view of the reorganization of States in 1956 and the coming into existence of the State of Maharashtra in 1960, areas for which no District Gazetteer had previously been compiled will be taken up and new District Gazetteers will be compiled in accordance with the common pattern.

In the nature of things, after a lapse of over 80 years after their publication, most of the statistical information contained in the old Gazetteer had become entirely out of date and had to be dropped altogether. In this edition an attempt has been made to give an idea of the latest developments, whether in regard to the administrative structure or the economic set-up or in regard to social, religious and cultural trends. There are portions in the old Gazetteer bearing on archaeology and history which have the impress of profound scholarship and learning and their worth has not diminished by the mere passage of time. Even in their case, however, some

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restatement is occasionally, necessary in view of later investigations and new archaeological discoveries by scholars, and an attempt has been made to incorporate in this edition, the results of such subsequent research. The revision of old Volumes has, in fact, meant an entire rewriting of most of the chapters and sections. In doing so, statistical and other information was obtained from the relevant Departments of Government, and articles on certain specialised subjects were obtained from competent scholars.

In this dynamic world, circumstances and facts of life change, and so do national requirements and social values. Such significant changes have taken place in India as in other countries during the last half a century, and more so after the advent of Independence in 1947. The general scheme and contents of this revised series of the Gazetteers have been adapted to the needs of altered conditions. There is inevitably some shift in emphasis in the presentation and interpretation of certain phenomena. For example, the weighted importance given to caste and community in the old Gazetteer cannot obviously accord with the ideological concepts of a secular democracy, though much of that data may have considerable interest from the functional, sociological or cultural point of view. What is necessary is a change in perspective in presenting that account so that it could be viewed against the background of a broad nationalism and the synthesis of a larger social life. It is also necessary to abridge and even to eliminate, elaborate details about customs and practices which no longer obtain on any extensive scale or which are too insignificant to need any elaboration. In the revised Gazetteer, therefore, only a general outline of the practices and customs of the main sections of the population has been given.

An important addition to the District Volume in this edition is the Directory of Villages and Towns given at the end which contains, in a tabulated form, useful information about every village and town in the district. The district map given in this edition is also fairly large and up-to-date.

The revised Gazetteers are published in two series:—

1. The General Series.—This comprises Volumes on subjects which can best be treated for the State as a whole and not for the smaller area of a district. As at present planned, they will deal with Physical Features, People and Their Culture, History, Language and Literature, Botany, and Public Administration.

2. The District Series.—This contains one Volume for every district of the Maharashtra State. The information given in all Volumes will follow the same pattern, and the table of contents will more; or less be the same for all districts.

It was originally thought feasible to number the district volumes in the alphabetical order in the District Series and accordingly the Poona Volume which was the first revised District Gazetteer to be compiled and published by the Board (in 1954), was numbered as Volume XX. However, the arrangement was not found to be suitable and it was, therefore, subsequently decided not to give any number to any volume.

In the preparation of this volume, the Board has received every assistance from the Gazetteers Unit, Ministry of Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs, Government of India. A draft copy of this volume was sent to the Gazetteers Unit and was returned with valuable suggestions which have been incorporated in the volume. The Government of India gives a grant-in-aid of Rs. 6,000 per volume towards the cost of compilation and 40 per cent, of the actual printing charges.

BOMBAY: P. SETU MADHAVA RAO,
May 1963. Executive Editor and Secretary.
HISTORY

EARLY HISTORY

[The Section on Early History was contributed by Dr. M. D. Paradkar, M.A., Ph.D., Head of the Sanskrit Department, M. M. College of Arts, Bombay-57. The Sections from Muslim Rule onwards were contributed by Prof. R. V. Oturkar, M.A., Poona.]

THE OLDEST KNOWN PLACE IN THE SATARA DISTRICT IS PROBABLY KARAD, styled as Karhakada in the inscriptions of about 200 B.C. These inscriptions have recorded gifts of pillars by Karad pilgrims at the Bharhut Stupa near Jabalpur in the Madhya Pradesh [Cunningham's Stupa of Bharhut, 135, 138, 139. Karad gives its names to the Karada Brahmins found in large numbers even now in the district.]. This is confirmed by a group of Buddhist caves found at a distance of about three miles south-west of Karad, one of which is associated with an inscription dating about the first century after Christ [Fergusson and Burgess' Cave Temple, 211-217: Archaeological Survey of Western India IV 60.]. Caves at Shirval and Wai in Javli also indicate Buddhist settlements [Besides these caves, there are groups of eaves and cells of Buddhist or Brahmanical origin at Bhosa in Tasgaon, at Malavadi and Kundal in Khanapur, at Patan in Patan, and at Pateshwal in Satara; Dr. Burgess' Antiquarian list 58-59.]. Wai is locally believed to be Viratanagar where Pandavas lived in the thirteenth year of their exile [Mahabharata Sabhaparva 70-9 "nagarim Sanjayantimca pasandam Karahatakam"]. From early times Mahabaleshvar at the source of Krsna is known as a holy place [Journal of Bombay Branch Royal Asiatic Society, X, 1, 18.].

It is true that the countries of the Deccan are mentioned in the Cylonese Chronicle Mahavamsa of the missions sent after the third Buddhist in 16th year of Ashoka's reign for the propagation of Dhamma in different countries. Here one Maharakkhita [The missionary who was sent to Maharashtra was called Mahadharmarakshita (The Age of Imperial Unity, p. 54).] is reported to have been sent to the Maratha country (Dakshinapath) which can be safely inferred as forming a part of Ashokan empire. As ancient Buddhist caves at Karad are found, the Maratha country referred to above appears to have included Satara district in it.

SATVAHANAS

The Mauryan empire in the Deccan was followed by the rules of Satavahanas. Two coins of Satavahana, the progenitor of the reign, are found at Hyderabad in 1945. Another coin of this very kine. found at Kondapur has made the inference possible that these Satavahanas belonged to Marathvada having their capital at Pratishtha i.e. modern Paithan. These kings ruled over entire Maharashtra from 230 B.C. to 250 A.D.Pauranik accounts mentioned Shishuka to be the first King, whose proper name appears to be Simuka, who was succeeded by Krsna, his brother (207-189 B.C.) as Satakarni. Simuka's son, was too young at that lime. Simuka and Krsna appear to have been separated from Satavahana by one or two generations. After Krsna Satakarni I, whose figure was sculptured in relieve at Naneghat along with the figures of his father Simuka, queen Naganika and three princesses. He conquered western Malva and an inscription of the queen records the performance of great sacrifices and huge fees paid to the priests on the occasion. Satakarni was followed by Vedisri who also like his father became known as the Lord of Dakshinapath. The illustrious author of Gathasaptasati namely Hala also belongs to the same race. The expansion of Satavahanas received a check from the Sakas. Bhumaka is the earliest of them, and Nahapana is known to be a great conqueror, whose rule extended over parts of southern Maharashtra, including Satara district.
The Satavahana power revived under the rule of Gautami-putra Satakarni (80-140 A.D.) [106-130 A. D. (The Age of Imperial Unity, p. 200).], who overthrew Nahapana (119-125 A.D.) and is deservedly known as the destroyer of Shakas, Yavanas and Pahalavas [A period of a century and a half intervened between the reign of Satakarni I (end of the first century B. C.) and that of Gautami-pntra Satakarni (beginning of the second century A. D.). (The Age of Imperial Unity, p. 200).]. In 1864, a few inscriptions, found in the caves of Nasik, refer to the 18th and 24th year of his reign. Among these caves, cave No. 3 contains one more inscription of Satakarni's mother engraved in the reign of Pulumayi, her grand-son. This inscription is important as it gives an adequate idea of the vast Satavahana empire, in the 2nd Century A.D. Coins of Pulumayi II, who reigned for twenty-four years, have been found in Godavari and Guntur districts. The struggle with Shakas was renewed and Pulumayi II recovered some of the provinces lost by his predecessors. Inscriptions, belonging to his reign, are found at Kanheri and Nasik. From inscriptional records, Shree Yajna appears to be the last Satavahana king, who retained control of the western as well as eastern provinces. Karna, Kumbha and Rudrasatakarni ruled over the eastern Deccan. Much is not known about the downfall of this dynasty.

The Satavahana rule was followed by the Chutus in Maharashtra and Kuntala (Sangli) [A 9th century tradition says that Virakuricha, an early Pallava king of great fame seized the insignia of royalty together with the daughter of the Naga King. K. A. N. Sastri thinks that this may be an echo of the Pallava conquest of the Chutus. (K. A. N. Sastri: History of South India, pp. 97-98).] A circular coin, made up of lead was found at Kondapur in 1941"[Dr. V. V. Mirashi, Samshodhan Muktavali, Part III, pages 86-87.]. This coin belongs to King Mana, the son of Bharadvaja, belonging to the Chutu race. The word Sakamanachutukukulasya and the signs of thunder-bolt and arrow, found on the coin indicate the Shaka race. He mentions himself to be the great general which makes him a former vassal of Satavahanas, who appeals to have risen to power after having overthrown them.

CHALUKYAS

Inscribed stones and copper plates, found in the neighbouring districts of Ratnagiri and Belganv as well as the state of Kolhapur, inform us that Satara and southern Maharashtra were held by Chalukyas of Badami between 550 and 753 A.D. The Aihole inscription of Chalukyas, speaks of Jayasimha, who defeated the early Rashtrakutas and formed his kingdom. The grand-son of Jayasimha, Pulkeshin I, performed Ashvamedha, assumed the title Satyashraya and Prithivivallabha and made Vatapi, his capital. After his death in 567 A.D. his son Kiritvarman I came to the throne and subjugated Kadambas as well as Mauryas. Pulkeshin II is the most illustrious ruler, who brought all the kingdoms in the southern India under his control (610-620 A.D.). Copper plates of Pulkeshln II speak of him as the king of three Maharashtras (Vidarbha, Maharashtra and Kuntala) consisting of 99,000 villages. He also prevented Harshavardhan from penetrating the south by inflicting a decisive defeat on him on the bank of Narmada. The Chinese traveller Hieuentang who visited his capital in 639 A.D., has spoken very highly of his administrative and military ability. Pulkeshin's reign came to a tragic end in 642, as Narasimhvarman I of Kanchi attacked Badami and ruined it [In his victory over PULKESHI Narasinhavarman was helped by his brothers and sons. One of the brothers was the Governor of Satara and Vengi (M. Rama Rao-Glimpses of Deccan History, p. 38.)] Vikramaditya I, his son, however averted his defeat and continued to rule up to 680 A.D. His son Vinayaditya turned out to be a generous ruler as is indicated by grants, given by him in the years 689, 691, 694. Vinayaditya was followed by Vijayaditya, who was accidentally caught by the Pahalavas but managed to escape and re-established his rule over the country. Vikramaditya II, his son, had a short reign of fourteen years from 733-747 A.D. and was succeeded by Kiritvarman II, whose copper-plate is available. He seems to have ruled up to 753 A. D. Dantidurga, one of the vassals of Chalukyas defeated the Pahalavas and was ultimately successful.
in snatching away the kingdom from the hands of the Chalukyas, before. January 754 A.D. when the Samangad plates were issued. These plates inform that the Chalukya emperor was defeated merely by the frown without any show of arms [सामगड़गम गृहीत नियात शक्ति - - - सहसा जिगाय]. This probably indicates the overthrow of Chalukya emperor by treachery. Kirtivarman continued to hold his sway even after the defeat, as in 757 A.D. he is known to have encamped his army at a village on the northern bank of Bhima [Vakkeri plates of Kirtivarman II, E.I., V.P.202.] As no other record of Chalukyas later than this date is available, it would be safe to infer that their overthrow was soon completed by Rashtrakutas. In fact the records of later Chalukyas themselves clearly state that the glory of Chalukyas set with Kirtivarman II [तद्भवो विक्रमादित्यः कीर्तिवर्मान् तदात्माः | येन चालुक्यराज्यश्री रत्नारायिन्य भूर्दभूमि[[]]. Recently four copper-plates found at Satara, Kolhapur, Gokak and Coi respectively indicate that the early Rashtrakuta race was ruling at Manpur in southern Maharashtra from 4th century A.D. One of these copper-plates, styles the race as Rashtrakuta and mentions the grant of a village known as Undikavatika by the King Abhimanyu. Another copper-plate found near Kolhapur is published in the annual reports (1929) of the archaeological department of Mysore State. This copper-plate records the grant of the village Pandurangapalli, along with places at Kamyaka and Javal on the bank of Anne by a king called Avidheya. The third copper-plate was found on the banks of Bhima at Hinganiberadi and is edited firstly by late P.M. Chandorkar and later on by Dr. M.G. Dikshit. In this copper-plate we hear of a gift of a village to a Brahman by Mahadev Shyavalahgi, the wife of Devraj and the mother of Rashtrakuta king Vibhuraja alias Mana. This copper-plate was given in the third year of Vibhuraja’s reign.

Rashtrakutas.

The fourth one was found at Dhond, which clearly refers to the race Rashtrakuta. As all plates are found in southern Maharashtra it is safe to infer that Rashtrakuta Mananka was ruling over Satara, Kolhapur and Sholapur. The capital Manapur is the modern Mana of Satara district. In the Pandurangapalli copper-plate Mananka is said to rule over the Kuntalas. The river Anne appears to be identical with the modern Yenna or Vena, flowing into Krsna. Javala, mentioned here, is identical with modern Javli. On the basis of the evidenc of these copper-plates attributed uniformly to the 4th and 5th century A.D., the genealogy of the early Rashtrakutas can be constructed as follows:—

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   Mananka (375-400 A.D.)
    |
   Devraja (400-425 A.D.)
    |
   Mana or Vibhuraja Avidheya Bhavishya
    (425-447 A.D.) (447-455 A.D.) (455-470 A.D.)
    |
   Abhimanyu (470-490 A.D.)
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Panduragpalli copper-plate mentions the victory of Mananka over the provinces of Ashmaka and Vidharbha. Inscription in cave No. 16 at Ajanta, speaks of the defeat of the Lord of Kuhtalas at the hands of Vindhyasena, the grandson of Vakataka Pravarsena. Rashtrakutas of Manpura and Vakatas of Vatsagulma were rulers of adjacent territories, and hence scuffles between them should have been inevitable as Vindhyasena is attributed to 360-400 A.D. The two can be contemporaries. Devaraj who seems to have come to the throne at the beginning of the 5th century A.D., is very probably referred to as the Lord of Kuntalas comparable to India and referred

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to in one of the verses of Kuntalesvar dautya attributed to Kalidasa [विविहवतभारः कुंतलानामधीशः ||]. Vakatakas and Rashtrakutas owed their allegiance to Chandra-gupta II, who assumed the title of Vikramaditya. This might have given a rise to a temporary peace between the two races. The Vakataka copper plates speak of the marriage of the king Narendrasena with a Kuntala princess, named Ajjhitbhattacharika, who might have belonged to the Rashtrakuta race. With the rise of Vakataka king Harishena, the enmity between the two appears to have been revived as Ajanta inscription records the defeat of the lord of Kuntalas at the hands of Harishena. But this defeat did not overthrow the Rashtrakuta race. In fact after Harishena, the Vakataka race became extinct and Rashtrakutas rose to power. A copper plate of Rashtrakuta king Dejjamaharaja, found at Gokak in Belgaum district (E.I. P 21 p. 289) seems to have been given in the year 532-533 A.D. After this, till Govinda I, much is not known. In the Aihole copper plate of 634 A.D. victory of Pulakeshin II over a king Appayika, with the help of Rashtrakuta king Govinda, is recorded. The above inscription is silent regarding the advantage, that the king Govinda should have secured from this alliance.

Inscriptional records of the predecessors of Dahtidurga are not available. It is probable that he was preceded by five generations.

Dantivamian (620 to 630 A.D.).
Indra I (630 to 650 A.D.).
Govinda I (650 to 670 A.D.).
Karka I (670 to 690 A.D.).
Indra II (690 to 710 A.D.).
Dantidurea (710 to 755 A.D.).

Samshodhana Muktavali — Part 3 pp. 143 and 144. The dates here are arrived at on the basis of conjecture according to the author.] Information about Dantidurga is available from Samangad plates dated 754 A.D. and the fragmentary Ellora Dashavatara cave inscription. The latter speaks of his victory over the rulers of Lata, Malva and Badami and refers to his Nrpatimahadana in Ujjayini which is confirmed by Sanjan plates of Amoghavarsa I. Dantidurga's victory over Kirtivarman II, referred to above, enabled him to occupy Khandesh, Nasik, Poona, Satara and Kolhapur districts as is clear from the first spot and the villages mentioned in the Samangad plates. In short, Dantidurga with his political insight and organising capacity, enlarged his kingdom including Gujarat, Khandesh, Berar and northern Maharashtra. Dantidurga was succeeded by his uncle Krishna I, probably because he left no male issue. He completed the Chalukya overthrow and succeeded in his offensive expedition against Gangawadi [Telegaon plates at Manne in Mysore State (Now Andhra Pradesh)—E.I. XIII, p. 275 ff.]. Chalukyas of Vengi were also subjugated by him in the next expedition carried under Yuvaraja Govinda. Krishna I was succeeded by his eldest son Govinda Prabhutavarsa Vikramavaloka, soon after 772 A.D. He gave himself to a life of pleasure and vice immediately after his accession (Karad plates of Krishna III—Ed. IV pp. 278ff as well as Kharda plates of Karka I 9 A-XII pp. 263ff). This event must have taken place alter 779 A.D. as Dhulia plates of Govinda II in the year speak of Dhuva as his subordinate. Dhrurva, one of the ablest of the Rashtrakuta rulers, not only re-established Rashtrakuta power in the south but carried on a successful expedition in Northern India and made the Rashtrakutas an all-India power. Govinda III who succeeded Dhuva was not the eldest son; but proved to be the ablest ruler in the race. He is compared to Partha in the Baroda plates of his nephew Karka. In fact all territories between the Himalayas and Cape Camorin were conquered by his victorious armies. The statement of Vani-Dindori plates that with Govinda III, the Rashtrakuta dynasty became invincible.
to the enemies is only a statement of fact. During the long reign of his son namely Amoghavarsha I, the kingdom was weakened by internal struggles. He was a lover of peace and literature. He is taken to be the author or inspirer of Kavirajamarga, the earliest known work on poetics in Kannada. Sanjan plates (V. 44) speak of the sacrifice of his finger by Amoghavarsha to Goddess Mahalakshmi thus bearing evidence to his tendency to practise religion. His leanings towards Jainism are also borne out by contemporary records. The concluding verse of Prashnottarimalika informs that its author Amoghavarsha had abdicated due to being convinced of the futility of life. Sanjan plates confirm this. There is a discrepancy between the Saunadatti record of Prthivivarma (J.B.R.R.A.S. x P. 200) speaking of the rule of Krshna II ruling in 875 A.D. and the Kancheri record (I. A. XIII p. 135) referring to Amoghavarsha as a king in 877 A.D. This can be removed by saying that during the concluding years of his reign Amoghavarsha was only a theoretical sovereign; his son Krishna was the de facto ruler. This is confirmed by Sanjan plates issued in 861 A.D. that speak of his abdication more than once. Krishna II who was able to come to the throne without any war of succession in about 880 A.D., had to wage wars with most of his neighbours. On the south he had to fight with the Gangas and the Nolambas, on the east with the Vengi Chalukyas and on the north with Gujarat Rashtrakutas and Gujar Pratiharas. Krshna II cannot be considered an able and gifted ruler. He defeated and destroyed the petty Gujarat branch; but was worsted by Chalukya Bhima or Vembali. With difficulty he maintained his own against Bhoja I of Gurjara-Pratihara dynasty and Mahendrapala of Kananj. Like his father, he was a Jaina having for his preceptor Gunabhadr the famous Jaina author of the last five chapters of Adipurana. Krshna II was succeeded by Indra III, his grandson, who had a short but brilliant career. He defeated the Paramara Chief Upendraraja and rightly taking advantage of the troubles of succession at Kananj after the death of Mahendrapala in 908 A.D., carried out a successful campaign in Northern India finally capturing Kananj. He also succeeded in shattering the prestige of Imperial Pratiharas. India died in 917 A. D. and was succeeded by his eldest son Amoghavarsha II who had a very short reign of about a year. The Bhadan plates of Parajita Silahara as well as Deoli and Karad plates of Krshna II hear testimony to his rule. The omission in the Sangli plates of Govinda IV of his name and the mention there, that Govinda IV mediated upon the feat of India Nityavarsha and not upon those of Amoghavarsha show that the two brothers were not on good terms. This must have come in the way of the latter. Govinda IV who came to the throne in 918, was the very essence of love and its pleasures as Deoli and Karad plates describe. These plates speak of his having taken to evil ways, which, by no means, is unbelievable. Bhima II of the Eastern Chalukya dynasty claims to have defeated a great army sent by King Govinda [Epigraphica Indica VIII, p. 1127.]. This Govinda is certainly Govinda IV. This reverse must have hastened his fall. The manner of his losing his kingdom is described by Pampa in his Vikramarj-unavijaya where he praises his patron Arikesarin II under the title of Arjuna. Although this has to be accepted with a grain of salt, it is clear from the account that his feudatories rebelled against Govinda and offered the crown to his uncle Amoghavarsha III. Deoli and Karad plates confirm the version of Pampa.

The reign of Amoghavarsha III commenced in 935 A.D. and must have ended after about 4 years only as Krshna III was already upon the throne in May 940 A.D. when the Deoli plates were issued by him. Amoghavarsha III seems to have been a man of religious fervour; the actual administration during these four years also, was very probably in the hands of the crowned prince Krshna. As a Yuvaraja, he defeated the Chech's in the north [This conclusion was arrived at by the late Dr. A. S. Altekar after analysing the Deoli plates. For the details see his work. "The Rashtrakutas and their times" pp. 112-144. Cf. Srijarsdeva it Khotrigadevalaksmin Jagraha yo Yudhi..... Epigraphica Indica, I, p. 235.). An inscription found at Jura in the Maihar slate of the Bagalkhand Agency, eulogizes Krsna III in Kannada. This confirms his conquest of Chitrakuta and Kananjara. Amoghavarsha III died some time after the 3rd of December 939 and before May 940 A.D. Krshna III, who must have: peacefully ascended to the throne some time in December 939 A.D., invaded the Chola kingdom during the 3rd year of his reign. The state in the Karad plates regarding the defeat of the Pandyas and the Kerajas at the hands of Krshna III gets corroboration
from Somadeva who completed his work Yashatilaka about two months later than the issue of the Karad plates of Krishna III i.e. in May 959 A.D. Jura inscription refers to Krishnas conquest of Kanchi and Tanjora. These conquests in the south, affected his position in the north. Alienating the sympathies of his Chedi relatives was also responsible for these reverses during the latter part of his reign. Any way Krishnas conquest completed his mastery over the whole of the country towards the south of the Narmada by handing over the throne of Venzi to his ally. An inscription from Kollagallu, dated Sunday, the 6th day of the bright half of Kshaya Phalgun of Saka 889 A.D. (17th February 968 A.D.) mentions the death of this able monarch during the year and speaks of Khottigas succession. In the reign of this king, the decline of the Rashtrakuta power set in. Udaipur prasnsti of the kings of Malya distinctly mentions the capture of royal glory and splendour of Khottigadeva by Shriharsha. This is corroborated by Dhanapala, the author of Paiyalacchi, who in V. 276 mentions that the work was written in Dhara in Vikrama Samvat 1029 (i.e. 972-73 A.D.) when Manyakheta, the Rashtrakuta capital was sacked by the King of Malva. Khottiga was alive in 972 A.D. when this event took place. He seems to have met his death in the war with the Paramaras as his successor is found issuing the Karad plates [Epigraphica Indica XII, p. 263.] in September of the same year. Thus the succession of Karka II can be placed in the Middle of 972 A.D. He was on the throne for hardly eighteen months, when he was defeated and ousted from the throne by Taila II, a nephew of Yuvaraja II, the reigning Chedi monarch. According to the inscription [Indian Antiquary XXI, p. 167.]of Vikramaditya VI, the Saka year in which the overthrow of the Rashtrakutas took place was Srimukha i.e. Saka 895: sometime between March 973 and March 974 A.D.; but as the latest known date [Gundur inscription, Indian Antiquary XII, p. 272 (Asadha month).] of Karka is July 973, it is safe to assume that his defeat must have taken place in the autumn or winter of 973 A.D. The fall of the Rashtrakuta empire must be considered to be dramatic.

VISHNUKUNDINS

Before passing on to the reign of Taila II of later Chalukyas over Satara, a reference to the Vishnukundins from Andhra is necessary. These Vishnukundins [For details see the article of Prachin Maharashtratil Vishnukundi Rajavat (प्राचीन महाराष्ट्रातील विष्नुकूंडी राजवट) from Sanshodhanamuktavali Part II (संशोधनमुक्तावलि सर दुसरा) Of Maha Mahopadhaya Dr. V. V. Mirashi.] appear to have hailed from Vishnukonda, a place at a distance of fifty miles to the south of the river Krishna in Andhra Pradesh. This place even now retains fragmentary remains and a fort, in ruined condition. Vikramamahendra, the progenitor of this race seems to have flourished somewhere in 450 A.D. His son, Govinda Varma has been the contemporary of the illustrious Vakataka king Harisena who after having conquered the Andhra country [Inscription from Ajanta Cave No. 16.] appears to have put Govindavarma on the throne. Govindavarma was the first among the Vishnukundins to assume the title Maharaja, indicative of his rule over the territory. The fact that Madhavavarma I, his son, has married a Vakataka princess, is envisaged by inscriptions. He appears to have helped Harisenas grandson in getting control over Vidarbha. After Harisena, the Vakataka empire, however, suffered from a downfall, ultimately helping this scion of the Vishnukundins in establishing his rule over southern Maharashtra and Kuntala. Two copper-plates of Madhavavarma have been found. Copper-plates of his descendants also give good information about him. He was a champion of Vedic religion and distinguished himself by performing 11 Ashavamedha sacrifices, certainly a rare feat among ancient kings of his land. Along with Andhra, Kuntala and southern Maharashtra, he appears to have brought under his thumb the southern Kosalas i.e. modern Chhattisgarh as is clear from the title in one of his Copper-plates, viz. ‘trivaranaagarbahanagataparanayuvatinandana’ or trivaranaagarbahanagataparam-yuvatijamviharanarati’. The king of Trivaranaagara is identical with Tivaradeva whose copper-plates have been found in Rajim and Phulzar near Chhattisgarh. Madhavavarma had defeated him. Another copper-plate found at Khanapur in Sangli district [Published by Shri Y. R. Gupte in the Quarterly Volume VIII, p. 163, Bharat Itihasa Samshodhaka Mandal (V 8, p. 163).] refers to the gift of a
village, on the bank of Krshna-venna named Ratturak along with the houses in the vicinity, to a Brahman on the full-moon day in the month of Vaishakha by the king Madhavavarman. The copper-plate was attributed to the 5th or 6th century A.D. on the basis of calligraphic evidence. This has also been finally attributed to this king Madhavavarma of Vishnu-kundins [Prachin maharashtra-tral visnu-kundin rajavat Samsodhan Muktavali sar 2, p. 106-107 (Maha Mahopadhyya Dr. Mirashi)]. This was issued in the 40th year of his reign. As his sons had predeceased him, the kingdom was divided between his grandparents. One of these namely Madhavavarman II is styled as 'trikuta-malayadhipathi' in his copper-plate. After Madhavavarman II, the Rashtrakutas became powerful in southern Maharashtra and at about 550 A.D. Kalachuris of Mahishmati came to establish then power in northern Maharashtra as well as Vidarbha. This leads to the inference that the Vishnukundins lost their power; although they continued to rule in their province namely Andhra till the 7th century A.D. before being vanquished by the illustrious Chalukya ruler Pulkeshin II.

**LATER CHALUKYAS**

Later Chalukyas.-Taila II, who overthrew Rashtrakuta Karka II (973-74 A.D.) claims to be a remote descendant of Chalukya dynasty of Badami. Two inscriptions, dated A.D. 957 and 965, reveal that Taila II was, in the early part of his life, a vassal of the Rashtrakuta Krshna III in Tardavadi now identified with the small village of Taddevadi on the south bank of the Bhima, in the Indi Taluka, Bijapur District. Taila I was required to fight with a number of other Rashtrakuta claimants, but was able to hold his own against all of them. Ultimately the feudatories of the Rashtrakutas transferred their allegiance to him. He assumed the titles Ahavamalla and Bhuvanaikamalla and his capital was Manyakheta up to A.D. 993. His victory over the Paramaras made him a master of the southern part of the Paramara kingdom. Taila I and his successors are mentioned as kings of Karnata, Kuhtala, or Rattapadi. The kingdom of the Chalukyas at the time included the three districts of the south viz. Shimoga, Chitalurg and Bellary, southern Konkau and the border of Northern Konkan in the west, and extended up to the upper course of the Godavari and possibly even up to the Narmada in the North. The last known date of Taila II from an inscription is A.D. 996. He was succeeded by his son Satyasraya in 996 A.D. The Silhaharas of northern Konkan fell a victim to his attack. Satyasraya assumed the titles of Irivabe-dariga, Ahavamalla and Akalarikacharita. Leading aggressive campaigns against his neighbours in the south, Satyasraya brought all territories up to the Kurnool and Guntur districts. In the latter district, his stone inscription (A.D. 1006) is found. During the reign of his successor Vikramaditya V (A.D. 1008-1014), the Chalukyas started expanding their kingdom in the east. Vikramaditya I was followed by his younger brother Ayyana II (A.D. 1014) who ruled for a year only and was followed by his youngest brother Jayasimha II in or before 1015 A.D. The dates of his inscriptions range from 1015 A.D. to 1043 A.D. He assumed the titles of Jagada-kamalla II, Trailokyamalla, Mallikamoda and Vikramasimha. Several inscriptions dated in 1028 A.D. and subsequent year reveal that he ruled from his capital Kalyana or Kalyani, modern Kalyani in Bidar, Mysore. The Chalukya capital appears to, have shifted from Manyakheta sometime after 993 A.D. Jayasimha II asserted his supremacy over the branch of the Silhahara dynasty that ruled at Karahataka, modern Karad in the Satara district from the 10th century A.D. Sometime during the rule of this king, the Chalukya kingdom appears to have suffered from internecine quarrels. His son Someshvara I (1043 to 1068 A.D.) who assumed the titles of Ahavamalla. Rajanarayana and Viramartanda had to fight with the Cholas as well as other dynasties of his time. He also succeeded in subduing the revolt of the Yadavas of Seuna-desa shortly before 1060 A.D. Someshvara II, his son, ruled from 1068 to 1076 A.D. After him his brother Vikramaditya VI came to the throne in 1076 A.D. He started a new era, called after his name. He married the Silhahara princess Chandralekha and cemented his friendship with the dynasty. Hoysalas of Gaghadem, Yadavas of Seuna-desa, Kadambas of Goa, Pandyas of Nolanibavadi and others accepted his supremacy. His court was graced by illustrious writers like Bilhana, the author of Mitaksara. The last known date of this great king is 1128 A.D.
His son Someshvara III (1126-1138 A.D.) was given the honorific title Sarvajna-bhupa or Sarvajna-Chakravarti for his extensive knowledge. He was the author of Abhilashitartha-chihtamani and Manasollasa. Someshvara III was succeeded by Jagadekamalla (1138 to 1151 A.D.) who was followed by Taila III who came to the throne in 1151 A.D. Sometime before 1153 A.D., he was taken a prisoner by Kakatiya Prola of Telingana, thus inflicting a shattering blow to the Chalukya Empire. Emboldened by this reverse of the Chalukyas, Bijjala, a feudatory chief belonging to Kalachuri dynasty wrested the sovereignty of Katyana from Taila III in 1156 A.D. Several inscriptions confirm this fact. He assumed the titles of Tribhuvanamalla, Nissakamalla and Giridurgamalla. The statements in some of the inscriptions of his successors that he invaded Simhala, Nepal, Magadha, etc. are hyperboles only. Someshvara, who assumed the title Riya-Murari ascended the throne in 1168 according to inscriptional evidence. He conquered Chola, Lata, and Gurjara countries before 1172 A.D.. His last known date is 1177 A.D. An inscription of the reign of his younger brother Sankarna II makes a very extravagant claim of his conquest of Ganda, Magadha, Turushka and Sinhala; but this must be accepted with a grain of salt. He was succeeded by his younger brother Ahavanamalla (1180 A.D.) who carried on campaigns against his neighbours. He worsted in battle the Silahara Aparaditya II of Northern Konkan and the Paramara Vindhyavarman of Malya. In 1181 A.D., however, Someshvara IV of the Chalukya dynasty succeeded in wresting from him, the larger portion of the Deccan including Kalyana. The last known date of Ahavanamalla is 1183 A.D. He was succeeded by his younger brother Singhana, who, however, completely surrendered to Someshvara IV in 1183-84 A.D. An inscription dated 1184 A.D. mentions him as a feudatory of Someshvara IV.

Chalukya Someshvara IV, son of Taila III, thus was successful in recovering his ancestral kingdom. This is confirmed by an inscription from Kurgod, in the Bellary Taluka of the Bellary District dated 1181-82 A.D. Someshvara IV ruled the Deccan up to the Godavari river till 1184 A.D. The last known date of his rule over Bellary and Shimoga Districts is 1189 A.D. In this year, he was deprived of his supremacy by Yadava Bhillama, forcing him to take shelter with Kadainta jayakesin III of Goa who accepted his rule up to 1198 A.D.. Nothing further about him is known.

SILAHARAS

Silaharas.-Three distinct families bearing the name Silaharas were ruling respectively northern Korikan, southern Konkan and the southern Maharashtra consisting of the districts of Kolhapur, Miraj and Karad. All of them assumed the title Tagarapura-varadhishvara. This indicates that they ruled the city of Tagara at one time. These families were founded in the times of Rashtrakutas and served as their feudatories. The first two of these families founded about the middle of the 9th century A.D. passed through trying circumstances during the rule of the later Chalukyas of Kalyani. This has been already mentioned. The third Silahara family was founded by Jatiga in 10th century A.D. with its capital probably at Karad. This family had a more distinguished career as its scions ruled as independent or semi-independent kings after the fall of the Rashtrakuta empire. It is said that Gandaraditya of this family who probably ruled in the first half of the 12th century A.D. became famous by feeding a hundred thousand Brahmanas and constructing a large tank named Gandasamudra in the Miraj District with the installation of the image of Buddha, Jina and Shiva.

Early History Silaharas

Vijayaditya, the son and successor of Gandaraditya, helped the northern Silaharas in recovering their independence and assisted Bijjala in his revolt against later Chalukyas. Kalachuris were unable to worst Bhoja II, Vijayaditya's son, but Singhana succeeded in overthrowing him and annexing the kingdom of Silaharas to the Yadava dominions.
The Silaharas carried the Suvarana-Garuda-Dhvaja and assumed the title Sriman-Mahalakshmi-labdha-vara-prasada; which proclaims Mahalakshmi as their tutelary deity. An epigraphic record [Epigraphies Indica, III, 192.] speaks of their descent from Jimutaketu who gave his life to Garuda for saving serpents, a story forming the basis of Nagananda of Shri-harsha. This record styles, the Silahara family as 'the best of the Sinihala kings' thus indicating a real or probably fancied relation with the island of Ceylon.

**YADAVAS OF DEVAGIRI**

Yadavas of Devagiri -The predecessors of Yadavas of Devagiri, who Devagiri. ruled over Khandesh, Nasik and Ahmadnagar Districts, were the vassals of the Rashtrakutas of Manyakheta and the Chalukyas of Kalyani for a period of over three hundred years. Drdhaprahara, the founder of the family hailing from Dhvaravatipura or modern Dvaraka in Kathiawar, flourished in the first half of the 9th century A.D. and had Chandradityapura or modern Chendor in Nasik district as his capital. His son Seunachandra I founded a city called Seunapura and also gave the name Seun-desa to the country on the confines of Dandaka and included Devagiri, modern Daulatabad, in the Aurangabad district. Inscriptions of the successors of Seunachandra style themselves as Seunas. Kama, one of the remote successors of this Seunachandra I had as son Bhillama V who was the first independent king of the race.

Bhillama ascended the throne in 1185 A.D. This was the time of a great upheaval in the Deccan. Failure of Chalukya Someshvara IV in consolidating his power, emboldened him in bidding for a paramount power in the Deccan. With the help of his able generals, he wrested power and territories from Someshvara IV including Kalyarm in 1189 A.D. Inscriptions of 'Bhillama's reign refer to his supremacy over Belvola, Tardavadi and Madagihar in the old Jath State. The statement of the Mutgi inscription that he secured victories over the Kalnigas, Gaudas, Vashigas, Arigas, Napalas and the Panehalas seems to be very extravagant. According to Hemadri, Bhillama founded the city of Devagiri and probably made it his capital. The earliest mention of Devagiri as the capital of Seunas is found in an inscription of Jaitugi or Jartrapala, son of Bhillama in 1196 A.D. Inscriptional evidence reveals that Bhillama associated with him his son in the Government from A.D. 1191 and died shortly after 1193 A.D. During the closing years of his reign he had to fight with Ballala II of Hoyasalas with no success. Jaitugi also failed to dislodge Ballala II from his position. Nevertheless the kingdom of Seunas during Jaitugi’s reign extended upto the confluence of Krshna and Tungabhadra bringing Seunas near Kakatiyas who were also defeated by jaitugi. Jaitugi ruled up to 1210 (1191 to 1210) A.D. and was succeeded by his son Singhana about the year 1210 (1210-1247 A.D.).

Singhana was certainly the most distinguished member of the family. He put an end to the rule of the Kolhapur branch of the Silahara family by overthrowing Bhoja II. With the exception of powerful Hoyasals, Singhana was able to assert supremacy over all kingdoms in the south. Singhana's empire extended from Khandesh up to the Shimoga and Anahtpur districts, and from the western coast (including Northern Konkan) up to the eastern parts of Hyderabad and Berar. During the reign of this king, Sharangdhara composed his famous treatise on music called Sarigita-ratnakara. Singhana was on the throne up to June 1247 A.D. Krshna, his grandson, came to the throne in 1247 A.D., and continued Singhana's policy of expanding the Seuna empire in all directions. Stone inscriptions of Krshna found in the Shimoga, Chitaldurg, Bellary, Dharvar and Belganv districts show that he succeeded in retaining the hounds of the kingdom of his grandfather Jalhana. The author of Suktimuktavali was his counsellor and commander. Krshna appointed Mahadeva, his brother, as heir apparent who succeeded him in 1261 A.D., Mahadeva continued hostilities with the Hoysalas, and Silaharas of Northern Konkan, the Vaghelas of Gujarat, the Parmaras of Malva and the Kakatiyas of Telunga country. His attempt to penetrate into the heart of
the Hoyasala kingdom was crowned with a failure. Hemadri, the founder of Hemadapanti architecture, was his minister. Mahadeva closed his reign in 1270-1271 A.D. Civil war between his son Amna and Ramachandra, the son of King Krishna resulted into the treacherous capture and slaughter of the former by the latter. Ramachandra in the early years of his rule made a frantic effort to crush the power of Hoyasalas, but was unable to achieve the end. He also failed in overcoming Vaghela Sararigadeva. He, however, succeeded in defeating the Chiefs of Dahala (modern Jabalpur), Vijrakara (modern Vairagarah in Madhya Pradesh) and Bhandagara (modern Bhandara in the Vidarbha region of Maharashtra). Inscriptions of Ramachandra show that he was able to retain the Seuna kingdom during the early days of his rule. But the prestige of the Seuna kingdom was irretrievably damaged on account of Ramachandra's failure to save his capital from being plundered by Ala-ud-din Khilji the governor of Kara, who invaded Devagiri by way of Eliehpur in 1296 A.D.

Hereditary enemies now pressed hard upon them. Kakatiya Prataparudra succeeded in pushing the western border of his empire upto Medak and Raichur. In A.D. 1305, Hoyasala Ballala III wrested from Ramachandra Banavasi, Santaliga and Kogali. In fact, there is no evidence to prove that Shimoga and Chitaldurg districts were under the rule of Seunas after 1300 A.D. The Deccan was again raided by Muslims, when Seunas were fighting for defence in the south. Ramachandra had to swerve from his allegiance to the Government of Delhi due to strained relations and in 1307 A.D. Ala-ud-din Khilji sent Malik-Naib Kafur with a great army, who overran the Seuna kingdom and took Ramachandra a prisoner to Delhi. Ramachandra was, however, released after a period of six months and was allowed to rule his kingdom as a vassal under the Sultanate army for an invasion of Telangana country. Ramachandra helped Muslims against Hoyasala Ballala III of Dorasamudra in 1311.

Ramachandra was succeeded by his son Shankaradeva in 1311 A.D. who antagonised the Sultan by his hostile activities. In A.D. 1313, Malik-Naib directed an expedition against Shankaradeva, killed him and assumed the government of Devagiri. Ala-ud-din's death caused confusion in Delhi. Taking advantage of this, Harapaladeva, the son-in-law of Ramachandra [The Struggle for Empire p. 48.] declared his independence and captured the fort of Devagiri with the help of Raghava, the minister of Ramachandra. But in 1318 A.D. [Ibid., p. 40.] Mubarak the son and successor of Ala-ud-din, recovered Devagiri by defeating and killing Harapaladeva or Haripala. Raghava suffered defeat at the hands of Khusruv Khan, Mubarak's commander. Thus the kingdom of Seunas passed into the hands of Muslims in 1318 A.D. [Ibid., p. 42.]

**MUSLIM RULE**

**Delhi Governors.**

**THE FIRST MUSLAMAN INVASION OF THE DECCAN TOOK PLACE IN 1296** [Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan Vol. VI, pp. 15-16. It was not Ram Dev but his son Sangama who gave shelter to the refugee king of Gujarath and Ram Dev denounced his son and asked Ala-ud-din to take steps to restore his authority. This happened after the unsuccessful expedition of Alauddin against Warangal in 1303-04 (K.A.N. Sastri-History of South India, p. 219.) but the power of the Devagiri Yadavas was not extinguished till 1318 [Briggs' Ferishta, I. 304. In 1296 (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan: Vol. VI, p. 31) Ramdev the ruling king of Devagiri or Devgad was surprised in his capital by Ala-ud-din Khilji, the nephew of the Delhi emperor Jalal-ud-din Khilji, and forced to pay tribute. In 1297, Ramdev gave shelter to Rai Karan the refugee king of Gujarath, and neglected to pay tribute for three years (Ditto, I. 365). In 1306-07 Malik Kafur, Ala-ud-din's general reduced the greater part of Maharashtra, distributed it among his officers, and confirmed Ramdev in his allegiance (Ditto, I. 369). In March 1307 (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Vol. VI, p. 31), Malik Kafur, on his way to Telengan was received with great hospitality at Devgad by Ramdev (Ditto, I. 371). In 1311 (Ramdev died in 1311, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Vol. VI, p. 38) as Ramdev was succeeded by his son Shankardev
(the name of Ramdev Rao's son is Sirighanadev and not Shankardev-Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Vol. VI, p. 48) who was not well affected to the Musalmans, Malik Kafur on his way to the Karnatak left a force at the town of Paithan on the left bank of the Godavari to overawe the Yadavas (Ditto, I. 373). In 1313 Malik Kafur marched a fourth time into the Deccan, seized and put Shankardev to death, wasted Maharashtra, and fixed his residence at Devgad (Ditto, I. 379), where he remained till Ala-ud-din in his last illness ordered him to Delhi. During Malik Kafur's absence at Delhi, Harpaldev the son-in-law of Ramdev stirred the Deccan to arms, drove out many Musalman garrisons, and with the aid of the other Deccan chiefs recovered Maharashtra. In 1318 Mubarak Khilji, Ala-ud-din's son and successor, marched to the Deccan to chastise Harpaldev who fled at the approach of the Musalmans, and was pursued, seized, and flayed alive. Mubarak appointed Malik yak Laki, one of his father's slaves, to command in the Deccan, and returned to Delhi (Ditto, I. 389). From 1318 Maharashtra began to be ruled by governors appointed from Delhi and stationed at Devagiri. The Delhi emperor Muhammad Tughlag (1325-51) made Devagiri his capital and changed its name to Daulatabad or the Abode of Wealth. In 1341 Musalmans exactions caused a general revolt in the Deccan, which, according to Ferishta, was so successful that in 1344 Muhammad had no part of his Deccan territories left him except Daulatabad. In 1345 there was widespread disorder, and the Delhi officers plundered and wasted the country [ Briggs' Ferishta. I. 432-33.]

MUSLIM RULES Bahmanis 1317-1489.

These cruelties led to the revolt of the Deccan nobles in 1347 under the able leadership of an Afghan soldier named Hasan Garigu bearing the title Zafar Khan. The Nobles were successful, and freed the Deccan from dependence on Northern India [Briggs' Ferishta, II. 285-91. Hassan Gangu, the first Bahamani kiwi, was an Afghan of the lowest rank and a native of Delhi. He farmed a small plot of land belonging to a Brahman astrologer named Gangu who was in favour with the king of Delhi. Having accidentally found a treasure in his field, Hasan had the honesty to give notice of it to his landlord. The astrologer was so struck with his integrity that he exerted his influence at court to advance Hasan's fortunes. Hasan thus roye to a great station in the Deccan, where his merit marked him out among his equals as their leader in their revolt. He assumed the name of Gangu in gratitude to his benefactor, and from a similar motive added that of Bahamani or Brahmani by which his dynasty was afterwards distinguished. About the origin and 'early history of Hasan there is much dispute and Wolseley Haig traces his descent to an ancient Persian hero, (see CHI, II 372) but Dr. P. M. Joshi is right when he says " On the whole it is much safer to leave the question open as to the origin and early history of Hasan ", Karlier he remarks " Firishta therefore cannot be dismissed off hand as absurd". (See Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan Vol. VI p. 249) Elphinstoue's History of India, 666'. The Bahamani dynasty consisted of the following eighteen kings, who were supreme for nearly 150 years (1347-1490) and continued in power for about thirty years more:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name.</th>
<th>Date.</th>
<th>Name.</th>
<th>Date.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ala-ud-din Bahaman (Hasan Gangu).</td>
<td>1347-1358</td>
<td>Humayun</td>
<td>1457-1461.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad I</td>
<td>1358-1375</td>
<td>Nizam</td>
<td>1461-1463.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujahid</td>
<td>1375-1378</td>
<td>Muhammad II</td>
<td>1463-1482.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Daud</td>
<td>1378.</td>
<td>Mahmud II</td>
<td>1482-1518.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahmud I</td>
<td>1378-1307</td>
<td>Nominal Kings.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghias-ud-din</td>
<td>1397.</td>
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</table>
Hasan founded a dynasty, which in honour of his patron, a Brahman he called Bahamani, and which held the command of the Deccan for nearly ISO years. The Bahamani capital was first fixed at Gulbarga about 180 miles east or Satara and in 1426 was removed to Bedar or Ahmadabad-Bedar about 100 miles further east. By 1351 Ala-ud-din Hasan Gangu Bahamani, by treating the local chiefs and authorities in a liberal and friendly spirit, had brought under his power every part of the Deccan which had previously been subject to the throne of Delhi [Briggs' Ferishta, II. 291-292; Grant Duff's Marathas Vol 1 p. 45.] . In 1357. Ala-ud-din divided his kingdom into four provinces or tarfs, over each of which he set a provincial governor or tarfdar. Satara formed part of the provinces of Gulbarga which extended from Gulbarga as far west as Dabhoi and south as far as Raichur and Muclgal in the Nizam's territory. Ala-ud-din apparently had control over the whole of Satara, except the hilly west which with the Koukan was not reduced till a century later. In the latter part of the fourteenth century, under the rule of Muhammad Shah Bahamani (1358-1375), the banditti which for ages had harassed the trade of the Deccan were broken and scattered, and the people enjoyed peace and good government [Briggs' Ferishta, II. 325-326.]. This period of prosperity, when the fort of Satara [Satara fort is said to have been built in 1190 A. D. by Silahar Bhoj II of Kolhapur (History of Kolhapur in Marathi Vol. 1 Part I, p. 170 by B. P. Modak) Satara may have been repaired later] and may other forts were probably built, was followed by the awful calamity of the Durga Devi famine, when the country is said to have been reduced to a desert by twelve rainless years (1396-1407). In the first years of the famine Mahmud Shah Bahamani (1378-1397), is said to have kept ten thousand bullocksi to bring grain from Gujarat to the Deccan, and it had founded seven orphan schools in the leading towns in his dominions [ Briggs' Ferishta, II. 349-350. These seven towns were Cheul, Dabhol, Elichpur, Daulatabad, Bedar, Gulbarga and Kandhar.]. No efforts of any rulers could preserve order of life, through so long a series of fatal years. Whole districts were left without people, and the strong places fell from the Musalmans into the hands of local chiefs [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I p. 50.]. Before the country could recover, it was again wasted by two rainless years in 1421 and 1422. Multitudes of cattle died and the people broke into revolt [Briggs' Ferishta, II. 405-06.]. In 1429 Malik-ut-Tujjar the governor of Daulatabad, with the hereditary officers ordeshmukhs, went through the country restoring order. Their first operations were against some Ramoshis in Khatav Desh and a body of banditti that infested the Mahadev hills. The army next marched to Wai and reduced several forts. So entirely had the country fallen waste that the old villages had disappeared and fresh villages had to be formed, which generally included the lands of two or three old villages. Lands were given to all who would till them, free of rent for the first year and for a horse-bag of grain for the second year. This settlement was entrusted to Dadu Narsu Kale, an experienced Brahman, and to a Turkish eunuch of the Court [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I p. 51.]. In 1453, Malik-ut-Tujjar, who was ordered to reduce the sea coast, of Konkan forts, fixed his head-quarters at Chakan, a small fort eighteen miles north of Poona, and, after reducing several chiefs, laid siege to a fort whose chief was named Shirke who he speedily obliged to surrender, and to deliver himself and family into his hands. Malik-ut-Tujjar insisted that Shirke should embrace the Muhammadan faith or be put to death. Shirke on this, assuming an air of great humility, represented that there existed between him and Sharikar Ray of Khelna or Vishalagad in Kolhapur a family jealousy, and that should he become a Muhammadan, his rival, on Malik-ut-Tujjar's retreat, would taunt him with ignominy and excite his own family and subjects to revolt. He further promised to accept the Muhammadan faith if Malik-ut-Tujjar would reduce his rival, and agreed to guide him and his forces through the woody and very difficult country to Shahkar's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shams-ud-din</th>
<th>1397.</th>
<th>Ahmad II</th>
<th>1518-1520.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firoz</td>
<td>1397-1422.</td>
<td>Ala-ud-din III</td>
<td>1520-1522.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad I</td>
<td>1422-1435.</td>
<td>Vali</td>
<td>1522-1526.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ala-ud-din II</td>
<td>1435-1457.</td>
<td>Kalim</td>
<td>1526.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
dominions. Malik-ut-Tujjar marched against the chief of Khelna but was treacherously surrounded and killed in the woods by Shirke [Briggs' Ferislita, III. pp. 438-39.]. About this time (1453-1480) no references have been traced to Satara places except to War and Man which are mentioned as military posts, whose troops in 1464 were ordered to join Mahmud Gavan in his Konkan expedition [Briggs' Ferislita, II. 483.]. In 1460, and twelve years later in 1472 and 1473, failure of rain so wasted the country that in 1474 when rain fell, scarcely any one was left to till the land [Briggs' Ferislita, II. 483, 493, 494.]. The power and turbulence of their provincial governors was a source of weakness and danger to Bahamani rule. To remove this evil Mahmud Gavan, the very learned and able minister of Muhammad Shah Bahamani II (1463-1482), framed a scheme under which the Bahamani territories were divided into eight instead of into four provinces. Satara was included under Bijapur, one of the two divisions into which Gulbarga was divided, and was placed under Khwaja Gavan himself. In each province only one fort was held in the governor's hands; all other forts were entrusted to captains and garrisons appointed and paid from headquarters; the pay of the captains was greatly increased and they were strictly compelled to keep their garrisons at their full strength [Briggs' Ferislita, II. 503, 504.]. This scheme for reducing their power brought on the minister the hatred of the leading nobles. They brought false charges of disloyalty against Mahmud Gavan. The king was weak enough to believe them and foolish enough to order the minister's execution, a loss which Bahamani power never recovered [Of the Bahamani kings Muhammad II was a scholar of Arable and Persian. He attracted Arab and Persian people to the Deccan in order to make the country the seat of learning and culture. He appointed teachers in various centres of the kingdom and large cities and towns. This immigration of Arabs and Persians had a great effect upon the culture and future history of the Deccan. With this influence which was definitely foreign in character, we find the native Hindu art influencing the cultural structure of the Bahamanis. We find that in the reign of Firoz the relations between Hindus and Muslims were excellent and the influence of Hindu culture was creeping even though slowly, in the sacred buildings of the Bahamanis. In a word the twenty-two years in interregnum between the death of Muhammad I and the accession of Firoz are really a period of struggle between the cultures immersing into an atmosphere of an attempted synthesis of purely Hindu forms, the foreign influence represented by the Afaqis and the northern tradition represented by the Bahamanis.].

**Adil Shahi 1489-1686.**

In 1481, on the death of Mahmud Gavan, his estate of Bijapur including Saturn was conferred on Yusuf Adil Khan the future founder of the Adil Shahi dynasty of Bijapur [Yusuf Adil Shah of Bijapur was a Turk, a son of Amurath Sultan (1421-1451) of Constantinople. He founded the family of the Adil Shahi ruler of Bijapur consisting of nine sovereigns whose rule lasted nearly 200 years. At the same time the Nizam Shahi dynasty under Ahmad Nizam was established at Ahmadnagar (1490-1636), the Kutb Shahi dynasty under Sultan Kutb-ul-mulk at Golkonda (1512-1609), and the Barid Shahi under Kasim Barid at Bedar (1492-1609). Though kings, nominally supreme, continued to rule as late as 1526, the supremacy of the Bahamanis may be said to have ceased when the Bijapur (1489) and Ahmadnagar (1490) governors threw off their allegiance and established themselves as independent rulers. According to Colonel Meadows Taylor, except Humayun Shah (1457-1461), the Bahamani kings protected their people and governed them justly and well. Among the Deccan Hindus all elements of social union and local government were preserved and strengthened by the Musalmans, who, without interfering with or remodelling local institutions and hereditary offices, turned them to their own use. Persian and Arabic education was extended by village schools attached to mosques and endowed with lands. This tended to the spread of the literature and faith of the rulers, and the effects of the education can still be traced through the Bahamani dominions. A large foreign commerce centred in Bedar, the capital of the Deccan, which was visited by merchants and travellers from all countries. The Bahamani kings made few public works. There were no water works, no roads or bridges, and no public inns or posts. Their chief works were huge castles which after 500 years are as perfect as when they were built. These forts
have glacis and countercarps, covered ways, traverses, flanking bastions with curtains and intermediate towers, broad wet and dry ditches, and in all plain fortresses a faussebraye or rampart-mound with bastions and towers in addition to main rampart. No forcible conversion of masses of Hindus seems to have taken place. A constant stream of foreigners poured in from Persia, Arabia, Tartary, Afghanistan, and Abyssinia. These foreigners, who served chiefly as soldiers, married Hindus and created the new Muhammedan population of the Deccan. The names and elates of the Ahmadnagar and Bijapur kings are:-

Ahmadnagar and Bijapur Kings, 1489-1686 (Cambridge History of India, Vol. III, p. 704)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ahmadnagar</th>
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<th>Bijapur</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad I</td>
<td>1490-1509</td>
<td>Yusuf</td>
<td>1489-1510</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burhan</td>
<td>1509-1553</td>
<td>Ismael</td>
<td>1510-1534</td>
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<tr>
<td>Husain I</td>
<td>1553-1565</td>
<td>Mallu</td>
<td>1534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murtaza</td>
<td>1565-1586</td>
<td>Ibrahim I</td>
<td>1534-1558</td>
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<tr>
<td>Husain II</td>
<td>1586-1589</td>
<td>Ali I</td>
<td>1558-1580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismael</td>
<td>1589-1591</td>
<td>Ibrahim II</td>
<td>1580-1627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burhan II</td>
<td>1591-1595</td>
<td>Mahmud</td>
<td>1627-1657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim</td>
<td>1595</td>
<td>Ali II</td>
<td>1657-1672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahadur</td>
<td>1596</td>
<td>Shikandar</td>
<td>1672-1686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad II</td>
<td>1596-1603</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murtaza II</td>
<td>1603-1630</td>
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<tr>
<td>Husain III</td>
<td>1630-1633</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murtaza III</td>
<td>633-1636</td>
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], who was appointed tarafdar or provincial governor, while Daria Khan Fakr-ul-mulk, Mallu Khan and most of the Mughal Officers attached to him obtained estates in the province. In 1489 Yusuf Adil Khan asserted his independence and proclaimed himself king. He wrested many forts from the governors of Mahmud Shall Bahamani If (1482-1518), and subdued all the country from the river Bhima to Bijapur [Briggs' Ferishta, III, 9.]. In 1551 Saif Ain-ul-Mulk, late commander-in-chief of the Ahmadnagar army who had taken refuge in Berar and who at the request of the Bijapur king had come to Bijapur was given considerable estates in Satara. In the battle of Sholapur against Ahmadnagar in the same year Ibrahim Adil Shah suspected Saif Ain-ul-Mulk of treachery, and he, in consequence, retired to Man in east Satara, collected the revenue, and divided them among his troops. Ibrahim Adil Shah sent one of his officers with 5,000 horse to expel Ain-ul-Mulk, but the Bijapur troops were defeated. Saif Ain-ul-Mulk, growing bolder by success, gathered the revenues of man)' districts including Valva in Sangli. Ibrahim next sent against him 10,000
horse and foot under Niaz Kuli Beg and Dilavar Khan Habshi. These troops were also defeated and so many elephants and horses and so great a store of valuable baggage fell into the hands of Ain-ul-Mulk that he levied fresh troops and determined to establish himself as an independent chief. Ibrahim Adil Shah took the field in person at the head of 5,000 chosen horse, 3,000 foot, and a train of artillery. Ain-ul-Mulk encamped on the river Man, and the king arrived and halted some days on the opposite bank without attacking him. Saif Ain-ul-Mulk resolved not to quit the country without fighting. For three days he advanced towards the king's camp as if to engage but as often retired, the royal army remaining under arms on each occasion from dawn till sunset expecting the attack. On the fourth clay Ain-ul-Mulk put his troops again in motion; but the king, supposing that his design was only to parade as on the preceding days, neglected to make preparations for his reception, the common guards of the camp only getting under arms. At length, when the enemy's standard appeared in sight, Ibrahim Adil Shah marshalled his troops in great haste and moved out of the camp to give battle. Ain-ul-Mulk averse from engaging the king in person consulted with his friends, observing that it was treason to fight against the royal standard. To this all agreed except Murtaza. Khan Anju who remarked that the standards did not light, and there was no danger of shedding royal blood. Ain-ul-Mulk satisfied with his casuistry and finding it too late to hesitate, charged the royalists, and attacking the centre where Ibrahim Adil Shah was posted, pressed on it so fiercely that it was thrown into disorder and the king fled. On this his whole line broke and victory declared in favour of Ain-ul-Mulk, who seized the royal canopy, elephants, and artillery, besides all the tents and baggage. Ain-ul-Mulk pursued the king towards Bijapur, but was afterwards obliged to fly by the route of Mail Desh to the Ahmadnaga dominions where he was assassinated [Ibid, 105.]. In 1579, the Bijapur minister Kishvar Khan falsely accused Chand Bibi, the dowager queen, of instigating her brother, Murtaza Nizam Shah, king of Ahmadnagar, to invade Bijapur, and sent her a prisoner to Satara after subjecting her to many indignities [Briggs' Ferishta, III.]. On Kishvar Khan's fall in the same year Chand Bibi was released from prison and conducted to Bijapur [Briggs' Ferishta, III, 150.]. In 1592 Dilavar Khan, the Bijapur regent, was sent a prisoner to Satara where he died [Briggs' Ferishta, III, 172-173.] shortly after.

Their Institutions

Under the Bijapur kings, though perhaps less regularly than afterwards under the Moghals, the country was divided into districts or sarkars. The district was distributed among sub-divisions which were generally known by the Persian names parchana,karyat, Minimal, mahal, and taluka, and sometimes by the Hindu names of prant and desh. The hilly west, which was generally managed by Hindu officers, continued to be arranged by valleys with their Hindu names of khora, mura, and maval. The collection of the revenue was generally entrusted to farmers, the farms sometimes including only one village. Where the revenue was not farmed, its collection was generally entrusted to Hindu officers. Over the revenue-farmers was a government agent or amil, who, besides collecting the revenue, managed the police and settled civil suits. Civil suits relating to land were generally referred to juries or panchayats. In money suits the amils or government agents probably passed decisions. One of the amildars, who superintended a considerable division and to whom all other amildars, were subordinate, was termed mokasadar, and it is conjectured that he had some percentage on the revenue. The mokasadar's office though sometimes continued from father to son was not hereditary. Frequently but not always over the mokasadar was a subba who, although he took no share in the revenue management and did not live in the district, executed deeds and formal writings of importance. Though the chief power in the country was Muhammedan, Hindus were largely employed in the service of the State. The garrisons of hill forts seem generally to have been Hindus, Marathas, Kolis, Ramoshis, and Dhangars, a few places of special strength being reserved for Musalmn commandants or killedars. Besides the hill forts, some parts of the open country were left under loyal Maratha and Brahman officers with the titles of estate-holder or jagirdar and of district head or deshmukh. Estates were generally granted on military tenure, the value of the grant being in proportion to the number of troops which the grant-holder maintained.
Phaltan from which in the time of the Peshvas 350 horse were required, furnished only fifty to the Bijapur government at a very late period of the dynasty, but the Maratha chiefs could procure horsemen at short notice and they were entertained or discharged at pleasure. Family feuds or personal hate, and, in the case of those whose lands lay near the borders of other kingdoms, an intelligent regard for the chances of war-, often divided Maratha families and led members of one family to take service under rival Musalman states. Numbers of Hindus were employed in the Bijapur armies and those of distinguished service were rewarded with the Hindu title of Raja, naik, andrav [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I pp. 64-65].

Maratha Chiefs

The principal Maratha Chiefs in Satara under the Bijapur government were Chandrararav More of Javli, about thirty-five miles northwest of Satara, Rav Naik Nimballkar of Phaltan about thirty-five miles north-east of Satara. Junjharrav Ghatge of Malavadi about twenty-seven miles east of Satara. Daphle of Jath about ninety miles south-east of Satara, Mane of Mhasvad about sixty miles east of Satara, and the Ghorpade of Kapshi on the Varna about thirty miles south of Karad. A person named More, originally a Karnatak chief was appointed in the reign of Yusuf Adil Shah (1490-1510) to the command of a body of 12,000 Hindu infantry sent to reduce the strong tract between the Nira and the Varna. More was successful. He dispossessed the Shirkes and completely suppressed the depredations of their abettors, the chiefs of whom were Gujar, Mamulkar, Mohite, and Mahadik. More was dignified with the title of Chandrarav and his son Yeshvantram, having distinguished himself in a battle fought with the troops of Burhan Nizam Shah (1508-1553), in which he captured a green flag, was confirmed in succession to his father as Raja of Javli and had permission to use the banner he had won. Their descendants ruled in the same tract of country for seven generations and under their mild and just management that barren tract became populous. All the successors of the first More assumed the title of Chandrarav. The unswerving loyalty of this family induced the Bijapur government to exact little more than a nominal tribute from districts producing so little, and which had always been in disorder under Muhammedan governors. Rav Naik Nimballkar or Phaltanraj was the Naik of Phaltan. His original surname was Pavar; he had taken the name of Nimballkar from Nimbalik or Nimlak where the first Nimballkar lived. The family is considered one of the most ancient in Maharashtra as the Nimallkar was made sardeshmukh of Phaltan before the middle of the seventeenth century by one of the Bijapur kings. The deshmukh of Phaltan is said to have become a polyar or independent chief and to have repeatedly withheld the revenues of the district. Vangoji or Jagpalraj Naik Nimballkar who lived in the early part of the seventeenth century was notorious for his restless and predatory habits. Dipabai the sister of Jagpalraj was married to Maloji Bhonsle, Shivajis grandfather who was one of the principal chiefs under the Ahmadnagar kingdom. Jagpalraj Naik seems to have been a man of great influence. It is said that it was through his exertions that the marriage of Maloji's son Shahaji and Jijabai, Lukhdev Jadhavraj's daughter, was brought about against the wishes of the girl's parents. One of the Phaltan Naiks was killed in 1620 in a battle between Malik Ambar and the Moghals. Nimballkar never exchanged his ancient title of naik for that of Raja. Junjharrav Ghatge, the deshmukh of Malavadi was the head of a powerful family whose founder Kam Raje Ghatge had a small command under the Bahamani kings. His native country Khatav was separated from that of the Nimballkar by the Mahadev Hills. The Ghatges were deshmukhs andsardeshmukhs of the pargana of Man. In 1626 Nagoji Ghatge was given the title ofsardeshmukh as an unconditional favour by Ibrahim Adil Shah II, together with the title of Jhunjarray. The head of the Mane family was deshmukh of Mhasvad, adjoining the district of the Ghatges. The Manes were distinguished shiledars or self-horsed cavaliers under Bijapur, but were nearly as notorious for their revengeful character as the Shirkes. The Ghorpades, who were originally Bhonsles, according to then-family legend acquired their present surname during the Bahamani times from having been the first to scale a fort [Khelna or Vishalagad in 1471. See Sherwani II. K., Bahamaniis of Deccan, p. 298.] in the Konkan which was deemed impregnable by fastening a cord round the body of a ghorpad or iguana. They were
Shivaji 1627-1680.

In 1636 the Nizam Shahi dynasty came to an end. In 1637 Shahaji Bhonsle, the son of Maloji Bhonsle, who had taken a considerable part in Nizam Shahi affairs during the last years of the dynasty, was allowed to retire into the service of Mahmud Adil. Shah of Bijapur (1636-1656). In 1637, besides giving Shahaji his jagir districts in Poona, Mahmud Adil Shah conferred on Shahaji a royal grant for the deshmukhi of twenty-two villages including Masur [Patrasar Sangraha No. 885.] in the district of Karad, the right to which had by some means devolved on government [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 96.]. Before the middle of the 17th century, Shahaji's son Shivaji, [Some recent sources assert that he was born on 19th February, 1630.] the founder of the Maratha empire, had begun to establish himself in the hilly parts of Poona in the north where he had been put in possession of his father's estate of Poona and Supa. By 1648 he obtained control over the strong forts of Torna [According to jadunalli Sarkar the fort of Torna was captured in 1646 and Kaigad was a new fort built by Shivaji in the same year (Jadnath Sarkar -Shivaji, p. 34).

The date of acquisition of Kondana is not known. Shivapur Deshpande Bhai gives the year 1647. This year is indicated by Mohammednania (Jadunath Sarkar-Shivaji, p. 35).] in Bhor about thirty-five miles and Kondana or Sinhgad about twelve miles south-west of Poona, of Purandhar about twenty miles south of Poona, and of Kaigad in Bhor about five miles east of Torna. At this time the south of the Nira, as far east as Shirval and as far south as the range of hills north of the Krishna, was farmed by the hereditary deshmukh of Hirdas Maval, a Maratha named Bandal, and the fort of Rohida was committed, to his care, fie early entertained a jealousy of Shivaji and kept a strong garrison and carefully watched the country round Purandhar. The deshpnde of the place was a Prabhu. Wai was the station of a Bijapur Mukasadar or manager who had charge of Pandugad, Kamalgad and several other forts in the neighbourhood. Chaurarav More, Raja of Javli, was in possession of the Ghatmatha from the Krsna to the Varna [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, p. 109.]. The Bijapur government being impressed with the idea that it was incited by Shahaji, caused him to be imprisoned, and at the same time sent an army under Fateh Khan to attack Shivaji; but Shivaji proved more than a match for him and killed him in the battle of Belsar near Purandhar. Shahaji was subsequently released in the same year, and an effort was made to bring about reconciliation between him and Baji Ghorpade, the Mudhol Chief who had been instrumental in his capture. To induce both parties to forget what had passed, Mahmud Adil Shah made them exchange their hereditary rights and inams as deshmukhs. Baji Ghorpade thus obtained from Shahaji the deshmuki rights of twenty-two villages in Karad which Shahaji had acquired in 1637 from Bijapur [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, p. 115.]. This agreement however was not acted upon. In the meanwhile another attempt was made to seize Shivaji and this time Baji Shamraj was sent for the purpose. Shivaji frequently lived at the town of Mahad in Kolaba and the party of Shamraj, passing through the territory of Chaurarav More, lurked about the Par pass until an opportunity should offer. Shivaji anticipated the surprise, attacked the party near the bottom of the pass and drove them in
great panic to the forests. Disturbances in the Karnataka prevented the Bijapur government any further from taking active steps against Shivaji, who finding that his father had been sent far away from the capital on a military campaign in Karnataka, began to devise new schemes for possessing himself of the whole Ghatmatha or hilly west Deccan. With this object in view Shivaji turned his attention to the Mores of Javli who were very powerful in that region. The ruling prince [Shiv Bharat Canto 13 shloka 43.] Yeshvantrav was however none too friendly towards Shivaji and would not fall in a line with the designs of Shivaji. In fact he had reasons to be grateful to Shivaji because it was he who was instrumental [Ruling princes of Javli enjoyed a hereditary title "Chandrarany "] in enabling Yeshvantrav to succeed to the jahagir of Javl on the death of Daulat trav in 1648, who died childless and whose widow had sought the help of Shivaji in adopting young Yeshvantrav and carrying on the administration in his name dining Yeshvantrav's minority with the assistance of one Hanmantrav More, a distant relation of the family. In course of time Yeshvantrav grew jealous of his independent position and impatient of Shivaji's interference. Shivaji spent years in negotiation for a peaceful way to gain his object. There was also some understandable reason for Shivajis patience. Afzalkhan the subedar of Wai who had acted as the representative of the sovereign power of Bijapur since 1649 was anxious to prevent both Yeshvantrav and Shivaji from growing very powerful in that region. He had sent letters to Kanhoji Jedhe and other sardars to join his standard for the purpose. There thus arose a triangular contest between the Mores, Shivaji and Afzalkhan.

About the year 1654, Afzalkhan came to be transferred to Kanakgiri [Sardesai: New History of the Marathas p. 112.] and Shivaji seized this opportunity of Afzalkhan's absence; to deal resolutely with the affair. He took into his confidence some of the Maval Deshmukhs, particularly Kanhoji Jedhe and Haibatrav Silimkar as also other neighbours of the Mores and sent a proposal to Javl stating terms which the Mores refused to accept. Then he dispatched a contingent of these Deshmukhs along-with his commander Sambhaj Kavji and a small force threatening their residence. This first attempt proved ineffectual, and Shivaji sent another force under Raghunath Ballal Korde. A battle was fought near Javl in which Hanmantrav More was killed and Yeshvantrav fled for his life and took shelter in the fort of Rairi. Prataprav More another scion of the family escaped to Bijapur to seek the help of Adil Shall to out Shivaji from Javl (26-1-1656). Shivaji himself at once proceeded to Javl, stayed there for two months, and strengthened his hold upon the principality. In the meantime Yeshvantrav started serious trouble afresh from the hill top of Rairi, a large and lofty plateau near Mahad which belonged to the Mores. Shivaji sent troops and his agent Haibatrav Silimkar to Yeshvantrav demanding submission. After a long negotiation, a meeting was arranged at the foot of Rairi in May. When the Mores came down to meet Shivaji, he killed the principal offender Yeshvantrav and carried his two sons Krshna and Baji as captives to Poona. The capture of the strong fort of Vasota, which had also belonged to Mores, about fifteen miles west of Satara, subsequently called Vajragad by Shivaji and the conquest of Shivthar valley completed the conquest of Javl. Later on the two sons of Yeshvantrav were detected conducting secret intrigues with Bijapur and were therefore put to death [Sardesai; New History of the Marathas Vol. I. p. 112-113.].

The result of Shivaji's swift and decisive action towards Mores was on the whole helpful to his pursuits, because the turbulent chiefs in the surrounding area came to know what to expect from him if an open opposition were offered to his plans and desires. Shivaji followed up his conquest of Javl by surprising Rohida which he scaled at night at the head of the Mavlis. Bandal, the deshmukh who was in the fort at the time stood to his arms on the first moment of alarm; and although greatly outnumbered his men did not submit until he was killed. At the head of them was Baji Prabhu Deshpande; Shivaji treated him with generosity, received him with great kindness, and confirmed him in all his hereditary possessions. He had relations with Shivaji, and afterwards agreed to follow the fortunes of his conqueror; the command of a considerable body of infantry was conferred upon him and he maintained his character for bravery and fidelity to the last.
Pratapgad built by Shivaji, 1656.

In 1656, to secure access to his possessions on the banks of the Nira and the Koyna and to strengthen the defences of the Par Pass Shivaji pitched upon a high rock near the source of the Krishna on which he resolved to build another fort commanding an extensive view of Konkan to the west. The execution of the design was entrusted to Moro Trimal Pingle, who shortly before had been appointed to command the fort of Purandhar in Poona. This man, when very young, had accompanied his father, then in the service of Shahaji to the Karnatak and returned to the Maratha country about the year 1653 and shortly after joined Shivaji. The able manner in which he executed every thing entrusted to him soon gained him the confidence of his master and the erection of Pratapgad, the name given to' the new fort, confirmed the favourable opinion entertained of him [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 119.]. A new image of the goddess Bhavani, the prototype of his family deity, Bhavani of Tuljapur, was later installed in the fort and Shivaji made it a practice to visit the place on devotional grounds, whereby he effectively served his political object of keeping a watchful eye on the region around. In the same year (1656) the Moghals invaded the Bijapur territories and Sarjerav Ghatge, Nimbalkar, and other Maratha estate-holders promptly joined Khan Muhammad, the Bijapur prime minister with their troops [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, 123.].

Battle of Pratapgad.

About the year 1658 Bijapur was distracted by factions among its nobles and the youth of its sovereign Ali Adil Shah II. At last they became sensible of the necessity of making an active effort to subdue Shivaji. For this purpose an army was assembled consisting of 500 horse and 7000 choice infantry, a good train of artillery or what was considered as such, besides a large supply of rockets, a number of swivels mounted on camels, and abundance of stores.

Afzal- Khan killed, 1659.

Afzal Khan, an officer of high rank, volunteered to command the expedition, and in his public leave-taking, in the vaunting manner particularly common to Deccan Muhammedans of those days, pompously declared that he should bring back the insignificant rebel and cast him in chain under the footstool of the throne. To avoid impediments which presented themselves on the straight route from Bijapur and the heavy rains which seldom subsided in the neighbourhood of the hills till the end of October, the army proceeded in September 1659 from Bijapur to Pandharpur and thence marched towards Wai. Shivaji, on its approach, took up his residence in Pratapgad and sent the most humble messages to Afzal Khan. He pretended to have no thought of opposing so great a personage, and seemed only anxious to make his peace with the Bijapur government through the Khan's mediation; he affected the utmost sorrow for his conduct, which he could hardly persuade himself would be forgiven by the king, even if the Khan should receive him under the shadow of his protection; and he would surrender the whole of his country to the Khan were it possible to assure himself of his favour. Afzal Khan, who had all the vanity of a Muhammedan noble, had also a thorough contempt for his enemy. At the same time as he had formerly been in charge of the Wai district he was aware of the exceeding difficulty of an advance through the wild country which he must penetrate. With such considerations and mollified by Shivaji's submission, Afzal Khan in answer to repeated applications despatched a Brahman in his own service named Gopinathpant with suitable attendants to Pratapgad. On his arrival at Par, a village below the fort, Shivaji came down to meet him. The Brahman stated that the Khan, his master, and Shahaji were intimate friends, that the Khan bore no enmity towards his son, but on the contrary would prove his desire to aid him by interceding for his pardon, and even endeavouring to get him confirmed as jagirdar in part of the territory he had usurped. Shivaji acknowledged his obligation although his reply at the public meeting was not couched in the same humble strain he had used in his message. He said that if he could obtain a part of the country in jagir it would be all he could expect, that he was the king's

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servant and that he had been of considerable use to his government in reducing several chiefs whose territory would now come under the royal authority. This was the substance of what passed at their first interview. Shivaji provided accommodation for the envoy and his suite, but assigned a place for the Brahman at some distance from the rest. In the middle of the night Shivaji secretly introduced himself to Gopinathpant. He addressed him as a Brahman, his superior. He represented that all he had done was for the sake of Hindus and the Hindu faith, that he was called on by the goddess Bhavani herself to protect Brahmans and cows, to punish the violators of their temples and their gods, and to resist the enemies of their religion, that it became Gopinathpant as a Brahman to aid a course which Bhavani had sanctioned, and that if he did, he should ever after live among his caste and countrymen in comfort and wealth. Shivaji seconded his arguments with presents, and the solemn promise to bestow the village of Hivra on him and his posterity for ever. The Brahman envoy could not resist such an appeal seconded by such an inducement and swore fidelity to Shivaji, declared he was his for ever, and called on the goddess to punish him if he severed from any task Shivaji might impose. They consulted on the fittest means for averting the present danger. The Brahman, fully acquainted with Afzal Khan's character, suggested tempting him to a conference and Shivaji at once approved of the scheme. He sent for Krshnaji Bhaskar, a confidential Brahman, informed him of what had passed, and of the resolution which he had adopted. After fully consulting on the subject they separated as secretly as they had met. After holding some interviews and discussion for the purpose of masking their design, Krshnaji Bhaskar as Shivaji's agent was despatched with Gopinathpant to the camp of Afzal Khan. Gopinathpant represented Shivaji as in great alarm; but if his fears could be overcome by the personal assurance of the Khan, he was convinced that he might easily be prevailed on to give himself up. With a blind confidence Afzal Khan trusted himself to Gopinathpant's guidance. An interview was agreed on, and the Bijapur troops with great labour moved to Javli Shivaji prepared a place for the meeting below the fort of Pratapgar; he cut down the jungle, and cleared a road for the Khan's approach but every other avenue to the place was carefully closed. He ordered Moropant and Netaji Palkar from the Konkan with many thousands of the Mavli infantry. He communicated his whole plan to these two and to Tanaji Malusare. Netaji was stationed in the thickets a little to the east of the fort, where it was expected that part of the Khan's retinue would advance, and Moro Trimal with a body of old and tried men was sent to hide himself in the neighbourhood of the main body of the Bijapur troops which as had been agreed remained near Javli. The preconcerted signal for Netaji was the blast of a horn, and the distant attack by Moro Trimal was to begin on hearing the fire of five guns from Pratapgar which were also to announce Shivaji's safety. Fifteen hundred of Afzal Khan's troops accompanied him to within a few hundred yards of Pratapgar, where, at Gopinathpant's suggestion they were desired to halt to dispel any doubt and fear that Shivaji had professed about Khan's preparations. Afzal Khan, dressed in a thin muslin garment, armed apparently only with his sword, and attended, as per mutual agreement only by two armed soldiers, Bada Sayyad and another, advanced in his palanquin to a well-decorated reception tent set up for the occasion, about half way up the ascent of the fort. Shivaji while preparing himself to meet the Khan for peaceful negotiations, had taken complete precautions to meet any contingency. It was Thursday, 10th of November 1659. On that day after a morning bath and usual worship and prayers, Shivaji took his meals and bid a hasty but affectionate farewell to his friends, committing his son Sambhaji to their care. He rose, put on a steel chain cap under his turban and chain armour under his cotton gown, heldBhavani sword in his right hand, concealed a crooked dagger or bichva in his left sleeve, and put on a shield to cover his back. Thus armed he slowly descended from the fort. The Khan had arrived at the place of meeting before him, and expressed his jealous indignation at the lavish grandeur of decoration of the mandap which surpassed something that could be observed at Bijapur and which the son of a sardar of Bijapur should be in a position to display. By that time Shivaji was seen advancing, attended by two of his companions Jiva Mahala and Sambhaji Kavji.

Shivaji viewing Afzal Khan at a distance expressed fear for the presence of Bada Sayyad and requested Khan, through Pantaji Gopinath that Bada Sayyad be kept a few paces away, to which

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Afzal Khan readily agreed and as if to dispel fear, even handed over his sword to Krshnaji Bhaskar who was standing nearby. Khan however, was not left completely unarmed; for he had a dagger fixed by his right side near the waist. With characteristic over-confidence Afzal Khan took no objection to Shivaji's companions although they had possessed their usual arms with them, a circumstance which might have passed unnoticed, being common amongst Marathas. He advanced two or three paces to meet Shivaji; they were introduced to each other by Pantaji Gopinath and further in the midst of the customary embrace, the tall and mighty Khan was able to hold the neck of comparatively short statured Shivaji under his left arm. As the Khan tried to press it, he took out his dagger from his waist on the right side and tried to hit the left side of Shivaji. As Shivaji was clad in armour, the steel weapon only made a sharp rubbing sound against his side but did not hurt him. Thereupon Shivaji, ever on his guard hit the bichva in his left hand on the right side of the Khan. Unfortunately the Khan wore no armour and therefore the hit proved singularly effective and ripped open his bowels [The story told by Sabhasad and reproduced by Grant Duff, that Shivaji fixedVaghnakhs or steel tiger's claw on his fingers and used the weapon for killing Afzal Khan, is not supported by Shiva Bharat, which is a contemporary and a comparatively more reliable evidence. That Vaghnakhi were found in the collection possessed by the later Chhatrapatis of Satara is however true. In 1827 Raja Pratapsinh then Chief of Satara (1810-1839) gave the Vaghnakhs to Mr. ElphInstone. They were most formidable steel hooks and attached to two rings fitting the fingers and lay concealed in the inside of the hand. Colbrooke's Elphinstone. II 188. See also Scott Waring's Marathas, 69.]. Khan uttered the words 'treachery' 'treachery' and shouted for help. Khan's hold on Shivaji's neck by this time was naturally slackened and Shivaji having made himself free quickly thrust his sword right through Afzal Khan's stomach and in a moment Afzal Khan lay dead on the ground. Krshnaji Bhaskar who possessed Afzal Khan's sword tried to rescue him but was held at bay by Shivaji who with another stroke of his sword separated the head of the Khan from the trunk of his body. At this moment Bada Sayyad rushed forth and tried to attack Shivaji but Jiva Mahala finished him. The palanquin bearers of Khan tried to take away the body putting it in the palanquin but Sambhaji Kavji hit at their legs, seized the head of the Khan and marched towards the gate of the fort. The sharp shrill sound of the bugle-like horn was a signal to Netaji Palkar and the Mavlis lying in concealment, who fell upon Khan's army, that was resting at the foot of the hill. Moro Trimal also, began his operations on hearing the sound of five guns fired from Pratapgad on Shivaji coming out safe. Few of the Bijapur soldiers had time to mount their horses or stand to their arms. Netaji Palkar gave no quarter; but orders were sent to Moropant to spare all who submitted. Shivaji's humanity to his prisoners was conspicuous on this as on most occasions. Many of those that had attempted to escape were brought in several days afterwards in a state of great wretchedness. Their reception and treatment induced many of the Maratha prisoners to enter Shivaji's service. The most distinguished Maratha taken was Jhnjharrav Ghatge whose father had been the intimate friend of Sbahaji, but Shivaji could not induce him to depart from his allegiance to Bijapur. At his own request he was allowed to return, and was honourably dismissed with valuable presents. The son and family of Afzal Khan were taken by Khanduji Khopde one of Shivaji's officers, but on being offered a large bribe he agreed to guide them to a place of safety, and led them by unfrequented paths across the mountains and along the banks of the Koyna, until he safely lodged them in Karad. When this treachery came to Shivaji's knowledge Khopde was condemned to death and at once executed [Afzal Khan incident was for a long time regarded as one of the controversial topics in the life of Shivaji. The fact that Afzal Khan who had gone to meet Shivaji should have met with sudden death at Shivaji's hands led the common observer to believe that Shivaji meant treachery. Muslim chroniclers and those that closely followed them naturally presented the story in that light. Subsequent research has however revealed that Afzal Khan intended to seize Shivaji dead or alive, and that he was making preparations to that effect (see Patra Sar Sangraha No. 774 and 792). Afzal's over-confidence and unguarded behaviour brought the tragic end upon him. Eager to meet Shivaji, Afzal rashly consented to meet the lion in his den as it were. If Shivaji had meant treachery, he would have certainly asked his people lying concealed in the thickets at the foot of the hill, to fall upon Afzal Khan then found well within his trap; and he
would have avoided the risk of an interview with the Khan. In this controversy enough weight has not been given to Shivaji's readiness to meet the Khan who was known for his earlier treacherous behaviour and whose intentions to seize Shivaji had been widely publicised. (See Shiva Charitra Nibandhavali : R. P. Patwardhans essay on "Afzal Khan's Expedition", pp. 178-179).]

This success greatly raised the reputation of Shivaji. The immediate fruits were four thousand horses, several elephants, a number of camels, a considerable treasure, and the who'e train of equipment which had been sent against him. Such of his troops as were wounded, Shivaji on this occasion distinguished by presents of bracelets, necklaces, chains of gold and silver, and clothes. These were presented with much ceremony, and served to stimulate future exertion among his soldiers as well as to give greater fame to his exploit. The sword of Afzal Khan and Shivaji's favourite swordBhavani passed to the Moghals on the capture of Sambhaji in 1689. They were restored by Aurahgzeb to Shahu in 1707 and till 1827 remained a valued trophy in the armoury of Shivaji's descendants. Gopinathpaht received the promised grant of Hivra in reward for his help to Shivaji, and was afterwards promoted to considerable rank in the service [Grant Duff's Marathas, 137.].

In 1659, Shivaji surprised the fort of Vasantgad about seven miles north-west of Karad, levied contributions along the Krshna, and left a thana or garrison with a revenue collector in the gadhi or mud fort of Battis Shirala. In January 1661, Ali Adil Shah II disappointed in his hopes of crushing Shivaji, took the field in person and marched to Karad. All the district authorities, some of whom had submitted to Shivaji, attended the royal camp to tender their allegiance. Ali Adil Shah recovered Panhala and Rangna in Kolhapur which had fallen to Shivaji in the previous year [Grant Duff's Marathas, 143.].

In 1661, as Shivaji was unable to visit the famous temple of Bhavani at Tuljapur during the rains, he with great solemnity dedicated as has been mentioned above, a temple to her in the fort of Pratapgad. His religious observances from this time became exceedingly rigid; he chose the celebrated Ramdas Svami as his mahapurush or spiritual guide and aspired to a high character for sanctity [Grant Duff's Marathas, 144. For a further elucidation as regards Ramdas- Shivaji relations see p. 39.]. In 1662 when Shivaji thought of making Raygad in Kolaba his capital he held the Kohkan Ghatmatha that is the hilly west Deccan from the Bhma to the Varna [Grant Duff's Marathas, 147.]. In 1665, in accordance with the terms of the treaty of Purandhar by which Shivaji ceded to the Moghals the forts which he had taken from them and twenty others taken or built by him in the old Nizam Shahi territory and obtained the right of levying the chauth ansardeshmukhi over the Bijapur dominions and to co-operate with the Moghals to subdue Bijapur, Shivaji with a body of 2,000 horse and 8,000 infantry joined Jaysingh and the combined army marched about November. Their first operations were against Bajaji Naik Nimbalkar a relation of Shivaji and jagirdar of Bijapur. Phaltan was reduced and the fort of Tathvad scaled by Shivaji's Mavlis. All the fortified places in their route were taken. Ali Adil Shah had prepared his troops, but endeavoured to prevent the invasion by promises of settling the demands of the Moghals. But Jaysingh continued his advance and met with little opposition until near Mahgalvedha in Sholapur [Grant Duff's Marathas, 165.] In 1668 Shivaji obtained a yearly payment of money from the Bijapur Government in lieu of a levy of the chauth and sardeshmukhi over the Bijapur dominions and in spite of the narrowing of his territory by the Purandhar treaty he still retained the western Satara hills.

Shivaji's institutions

The years 1668 and 1669 were of greatest leisure in Shivaji's life. Some of his contemporaries, speculating on the future, supposed from his apparent inactivity that he would sink into insignificance, but he employed this interval in revising and completing the internal management of his government, which with his various institutions are the key to the forms of

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government afterwards adopted by every Maratha state. Shivaji's regulations were gradually formed and enlarged, but after a certain period underwent no change by the extension of his territory until he assumed the ensign of royalty. Even then the alterations were rather in matters of form than in rules. The plans of Maratha expansion which were afterwards pursued so successfully by his nation may be traced from a very early period and nothing is more remarkable in regard to Shivaji than the foresight with which some of his schemes were laid and the fitness of his arrangements for the genius of his countrymen.

The foundation of his power was his infantry; his occupation of the forts gave him a hold on the country and a place of deposit for his plunder. His cavalry had not yet spread the terror of the Maratha name; but the rules of formation and discipline for his troops, the interior economy of his infantry and cavalry, the regulations for his forts, his revenue and judicial arrangements, and the chief offices through which his government was administered were fully developed. Shivaji's infantry was raised in the West Deccan and Konkan; the men of the West Deccan tract were called Malis or westerners, those of the Konkan, Hetkaris or southerners. These men brought their own arms and required nothing but ammunition. Their dress, though not uniform, was generally a pair of short drawers coming half-way down the thigh, a strong narrow band of considerable length tightly girt about the loins, a turban, and sometimes a cotton frock. Most of them wore a cloth round the waist, which likewise answered the purposes of a shawl. Their common arms consisted of a sword, shield and matchlock. Some of the Hetkaris, especially the infantry of Savantvadi used a species of firelock, the invention of the lock for the flint having been early received from the Portuguese. Every tenth man, instead of firearms, carried a bow and arrows which were useful in night attacks and surprises when firearms were kept in reserve or forbidden. The Hetkaris excelled as marksmen but they could seldom be brought to the desperate sword-in-hand attacks for which the Mavails were famous. Both of them had unusual skill in climbing, and could mount a precipice or scale a rock with ease, where men of other countries must have run great risk of being dashed to pieces. Every ten men had an officer called a Naik and every fifty a havildar. The officer over a hundred was termed jumladar and the commander of a thousand was styled ek-hazari. There were also officers of five thousand, between whom and the sarnobat or chief commander there was no intermediate step. The cavalry was of two kinds. bargirs, literally bridlemen or riders who were supplied with horses and shiledars who were self-horsed; Shivaji's bargirs were generally mounted on horses, the property of the state. A body of this description was termed pagah or household troops, and Shivaji always placed more dependence, on them than on theshiledars or any horse furnished on contract by individuals; with both he had a proportion of his pagah mixed, to overawe the disobedient and to perfect his system of intelligence which abroad and at home penetrated into a knowledge of the most private circumstances, prevented embezzlement, and frustrated treachery. The Maratha horsemen were commonly dressed in a pair of tight breeches covering the knee, a turban which many of them fastened by passing a fold of it under the chin, a frock of quilted cotton, and a cloth round the waist, with which they generally girded on their swords in preference to securing them with their belts. The horseman was armed with a sword and shield; a proportion in each body carried matchlocks, but the great national weapon was the spear, in the use of which and in the management of (heir horses they showed both grace and skill. The spearmen had generally sword and sometimes a shield; but the shield was unwieldy, and was carried only in case the spear should be broken. Over every twenty-five horsemen Shivaji had a havildar. To one hundred and twenty-five there was a jumladar, and to every five jumlas or six hundred and twenty-five was a subhedar. Every subha had an accountant and auditor of accounts appointed by Shivaji, who were liable to be changed and were invariably Brahmons or Frabhus. To the command of every ten subhas or six thousand, two hundred and fifty horse, which were rated at only five thousand, there was a commander styled panch-hazari with whom were also stationed a muzumdar or Brahman auditor of accounts and a Prabhu registrar and accountant who' was called amin. These were government agents. Besides these, every officer, from the jumladar upwards, had one or more karkuns or writers paid by himself as well as others in the pay of government. Except the sarnobat
or chief, no officer was superior to the commander of five thousand. There was onesarnobat for the cavalry and one for the infantry. Every jutna, subha, and panch-hazar had an establishment of news-writers and spies besides secret intelligencers. Shivaji's head spy was a Maratha named Bahirji Naik. The Marathas are peculiarly roused from indolence and apathy when charged with responsibility. Shivaji at the beginning of his career personally inspected every man who offered himself, and obtained security from some persons already in his service for the fidelity and good conduct of those with whom lie was not acquainted. This system of security must soon have made almost every man answerable for some of his comrades; and although it could have been in most instances but a form, owing to the ease with which the responsibility could be evaded, the demand of security was always a part of Shivaji's instructions to his officers. The Mavlis sometimes enlisted, merely on condition of getting a subsistence in grain; but the regular pay of the infantry was 1 to 3 pagodas [A pagoda was equal to from Rs. 3 to Rs. 4.] a month; that of the bargis or riders, was 2 to 5 pagodas and that of the shiledars or self-horsed cavaliers 6 to 12 pagodas a month. All plunder as well as prizes was the property of government. It was brought at stated times to Shivaji's darbar or place of public audience and individuals formally displayed and delivered their captures. They always received some small proportionate compensation; they were praised, distinguished, and promoted according to their success. In fact to collect plunder from the enemy's ranks was usually regarded by the Marathas to express a victory, of which in their estimation it could be the only tangible proof. The horses, especially at an advanced period of Shivaji's history, were subsisted during the fair season in the enemy's country; during the rains they were generally allowed to rest, and were cantoned in different places near kurans or pasture lands, under the protection of some fort, where the grass of the preceding season was stacked and grain prepared by the time they returned. For this purpose persons were appointed to whom rentfree lands were hereditarily assigned. The system was preserved when many of Shivaji's institutions were neglected, and it proved a great aid to the success of his countrymen.

Shivaji kept the Hindu festival of the Dasara with great pomp. It falls in October at the end of the south-west rains, and was particularly convenient for a general muster and review of his troops previous to their taking the field. At this time each horse was examined and an inventory and valuation of each soldier's effects were taken to be compared with what he brought back or eventually to be made good. If a horseman's effects were unavoidably lost, his horse killed, maimed, or destroyed in government service they were on due proof replaced. On the other hand all plunder or articles discovered, of which no satisfactory account could be given, were carried to the credit of government, either by confiscating the article or deducting the amount from the soldier's arrears. It was at the option of the captors to keep almost any articles if fairly brought forward, valued, and paid for. The, accounts were closed every year, and balances due by government were paid either in ready money or by bills on the collectors of revenue in favour of the officers, but never by separate orders on villages. The only exceptions to plunder made by Shivaji were in favour of cows, cultivators, and women; these were never to be molested—nor were any but rich Muhammedans or Hindus in their service who could pay a ransom to be made prisoners. No soldier in the service of Shivaji was permitted to carry any female followers with him to the field on pain of death. His system of intelligence was the greatest check on every abuse, and his punishments were rigorous. Officers and men who had distinguished themselves, who were wounded, or who had suffered in any way, were always gratified by promotion, honour or compensation. Shivaji did not approve of the jagir or estate system; he confirmed many, but, with the exception of the establishment for his forts, he seldom bestowed new military estates and gave away very few as personal assignments. Inam lands were granted by him as well in reward of merit as in conformity with the tenets of his faith; a gift of land, especially to Brahmans, being of all charities the most acceptable to the divinity. Shivaji's discipline, which required prompt obedience to superiors in every situation, was particularly strict in his forts. The chief person or killedar in the command of a fortress was termed havildar and under him there was one or more sarnobats. In large forts there was a sarnobat to each face. Every fort has a head clerk and a commissary of grain and stores; the

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head clerk, a Brahman was termed sabnis; the commissary was commonly of the Prabhu caste and was called karkhanis. The orders regarding ingress and egress, rounds, watches, and patrols, care of water, grain, stores, and ammunition were most minute, and the head of each department was furnished with distinct rules for his guidance from which no deviation was allowed. A rigid economy characterised all Shivaji's instructions regarding expenditure. The garrison was sometimes partly composed of the common infantry. Independent of them, each fort had a separate and complete establishment. It consisted of Brahmans, Marathas, Ramoshis, Mahars, and Mangs; the whole were termed gadkaris or fort-men. They were maintained by permanent assignments of rent-free lands in the neighbourhood of each fort, which with the care of the fort passed from father to son. The Ramoshis and Mahars were employed on outpost duty. They brought intelligence, watched all the paths, misled inquiries, or cut off hostile stragglers. This establishment while new and vigorous was admirably suited to Shivaji's purpose as well as to the genius of the people. The gadkaris described the fort as the mother that fed them, and among other advantages, no plan could better provide for old or deserving soldiers.

Shivaji's revenue arrangements were founded on those of Dadaji Kondadev, Shahaji's Brahman manager, to whom Shivaji's education in Poona was entrusted (1641) [D.V. Kale: Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj p. 27.]. The assessments were made on the actual state of the crop, the proportionate division of which is stated to have been three-fifths to the husbandmen and two fifths to government. As soon as Shivaji got permanent possession of any territory, every species of military contribution was stopped, all farming of revenue ceased, and the collections were made by agents appointed by himself. Every two or three villages were superintended by karkun under the tarafdar or talukdar who had charged of a small district, and was either a Brahman or a Prabhu. A Maratha havildar was stationed with each of them. Over a considerable tract there was a subedar or mamlatdar who had charge of one or more forts in which his collections both of grain and money were secured. Shivaji never permitted thedeshmukhs and deshpandes to interfere in the management of the country; nor did he allow them to collect their dues until their amount had been ascertained, when an order was annually given for the amount. The patil's, khots and kulkarnis were strictly superintended, and Shivaji's government though popular with the common cultivators, would have been unpopular with village and district officers, of whom Shivaji was always jealous, had it not been for the recourse which all had of entering his military service.

The method which the Brahman ministers of the Maratha government afterwards adopted, of paying the military and civil servants by permanent assignments on portions of the revenue of villages, is said to have been early proposed to Shivaji. He objected to it, not only from fear of immediate oppression to the husbandmen, but from apprehending that it would in the end cause such a division of power as must weaken his government and encourage the village and district authorities to resist it as they frequently did that of Bijapur. With the same view he destroyed all village walls and allowed no fortification in his territory which was not occupied by his troops. Religious establishments were, carefully preserved, and temples for which no provision existed had some adequate assignments granted to them, but the Brahminans in charge were obliged to account for the expenditure. Shivaji never sequestrated any allowance fixed by the Muhammedan government for the support of tombs, mosques, or saints' shrines. The revenue regulations of Shivaji were simple and judged by the standards of those times undoubtedly judicious.

People were encouraged to clear the jungles, raise crops and revive the villagepanchayats. They were further assured that the authorities would not take anything more than whatever be due according to law. This persistent effort to foster the rule of law and create an atmosphere of security endeared him to his people, it is just possible, however, that his judicious measures may not have been attended with immediate improvements and prosperity to the people as is sometimes alleged; for his districts were frequently exposed to great ravages, and he never had sufficient leisure: to complete his arrangements by that persevering superintendence which alone can perfect such

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institutions. The Muhammedan writers, and Fryer, a contemporary English traveller describe his country as in the worst possible state, and the former only mention him as a depredator and destroyer. Still those districts taken by him from Bijapur which had been under the management of farmers or direct agents of government undoubtedly experienced great benefit by the change. The judicial system of Shivaji in civil cases was that of panchayat or council which had invariably obtained in the country. Disputes among his soldiers were settled by their officers. He drew his criminal law from the Hindu sacred works or Shastras; but as the former rulers were Musalmans they had naturally introduced changes which custom had sanctioned and perpetuated. This accounts for the difference that long afterwards persisted between Hindu law and Maratha usage.

To aid in the conduct of his government, Shivaji established eight offices; 1st the Peshva or head manager whose office was held by Moro Pant or Moreshvar Trimbak Pingle; second the Muzumdar or general superintendent of finance and auditor general of accounts, whose office was held by Abaji Sondev, subhedar of the province of Kalyan; third the Sumis or general record-keeper, superintendent of correspondence, examiner of letters; the office was held by Annaji Datto; fourth the Vanknis or private record-keeper and superintendent of the household troops and establishment; the office was field by Dattajipant; fifth the Sarnobat or chief captain of whom there were two, Pratapprav Gujar over the cavalry and Yesaji Kank over the infantry; sixth the Dabir or minister for foreign affairs, an office held by Somnathpant; seventh the Nyayadhish or superintendent of justice, an office managed by Niraji Ravji and Gomaji Naik; and eighth the Nyaya Shastri or expounder of Hindu law, an office held first by Shambhu Upadhya and afterwards by Raghunathpant.

The officers at the head of these civil situations, except the Nyayadhish and Nyaya Shastri, held military commands and frequently had not leisure to superintend their duties. All therefore were aided by deputies called karharis, who often had power to fix the seal or mark of their principals on public documents. When so empowered they were styled mutaliks. Each department and every district establishment had eight subordinate officers under whom were an adequate staff of assistants. These officers were, 1st the Karbharhi, Mutalik or Divan; 2nd the Muzumdar or auditor and accountant; 3rd the Fadnisor Fadravis deputy auditor and accountant; 4th the Sabnis or clerk sometimes styled daftardar; 5th the Karkhannis or commissary; 6th the Chitnis or correspondence clerk; 7th the Jamdar or treasurer in charge of all valuables except cash; and 8th the Potnis or cashkeeper. Attached to himself, Shivaji had a treasurer, a correspondence clerk, and an accountant besides a Farisnis or Persian secretary. His clerk was a Prabhu named Balaji Avji, whose astuteness and intelligence were remarked by the English at Bombay on an occasion when he was sent there on business. Balkrishnapant Hanmante, a near relation of Shahajis head manager was Shivajis accountant. On Shivaji's enthronement at Raygad in 1674 the names of such offices as were formerly expressed in Persian were changed to Sanskrit and some were marked by higher sounding titles. There was only one commander-in-chief for the infantry and cavalry and one Nyayadhish or judge [Grant Duffs Marathas, 206'::207. The following statement gives the names and the old and new titles of Shivaji's ministers in 1674:]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name.</th>
<th>Old Title.</th>
<th>New, Title.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moropaat Pingle</td>
<td>Peshva</td>
<td>Mukhya Pradhan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramchandrapant Bavdevkar</td>
<td>Muzumdar</td>
<td>Pant Amatya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annaji Datto</td>
<td>Surnis</td>
<td>Pant Sachiv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dattajipant</td>
<td>Vanknis</td>
<td>Mantr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hambirrav Molate</td>
<td>Sarnobat</td>
<td>Senaputi.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Shivaji's takes Satara.

In May 1673 a detachment of Shivaji's Mavlis surprised Parali about four miles south-west of Satara. Its capture put the Musalman garrisons on the alert, and Satara, a fort that had always been kept in good order by the Bijapur government, which was next invested, sustained a siege of several months and did not surrender till the beginning of September. It is remarkable that this fort which had long, perhaps before the Adil Shahi Dynasty, been used as a slate prison, often became the prison of Shivaji's descendants in later years. The forts of Chandan, Vandan, Pandavgad, Nandgiri, and Tathvad all fell into Shivaji's hands before the fair season [Grant Duffs Marathas, 202. Satara was captured on 27th of July and after the capture of Satara Shivaji installed his Guru in the neighbouring hill for of Parali or Sajjangad, and guides still point out the tourists the seat on the top of the Satara hill from which Shivaji used to hold conversation with the saint across 4 miles of the space (Sarkar-Shivaji p. 193 and p. 363)]. In 1075 Shivaji again possessed himself of all the forts between Panhala in Kolhapur and Tathvad. As soon as he was occupied in Konkan and had carried down all the infantry that could be spared, Nimbalkar and Ghatge, the deshmukhs of Phaltan and Malavdi, attacked Shivaji's garrisons, drove out the posts and recovered most of the open country for Bijapur [Grant Duff's Marathas, 208. Satara was captured on 27th of July and after the capture of Satara Shivaji installed his Guru in the neighbouring hill for of Parali or Sajjangad, and guides still point out the tourists the seat on the top of the Satara hill from which Shivaji used to hold conversation with the saint across 4 miles of the space (Sarkar-Shivaji p. 193 and p. 363)]. In 1676 Shivaji for the third time took possession of the open country between Tathvad and Panhala. To prevent future inroads by neighbouring proprietors Shivaji gave orders to connect the two places by a chain of forts, which he named Vardhangad, Bhushangad, Sadashivgad, and Machhindragad. Although of no great strength they were well chosen to support his intermediate posts and to protect the highly productive tract within the frontier which they embraced. While engaged in this arrangement Shivaji was overtaken by a severe illness which confined him at Satara for several months. During this period he became extravagently rigid in the observance of religious forms, but he was at the same time planning the most important expedition of his life, the invasion of the Madras Karnatak [Grant Duff's Marathas, 209.]. The discussion of his legal claim to share in half his father's Karnatak possessions and the possibility of making this a cloak for more extensive acquisitions in the south was a constant subject of consultation [Grant Duff's Marathas, 213.]. While Shivaji was in the Karnatak a body of horse belonging to Ghatge and Nimbalkar laid waste Panhala in the south and retired plundering towards Karad. A detachment from Shivaji's army under Nilaji Katkar overtook them at Kurl, attacked and dispersed them, recovering much valuable property, which, as it belonged to his own subjects, Shivaji scrupulously restored [Grant Duff's Marathas, 221].

In 1679, Shivaji's son Sambhaji joined "the Moghals [According to Sardesai, Sambhaji joined the Moghals in 1678 but the fort was captured in 1679 (Sardesai-New History of Marathas Vol. 1 p. 251 and Sarkar-Shivaji p. 317)]. Diler Khan the Moghal general, intent on making Sambhaji the head of a party in opposition to his father, sent a detachment of his army from before Bijapiir which they had invested, accompanied by Sambhaji as Raja of the Marathas, and took Bhupalgal in the Khanapur sub-division Shivaji's easternmost outpost [ Grant Duffs Marathas, 225.]. At the time of his death in 1680, Shivaji, who during the last two years of his life had become an ally of Bijapur against the Moghals, possessed that part of Satara of which the line of forts built from Tathvad to Panhala distinctly marked the eastern boundary. Shinganapur in the Man sub-

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Janardanpant Hanmunte.</th>
<th>Dabir</th>
<th>Sumant.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Balajipant</td>
<td>Nyayadhish</td>
<td>Nyayadhish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raghunathpant</td>
<td>Nyayashastri</td>
<td>Panditrap.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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division in the east with the temple of Mahadev was his hereditary inam village given by one of the Ghatges to his father Shahaji [Grant Duffs Marathas, 231]. Ramdas Svami, Shivaji's guru or spiritual guide, whose life and conduct seem to have deserved the universal praise of his countrymen, a few days before his death in 1682 January wrote to Sambhaji his elder son from Parali an excellent and judicious letter, advising him for the future rather than upbraiding him for the past, and pointing out the example of his father yet carefully abstaining from personal comparison [Grant Duffs Marathas, 238].

The name of Ramdas Svami is closely associated with many places in Satara region. On the completion of his all India pilgrimage he settled at Masur north of Karad near the river Krshna, in about 1644. After staying there for about three or four years he shifted to Chaphal where he continued his practice of celebrating the annual Ramnavmi festival for which Shivaji, is reported to have made an annual grant of 200hons or about Rs. 700. There is some controversy as to the nature of relationship between Ramdas and Shivaji as also about the exact year in which they met each other, one side advocating that Ramdas met Shivaji as early as in 1649 and initiated him into his favour, while the other advocating that the two could not have met each other earlier than in 1672 [G. S. Sardesai: New History of Marathas, Vol. I, p. 266]. Even accepting the later year i.e. 1672 as the one of their actual meeting it should be taken into account that their spheres of activity in which they worked for over thirty years, overlapped each other. Under the circumstances it is highly improbable that they might not have heard of each other. In fact there is ample indirect evidence to believe that the two held each other in high respect [G. S. Sardesai: New History of the Marathas Vol. I, p. 265]. There is however no first hand evidence to prove that Shivaji ever took his inspiration from Ramdas for his political mission. Similarly there is also no first hand evidence to show that Ramdas's teaching which had been first purely religious, developed a secular and political character later because he was influenced by Shivaji's activities. It must be remembered that Ramdas started collating his famous Dasbodh in 1654, the piece-meal composition of which must have been done much earlier [Patra-Sar-Sangraha-1039]. In 1676 Ramdas at the request of Shivaji came to stay at Parali which soon came to be known as Sajjangad [Patra-Sar-Sangraha, 1864]. On Shivaji's return from the Karnatak campaign in 1678 Shivaji was apprised of the misconduct of his son Sambhaji whereupon Shivaji asked him to go to Ramdas at Sajjangad and stay with him for some time, hoping of course that the association of the saint would bring about the required change in his son's conduct. Unfortunately the hope was not realised, for Sambhaji soon chose a moment to escape from Sajjangad with the object of joining Diler Khan.

Sambhaji 1680-1689

After Shvaiji's death. Rajaram his younger son was placed on the throne at Raygad by his mother Soyarabai, who was supported by Shivaji's confidential secretary Balaji Avji. He wrote letters in his own hand to the Killedar of Panhala, calling upon him to keep a strict watch upon Sambhaji. The news of Shivaji's death could not however be long concealed from Sambhaji. who killed the Killedar, took possession of Panhala and prepared for a march on Raygad. Senapati Hambirrav Mobile who was near Karad, and who probably had no intimation of the plans at Raygad went over to Sambhaji. In the meantime two of Shivaji's prominent ministers Moropant Pingle and Annaji Datto who had supported the accession of Rajaram were moving towards Panhala, apparently to prevent Sambhaji from doing any mischief. Sambhaji however managed to capture and confine them both at Panhala under a rigorous watch. Determined to put down Soyarabai and her supporters, Sambhaji inarched on Raygad and got possession of the capital on 18th June 1680, putting Rajaram and Soyarabai in close confinement. In gratitude for this easy success he immediately made a formal grant to his family goddess Bhavani of ten thousand gold hons a year. Matters thus appeared to move smoothly. Moropant Pingle died in October 1680 and Sambhaji appointed his son Nilopaut to Peshvaship. Annaji Datto was released and restored to his office. The formal coronation ceremony was performed on 10th January 1681 (Magh Shuddh 7, Shiva Charitra

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Pradip p. 31). The disturbed atmosphere of Maharashtra appeared for a time to assume its normal tenor [Sardesai: New History of the Matharas.].

At this time Akbar the son of Aurahgzeb rose up in rebellion against his father and fled to Rajputana. Aurangzeb fought a battle with him at Ajmer and defeated him. Akbar who had been supported by the Rathods of Rajputana under Durgadas fled with him to the south and came to the Deccan to seek the support of Sambhaji who extended his hospitality and accommodated him at Pali in Konkan. The discomfited group of Shivajis statesmen again revived their efforts and probably sought the support of Akbar in their designs against Sambhaji, who straightway communicated the whole plot to Sambhaji. His anger now knew no bounds with the result that he instantly put the conspirators, like Annaji Datto, Balaji Avji and Hiroji Farjand to death. (August-September 1681). Soyarabai, the mother of Kajaram who died soon after, was said to have been poisoned under instructions from Sambhaji. Members of the Shirke family to which Soyarabai belonged also incurred the displeasure of Sambhaji who put many of them to death [Marathi word 'Shirkan' meaning 'massacre' has been derived from this incident of the massacre of Shirkes.]. The massacre of Shivajis best men had a psychological reflex upon Sambhaji who felt himself somewhat lonely with almost none on whom he could depend. At this stage he developed closer relationship with one Kavi Kalash, a kanjibrahman coming from Pravag, who soon became his trusted and intimate friend, it appears that Sambhaji had known him long since the time of his return journey from Agra during the life time of Shivaji. The term Kavi Kalash came to be mutilated at the hands of his detractors into Qalusha which in Marathi meant a calumniator.

On his accession to the throne, Sambhaji found that his task was simply stupendous. On the Konkan side he had to face the Side and the Portuguese who constantly harassed his possessions in that region, while on the Deccan plateau he had to watch the movements of the Moghals under Azam, another son of Aurangzeb who had reached Aurangabad by that time. In the following year Moghal contingents were further strengthened by the arrival of prince Muazzam and Shahabuddin and they planned a three pronged attack on Sambhaji in Konkan, Shahabuddin penetrating from the north near Kalyan, Muazzam marching from Belganv across Ramsej ghat and joining hands with the Portuguese at Goa and thus blockading him from the south, and the Sidis co-operating with both cutting off the supplies and preventing them from reaching the Maratha forces which were to be trapped both from the north and the south. Simultaneously Azam was expected to distract the attention of Sambhaji by carrying on a foraging campaign into Baglan. For about three years Sambhaji was incessantly facing the difficult situation and it must be said to his credit, that he proved himself to be a worthy son of his father and foiled with great skill and adventure all the attempts of the Moghals, the Sidis and the Portuguese. There is a reference that Durgadas helped him on the Surat side in this effort. Akbar, the rebel prince, wanted Sambhaji to join him in his north India campaign for the conquest of Delhi; but it is not surprising that Sambhaji refused to move far away from his base of operations, particularly when he had always reason to suspect some plot formation against him at home. Disappointed. Akbar thereafter proceeded to Iran in February 1687.

*Fall of Bijapur 1686.*

To turn to the Moghals: Aurangzeb was so enraged at the discomfiture of his forces that he is reported to have taken the cap off his head and thrown it on the ground taking a vow never to wear it until Sambhaji was overcome. He however decided to proceed against Adil Shahi and Kutb Shahi powers first with the object of destroying them before he could turn his attention to Sambhaji. Accordingly he ordered his army to proceed to Bijapur. Thereupon Sambhaji resolved to harass Aurangzeb from the rear and with that object in view concentrated his forces under Kavi Kalash at Panhala and also asked Hambirrav to be watchful in that region. Sambhaji's efforts to distract the attention of Aurahgzeb in this manner, however, did not prove effective probably because Sambhaji gave himself up to pleasure and slackened in his grip over the situation. Aurahgzeb was able to
capture Bijapur towards the end of 1686 and Golkonda next year and was now free to concentrate all his might against Sambhaji. For this purpose he encamped at Akluj [G. S. Sardera: New History of the Marathas, Vol. I, p. 313.] on the banks of Bhima near Pandharpur. One of the old Bijapur generals Sharza Khan, a clever and watchful man, conversant with the terrain of the Maratha country who had now joined the Moghals, invaded the Satara district. Sambhaji's senapati Hambirrav Mohite came to oppose him.

*Moghals 1686-1720 Sambhaji 1680-1689.*

An action was fought between them near Wai towards the end of 1687 in which Hambirrav lost his life on the battle field. A kind of encircling movement was now started against Sambhaji in all directions. He was surrounded by swarms of Moghal parties occupying the difficult passes and stopping communication between Panhala and Raygad where Sambhaji was known to be moving.

The hilly region below the Sahyadri range between Kolhapur and Satara were long held by the Shirkes who had become Sambhaji's mortal enemies. They now played their game, watched Sambhaji's movements and communicated them to the Moghal officers. For about a year after Hambirrav's death Sambhaji and Kavi Kalash struggled as best as they could. In November 1688 Sambhaji having learned that Shirkes had attacked Kavi Kalash and forced him to run away to Vishalgad for protection, rushed against them, forced them to take to their heels and joined Kavi Kalash at Vishalgad. Although Shirke was thus defeated, he came to know the movement of Sambhaji and lost no time in communicating them to the Moghals. On the 1st of February 1689 Sambhaji and Kavi Kalash started from Vishalgad and on their way to Raygad halted at Sangameshvar. No sooner was this known Shaikh Nizam of the Moghals lost no time in rushing thither from Kolhapur and seized them both alive:, while many others ran away to Raygad [Shiv Charitra Pradeep, pp. 34-35.]. Shaikh Nizam seated Sambhaji on his own elephant and the other captives were accommodated on horses and camels, all moving towards the Emperor's camp via Amba Ghat. Aurahgzeb moved from Akluj to Bahadurgad [Ditto 314.] where the captives were presented before him. They were subjected to disgrace and severe ill-treatment at that place and then Sambhaji was offered survival on very humiliating terms. Sambhaji who was roused to self-respect, spurned the offer and preferred a martyr's death to a disgraceful existence. Aurahgzeb now ordered him to be put to death by cruel torture and this was effected at Koregany on 11th March 1689, the Amavastya day of Falguna, Saka 1610.

*Social effects of Moghal-Maratha Conflict.*

Before turning to subsequent events it is necessary to understand the social effects of the constant warfare and consequent uncertainty prevailing in Maharashtra during this period. The system of administration which Shivaji had introduced gradually fell into decay, which first appeared in the army where Shivaji's discipline and strict orders came to be neglected. When the horse took the field, stragglers were allowed to join, plunder was secreted, women followers who had been forbidden on pain of death were not only allowed but women were brought off from the enemy's country as an established article of plunder and either kept as concubines or sold as slaves. The booty brought back by the commanders of the horse was too small for the pay of the troops. They took the field in arrears and leave to keep part of the plunder was a natural compensation for the regular pay allowed by Shivaji. As Sambhaji had to incur heavy expenses, his favourite minister Kavi Kalash, raised the land-rent by the addition of various cesses. When he came to collect the revenue he found the receipts much less than they had been in the time of Shivaji though the assessments were nominally greater. The managers of districts were in consequence removed for what seemed to him evident peculation. The revenue was farmed, many of the husbandmen fled from their villages, and the approach of a vast army of the Moghals under Aurangzeb helped to complete the prospect of ruin to the Maratha territory [Grant Duff's Marathas, 246.]. In 1685 during
his campaign Sultan Muazzam lay at Valva, and in the emperor's name took possession of such parts of the country as he could overrun. Deeds still remain in which Muazzam confirmed in his own name grants of lands originally given by Bijapur generals. In October a pestilence broke out in his camp, swept off many of his men, greatly diminished his force. Still on receiving the emperor's orders to reduce the south-west districts above the Sahyadris, formerly taken by Shivaji from Bijapur, he advanced without hesitation for that purpose [Grant Duffs Marathas, 250.]. In October 1686 Bijapur completely fell to Aurangzeb, the Bijapur government came to an end, and its territories passed to the Moghals [Grant Duffs Marathas, 206. In taking possession of a district the Moghals appointed two officers the fauzdar, a military and the khalsa divan, a civil officer. The fauzdar, who was in command of a body of troops was charged with the care of the police and the protection of his division. He held, or, according to circumstances assumed, a greater or less degree of power. The regular amount allowed him for the maintenance of the district establishment was about 25 per cent, of the government collections. The duties of the divan were entirely civil and he was entrusted with the collection of the revenue whether for the exchequer or on account of a jagirdar. The Moghal commander who received land grants, or jagirs from the newly acquired territories seldom had lands permanently made over to them similar to the tenure by which the Maratha mansabdars held their possessions. The usual practice was to grant assignments for a term of years on specified districts for the support of their troops. Thus, the fauzdars were on the footing of feudatories than the jagirdars. The fauzdars in conjunction with the divans farmed out the districts to the deshmukhs or desais and thedivans realized the amount from them. Ditto, 267]. The Maratha mansabdars on men of title who had been in the service of Bijapur, sent professions of duty to the emperor, but showed no readiness to join his standard.

**Effect of Bijapur and Golkonda conquest.**

The advantage which the Marathas had gained by the extinction of Bijapur Government was not neglected; several detachments pushed forward and occupied a great part of the open country towards Bijapur [Grant Duff's Marathas, 267- ]. This indiscriminate rush for the occupation of the extensive territory resulted in further weakening of the discipline in the Maratha army. Though ruinous to Sambhaji's resources as head of an organized state, this increased looseness had a wonderful effect in spreading predatory power. Every lawless man and every disbanded soldier, Mohammedan or Maratha, who could command a horse and a spear, joined the Maratha parties, and such adventurers were often enriched by the plunder of a day. It must also be realised that the Moghal invasion of the Deccan was a challenge to the Marathas whose spirit of independence was roused and stimulated by the prospects of a worthy prize to their spirit of adventure. The multitude of horsemen nurtured by former wars was already too heavy for the resources of the Maratha state. The proportion of the best troops which was kept in the Imperial service would probably have soon enabled Aurangzeb to suppress the forces of disorder had not the spirit of independence as also the love of war been kindled among the Marathas. A pride in the conquests of Shivaji, their confidence in the strength of the forts, the skill and bravery of many of the Maratha leaders, the ability and influence of many of the Brahmins, and the anger raised among Hindus by the odious poll-tax, excited a ferment which developed a nationalistic character for they felt that they were fighting for the ashes of their fathers and temples of their gods. It required a man of broader vision than Aurangzob to deal with the new forces released by the spirit of the times.

Aurangzeb had great military and financial strength: he had considerable local knowledge, and in the first: instance the same power of confirming or withholding hereditary right as his predecessors in conquest. Titles, Mansabs, and jagirs were bestowed and still more frequently promised with a liberality greater than that of any former conqueror. Still, presumption, jealousy, and bigotry deprived him of many of those advantages. He was not fully aware of the strength of the people fired with the spirit of independence and determined for once to put an end to the spirit of religious intolerance of which he himself was an example incarnate. Instead of crushing it by the
aid of the established governments Aurangzeb pulled down the two leading states of Golkonda and Bijapur and raised nothing in their place. He involved himself with enemies on every side; he dis- barged the soldiery, whom, in addition to his own troops, he could not maintain, and thus sent armies into the field against himself. He supposed that he was not only acquainted with the details of the arrangements necessary in a newly conquered territory, but capable of superintending them. He placed little confidence in his agents, while at the same time he employed Muhammadans in situations for which policy and humanity alike advised the choice of Hindus. The confusion and disorder which followed could not be quieted by the emperor's fancied wisdom or by the flattery and praises of his court and countrymen. Marathas far from being dazzled by the pomp of the Moghal camp soon found the weak points in the magnificence of the emperor. The powerful Satara chiefs Daphle, Ghatge, Mane, and Nimbalkar, during the siege of Bijapur hovered round the imperial camp until the fall of the capital. They then withdrew to their estates, sending their agents with humble professions of duty, and in some cases attending themselves. Still from this time they became unsettled and joined the adventurous parties of their countrymen or submitted to the Moghals as circumstances invited or forced them. Few of those adventurers were independent of Sambhaji's parties or of some of the local chiefs because the Moghal fauzdar's troops were always too strong for an isolated adventurer. While their envoys were in the imperial camp professing obedience to Aurangzeb, the chiefs often sent parties to plunder the Moghal districts. In case of discovery their Brahman agent, who by bribery had secured the patronage of some great man at the Moghal court was ready to answer for or to excuse the irregular conduct of his master's followers. The Moghal fauzdars were told to please the Maratha chiefs on conditions that they agreed to serve the Moghals. The chiefs were negotiating with the jauzdar; their agents were intriguing at court; their own villages were secure; and their followers, hid under the vague name of Marathas, were making the Moghal rule unsettled in the country. The Moghal officers who had land assignments in the Deccan soon found that they could raise little revenue. Their corruption was increased by poverty, and the offenders who in the first instance had plundered their districts by purchasing the connivance of the fauzdars, bribed the jagirdars at court with a part of the village. The hereditary rights and the family feuds which had before usefully served as an instrument of Government, in the general confusion of the period became a cause of increasing disorder. The intricate nature of some of the hereditary claims in dispute and the ingenuity of Brahmans who with their ability to read and write and manage thedaftar were usually the managers, made every case so plausible that the officers of Government found little difficulty in excusing or at least in palliating many acts of gross injustice to which they scandalously lent themselves. The rightful owners had often reason for complaint; they absented themselves with their troops, joined the adventurers, and when induced or compelled to come in, they boldly justified their behaviour by the injustice they had suffered.

When an hereditary office was forfeited or became vacant in any way the Moghal government selected a candidate on whom it was conferred; but the established premium of the exchequer was upwards of six and a half years' purchase or precisely 651 per cent, on one year's emoluments, one-fourth of which was made payable at the time of delivering the deed and the remainder by instalments. Besides this tax the clerks exacted an infinite number of fees or perquisites all of which lent encouragement to confiscations and new appointments. The emperor, weighed down by years, was soon overwhelmed with pressing cares; his ministers and their underlings were alike negligent and corrupt; even after deeds and papers were prepared years passed before the orders they contained were carried out [Grant Duff's Marathas,270-273.]. Aurangzeb spent some time for the settlement and restoration at Bijapur. During this time his arms were everywhere successful. In Sambhaji's Deccan districts nothing but the strong forts remained unsubdued (1689). The Moghal troops had possessed themselves of Tathvad and the range of forts built by Shivaji between that place and Panhala, and Aurangzeb was now preparing to enter on a regular plan for reducing the whole of the forts, as, in his opinion, this was all that remained to complete the conquest he had so long meditated. His plans were thwarted by the terrible outbreak of plague which forced him to leave Bijapur and pass north to Akluj in Sholapur.
Rajaram 1689-1700.

[The Marathas gained their first signal victory over the Moghals on 4th June, 1690, when they captured Sharza Khan near Satara with his family, 4,000 horses and the, entire camp and baggage of his army, after slaying 1,500 of his men. Then they recovered several forts namely Prabal gad, Rohida, Raj gad and Torna In 1692 there was a renewal of Maratha activity and their success was conspicuous in many quarters such as the recovery of Panhala. The disaster of Sharza Khan in 1690 compelled the emperor to occupy the Satara district in force, which led to frequent but indecisive conflicts with Santaji Ghorpade, who had made the Mahadev hill the base, and used to raid far to the south and the east (Sarkar in Cambridge History Vol. IV pp. 293-94).] As has been said before, Sambhaji was surprised at Sangameshvar in 1689 and was carried in triumph to Aurangzeb's camp and subsequently met a heroic death. At Raygad, on the news of his death, his younger brother Rajaram was declared regent during the minority of Sambhaji's son Shivaji afterwards known as Shahu. In 1689 Raygad the Maratha capital fell to the Moghals and young Shivaji and his mother Yesubai were made prisoners and taken to the Moghal camp. Shivaji's sword Bhavani and the sword of Afzal Khan were taken by the Moghals. Yesubai and her son found a friend in Begam Saheb the daughter of Aurangzeb, and the emperor himself became partial to the boy whom he named Shahu. Undaunted by the calamities the Marathas resolved to fight with the Moghals by dividing their own forces and thus widely extending the field of military operations. Rajaram moved from place to place and afterwards made Jinji about eighty miles south-west of Madras his head-quarters. In a fresh arrangement of state offices made at this time Santaji Ghorpade the oldest representative of the Kapshi family was made senapatiand was to act as a roving general between Kolhapur and Jinji. He was dignified with the title of Hindu Rav Mamlakat Madar. He was also entrusted with a new standard called thejaripatka or Golden Streamer, and in imitation of the imperial officers of the highest rank he was authorised to beat the naubat or large drum and assume various other signs of rank. Rajaram at this time created a new office called pratinidhi or the King's representative and conferred it on Pralhad Niraji who at this time was the soul of the Maratha cause.

Satara taken by Aurangzeb 1700.

While Rajaram was at Jinji, Ramechandrapant Bavdekar who held the post of Amatva was given the title of Hukmat Panha and was placed in charge of all the forts. He was given all powers of government, and under him was placed Parshuram Trimbak who from the humble situation of hereditary Kulkarni of Khinai had brought himself into notice and had given proofs of intelligence and spirit. These officers used great exertions in restoring forts and giving spirit and zeal to the garrisons. Ramechandrapant moved from place to place, but fixed his principal residence at Satara, where, by the aid of his head writer Shankaraji Narayan Gandekar, he not only attended to every military disposition, but regulated the revenue and established order. He had raised troops of his own and had cut off several straggling parties of Moghals before Santaji and Dhanaji returned from Jinji. When they joined him Ramechandrapant proposed a plan for surprising the fauzdar at Wai to which, Santaji greatly pleased immediately agreed, took the fauzdar with all his troops prisoners, and in their stead established a Maratha post. The presence of Santaji and Dhanaji inspired Ramechandrapant's men and he stirred his captains to follow their example. He sent them to make their established collections, the chauth and sardeshmukhi, as they were termed, from the Moghal territory, and under the encouragement of success, his officers added a third contribution for themselves under the head of ghasdana or forage money. In this manner a new army was raised whose leaders were Pavar, Thorat, and Atole. Rajaram gave them honorary presents and rewards; the title of Vishvasrav was conferred on Pavar, of Dinkarav on Thorat, and of Shamsher Bahadur on Atole. Ramchandrapant was particularly partial to the Dhangars or shepherds, a great number of whom served among his troops; and many of the ancestors of those who afterwards became great chiefs in the empire began their career under Ramechandrapant. Shankaraji Narayan, known as an able officer, received charge of Wai [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 286.]. Jinji in which Rajaram
was besieged fell to the Moghals in January 1698. But a few days before the fall, Rajaram was allowed to escape and came in safety to Vishalgad in Kolhapur [Grant Duff’s Marathas, Vol. I, 293.]. In 1699 Rajaram remained for a short time at Satara which at the recommendation of Ramechandrapant he made the seat of government and then passed north with his army plundering [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, 296. ]. On hearing of Rajaram's return, Aurangzeb inarched west from Brahmapuri in Sholapur and encamped under the fort of Vasantgad about seven miles north-west of Karad. Batteries were prepared and in three days the garrison surrendered. The emperor named the fort Kalied-i-fateh or the Key of Victory and was much pleased with his success. Aurangzeb marched for Satara, a movement wholly unexpected by the Marathas, who, filled with the idea that Panhala in Kolhapur was about to be besieged, had directed all their preparations towards its defence. The provisions in Satara fort were not enough to stand more than a two month's siege. Tin's neglect roused the suspicion that Ramechandrapant had purposely left it unprovided. Of this suspicion Aurangzeb took advantage, and when during the siege in consequence of Rajaram's illness, Ramechandrapant was called to Sinhgad in Poona, Aurangzeb wrote a letter which fell into the hands of Parashuram Trimbak and widened the breach which had for some time existed between him and Ramechandrapant. On arriving before Satara Aurangzeb pitched his tents to the north of the fort on the site of the present village of Karanja. Azam Shah was stationed at a village on the west side which has since borne the name of Shahapur. Sharza Khan invested the south side and Tarbiyat Khan occupied the eastern quarter; and chains of posts between the different camps effectually secured the blockade. The fort which occupies the summit of a very steep hill of moderate height, and whose defences consist of a sheer scarp of over forty feet topped by a stone wall, was defended by Prayagji Prabhu Havildar, who had been reared in the service of Shivaji. He vigorously opposed the Moghals, and disputed every foot of ground as they pushed forward their advanced posts. As soon as they began to gain any part of the hill he withdrew his troops into the fort and rolled huge stones from the rock above, which did great execution, and, until they threw up cover, were as destructive as artillery. In spite of Prayagji's efforts the blockade was completed. All communication with the country round was cut off; and as the small stock of grain was soon exhausted, the besieged must have been forced to surrender had not Parashuram Trimbak, who had thrown himself into the fort or Parali, bought the connivance of Azam Shah and brought provisions to the besieged. The divisions on the west and south faces raised batteries, but the grand attack was directed against the north-east angle, one of the strongest points with a total height of sixty-seven feet of which forty-two were rock and twenty-five were masonry.

Tarabai’s Regency 1700-1707.

Tarbiyat Khan undertook to mine this angle, and at the end of four months and a half (1700) completed two mines. So confident of success were the Moghals, that the storming party was readily formed, but concealed as much as possible under the brow of the hill from the view of the garrison. Aurangzeb was invited to view the spectacle, and to draw the garrison towards the bastion emperor moved off from that side so that when the match was ready, hundreds of the Marathas, drawn by his splendid retinue crowded to the rampart. The first mine was fired. It must several fissures in the rock, and caused so violent a shock that a great part of the masonry was thrown inwards and crushed many of the garrison in its ruins. The storming party in their eagerness advanced nearer; the match was applied to the train of the second and larger mine, but it was wrongly laid and burst out with a dreadful explosion, destroying, it is said, upwards of 2,000 Moghals on the spot. Prayagji the Maratha commandant was buried in the ruins caused by the first explosion close to a temple dedicated to the goddess Bhavani, but was afterwards dug out alive. His escape was considered a lucky omen, and under other circumstances might have done much to inspirit the garrison to prolong the defence. But as Azam Shah could no longer be persuaded to allow grain to pass into the fort, proposals of surrender were made through him, and the honour of the capture which he so ill-deserved was not only assigned to him, but the place received his name and was called by the emperor Azam Tara. Satara surrendered on 21st April 1700. Immediately on
the fall of Satara, Parali was invested. The siege lasted till the beginning of June, when, after a good
defence, the garrison left the fort. The fort was called by the emperor Nauras Tara. As the south-
west monsoon burst with great violence, the Moghal army, which was unprepared, suffered much
distress and hardship before the camp could be moved from the hills. After much loss both of
baggage and of life, the army reached Khavaspur on the banks of the Man in Satara, where the rains
are comparatively light [Grant Duff's Marathas, 299-300].

A raid of Rajaram's against Jalna about fifty miles east of Aurangabad was met so
vigorously by Zulfikar Khan, the only Moghal general of whom the Marathas then stood in fear,
that Rajaram was forced to fly. So hot was the pursuit that though he managed to escape he died of
exhaustion at Sinhgad near Poona on 3rd March 1700, more than a month before the fall of Satara
[Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 300.]. The news of Rajaram's death was received in the emperor's
camp at Satara with great rejoicing. Tarabai, Rajaram's' elder widow, who, with the aid of
Ramechandrapant Amatya had immediately assumed the government for her son Shivaji a boy of
ten, raised Parashuram Trimbak to the rank of Pratinidhi, and placed him in general charge of all the
forts. Tarabai had no fixed residence [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 301.]. Themankaris began to
profess obedience to the descendant of Shivaji and sometimes joined his standard, but they always
plundered on their own account when opportunity offered [Grant Duff's Marathas, 302.].

Aurangzeb, whose reign was prolonged beyond all expectation, persevered to the last in his
fruitless endeavours to stifle Maratha independence. In 1701 besides several other forts in Poona
and Kolhapur, Chandan, Vandan and Pandugad surrendered to his officers [Grant Duffs Marathas,
303; Elliot and Dowson, V. 370.]. But these apparently vigorous efforts were unsubstantial; there
was motion and bustle without zeal or efficiency. The empire was unwieldy, its system relaxed, and
its officers corrupt beyond all example. It was inwardly decayed, and ready to fall to pieces as much
by its inherent weakness as by the corroding power of the Marathas whom the Muhammedan wars
had trained to arms. Though the weakness of the government tempted them to plunder, the Marathas
had not yet the feeling of conquerors. There was a common sympathy but no common effort; their
military spirit was excited by plunder, more than by patriotism. Many enjoyed greater advantages
under the weak Moghals than they were likely to enjoy under a strong Maratha government and
these were eager that war should not cease. Many Moghal officers in charge of districts were in the
pay of both parties, and they also had no wish that the confusion should end. Parties of Marathas in
the service of the Moghals met, rioted, and feasted with their countrymen, and at parting or when
passing within hearing of each other used to mock the Muhammedans by uttering analhamdilah-
praise be to Alla, and praying for long life to the glorious Alamgir whose mode of warfare made
their life so easy.

Some of the Moghal officers were anxious to negotiate a peace and Kam Bakhsha, the
favourite son of the emperor, whose early plans were directed to the establishment of an
independent kingdom at Bijapur, contrived to obtain the emperor's consent to open a negotiation
with Dhanaji Jadhav. Overtures were begun by proposals for releasing Shahu, the son of Sambhaji.
The negotiations proceeded and for a few days Aurangzeb had been brought to agree to pay ten per
cent, of the whole revenue: of the six subhas of the Deccan as sardeshmukhi for which the Marathas
were to engage to maintain order with a body of horse. On the news of the concession, the
Marathas, who, notwithstanding their predatory practices were exceedingly eager to have any right
formally recognised, flocked to Dhanaji's camp. With their increasing numbers their expectations
and their insolence rose. Their tone changed from prayer to demand, they crowded near the camp,
and when they required honorary dresses for seventy officers, Aurangzeb suspected treachery, broke
off the negotiations, and recalled his ambassador. Soon after he left the Maratha camp the Moghal
ambassador was attacked, and as this confirmed the emperor's suspicion of treachery he withdrew to
the cast. [Grant Duffs Marathas, 306.]
In 1705 Tarabai went to live at Panhala in Kolhapur and admitted Ramechandrapant to a very large share of power. In the following year Vasahatgad and Satara were taken by the Pratinidhi, Parashuram Trimbak. Satara was surprised by the artifice of a Brahman named Annajipant. This man had escaped from prison at Jinji and assumed the character of a mendicant devotee. He fell in with a party of Moghal infantry marching to relieve the Satara garrison, amused them with stories and songs, obtained alms from them, and so ingratiated himself with all that they brought him with them, admitted him into the fort and in reward for his wit allowed him to live there. Annajipant, who had been a writer attached to a body of Mavli Infantry, saw that with the aid of a few of his old friends the place might be surprised. He watched his chance, told Parashuram Trimbak of his design, and having introduced a body of Mavlis into the fort the enterprising man seized the opportunity to put every man of the garrison to the sword. [Grant Duff's Marathas, 308.]

MARATHA RULE

Shahu, 1707-1749.

AURANGZEB DIED IN 1707. By the advice of Zulfikar Khan Aurangzeb's second son, prince Azam Shah, determined to release Shahu and promised that if he succeeded in establishing his authority and continued steadfast in his allegiance he should receive the tract conquered from Bijapur by his grandfather Shivaji with an additional territory between Bhima and Godavari [Grant Duff's Marathas, 314.]. On Shahu's approach Tarabai, unwilling to lose the power she had so long held, pretended to believe him an impostor and determined to oppose him. The first encounter between Shahu and Tarabai's forces under Dhanaji Jadhav and Parashurampant Pratinidhi took place at Khed where Shahu got an easy victory on 12th October 1707, because Dhanaji feeling that Shahu's cause was just, did not fight and the Pratinidhi finding himself single-handed withdrew from the field and fled to Satara. Shahu proceeded towards Shirval which guarded the way towards Rohida fort. Tarabai had assigned to Shankaraji Narayan Sachiv, the work of guarding the western hilly region round about. He was one of those who had expressed his loyalty towards Tarabai by taking an oath on boiled rice and milk (Malbar Ramrao Chitnis: Thorale Shahu Maharaj p. 14). Shahu invited Shankaraji to see him for a talk, but he would not go. Shahu then himself decided to see him. Shankaraji made all possible efforts to avoid him but finding his position rather critical, and himself divided between the conflict of loyalties, he suddenly put an end to his life [Grant Duff says that he performed Jal Samadhi or water death, a form to which Hindu devotees were partial. The victim seated himself on a wooden platform supported in deep water by earthen pots with their mouths turned down. Small holes were bored in the earthen pots and the platform sank. (Grant Duff Vol. I, p. 320). Whatever the truth about the manner of Shankaraji's death, the dates and the sequence given by Duff are wrong. Shankaraji met his death in 1707.], rather than prove unfaithful to the oath that he had taken. Thereupon Shahu went to console his aggrieved widow and promised to continue her son Naro Shankar in her husband's post, and confirmed Shankaraji's Mutilak in his office: as before. This measure firmly secured to Shahu the support of Pant Sachiv's party who never afterwards departed from their allegiance to him. Shahu further proceeded to the South and took Chandan Vandan. Tarabai now assigned the task of defending Satara to Pratinidhi and herself fled to Panhala for security and thence subsequently to Malvan. Shahu on approaching Satara seized the families of all who were acting against him and sent an order to Parashuram Trimbak to surrender Satara. Parashuram did not obey, but Shaikh Mirah a Muhammedan officer who commanded under him confined him and gave up the fort [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 315.]. On gaining possession of Satara, Shahu formally seated himself on the the throne on 12th January 1708. (Marathi Daftar, Rumal I. p. 118. Edited by V. L. Bhave). Gadadhar Pralhad was appointed Pratinidhi and Bahiropant Pingle was made Peshva. Dhanaji Jadhav was confirmed in his rank of Senapati or chief captain and the right of making collections in several districts was entrusted to him. In the prevailing confusion the revenue was realised on no fixed principle, but was levied as
opportunity presented itself in the manner of contribution. The principal writers employed by Dhanaji in revenue affairs were Abaji Purandare, accountant of Sasvad near Poona, and another Brahman accountant originally belonging to Shrivardhan in Janjira, a village claimed by the Sidi, which he had left for a career as early as in 1689 if not earlier. Since then he held different posts as Sar-Subhedar of Poona (Sardesai: Marathi Riyasat 5, Punya Shloka Shahu p. 50) and Daulatabad, and played an important part in the War of Independence as a mediator between the Moghal and the Maratha camps and occasionally extended a helping hand to Shahu during his long period of confinement. In the course of his activities he came to be associated with Purandares of Sasvad and was therefore recommended to Dhanaji by Abaji Purandare and Parashuram Trimbak. The name of the Shrivardhan accountant, afterwards famous as the founder of the Peshva's power, was Balaji Vishvanath Bhatt. Shortly afterwards Dhanaji Jadhav was deputed towards Khadshet for fighting with the Moghals and Shahu himself proceeded to the south towards Panhala and Vishalgad. Having captured the forts he turned his attention towards Rahgana which was defended by Ramechandrapant on behalf of Tarabai. On the approach of the rainy season Shahu's army was cantoned at Panhala. Dhanaji however was not destined to see him as he met his death at Vadgany on the banks of the river Varna, as he was returning after finishing his Khadshet campaign. (27th June 1708) (Sardesai: Marathi Riyasat, Punya Shloka Shahu p. 53). During this period Shahu neglected no preparations to enable him to reduce his rival. Among other expedients he made an unsuccessful application to Sir Nicholas Waite, the Governor of Bombay for a supply of guns, ammunition, European soldiers, and money [Bruce's Annals in Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 318.].

At the opening of the fair season, after holding the Dasara holiday, preparations were made to renew the war against Tarabai (1709). But about that time an agreement with the Moghals waived the question of hereditary claim and made the reduction of Tarabai less important to Shahu [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 319.], Daud Khan Panni, whom Zulfikar Khan left as his deputy in the Deccan, settled with such Maratha chiefs as acknowledged Shahu's authority, with certain reservations, to allow them one-fourth of the revenue, at the same time reserving the right of collecting and paying it through his own agents. Daud Khan's intimacy with most of the Maratha chiefs, his connection with Zulfikar Khan, and the terms of friendship between Zulfikar and Shahu, not only preserved Shahu's ascendancy, but, except in instances where independent plundering bands occasionally appeared, secured a fairly correct observance of the terms of the agreement. At the close of 1709 Shahu returned to Satara and married two girls, one from the Mohite and the other from the Shirke family. His other two wives who were married to him while in Aurahgzeb's camp were with his mother at Delhi, where one of them, the daughter of Shinde shortly afterwards died. During this period Balaji Vishvanath always acted as the righthand man of shahu. This brought on Balaji the keen jealousy of Dhanaji's son Chandrasen Jadhav, and of several others in his service. In 1710, the army had scarcely returned to Satara, when Tarabai encouraged by the commandant of Panhala, marched from Malvaii in Ratanagiri reinforced by the troops of Phond Savant, and made Panhala and the neighbouring town of Kolhapur her residence. Her hopes were now raised as Chandrasen Jadhav left Shahu and joined Tarabai under circumstances to be narrated later for over three years. Tarabai held her position firmly at Panhala and Shahu was in no mood to disturb her; but in 1714 coup d'etat at Kolhapur in which Tarabai and her son Shivaji were put into prison and Rajasbai and her son Sambhaji were placed on the throne (1714). [According to Jadunath Sarkar Tarabai was removed from administration and her place was taken by Rajas Bai in the year 1712 (Cambridge History, Vol.IV,p.392).] It is believed that Ramechandrapant who was never fully trusted by Tarabai had a hand in this court revolution. Whatever the truth, there is no doubt that Ramchandrapant exerted himself with renewed vigour to reorganise the administration at Kolhapur and uphold the claims of Sambhaji as a rival to Shahu. Still so long as Daud Khan's government continued Shahu was secured in the ascendancy. He was surrounded by most of the experienced ministers and had acquired a name for himself by his conciliatory disposition. It has already been said that he had won over Sachiv to his side. But he was not equally-successful in binding to his interest all the members of the Pratinidhi's family. In 1713. Shahu released Parashuram Trimbak,
restored his honours by the removal of Gadadhar Pralhad, and confirmed him in his formal charge of Vishalgad and its dependencies. The Pratinidhi sent his eldest son Krshnaji Bhaskar to assume the management of the fort and district, but he had no sooner obtained possession than he revolted, tendered his services to Sambhai and was made Pratinidhi at Kolhapur. On this defection Parashuram Trimbak was again thrown into confinement, and Shahu, under the belief that the revolt had been encouraged by him, intended to have put him to death but was dissuaded from his design by the timely mediation of Khando Ballal [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 321.]. In consequence of changes at the imperial court, Daud Khan was removed from the government of the Deccan and the agreement between the Moghals and the Marathas was dissolved. Chandrasen Jadhav, who on the death of his father Dhanaji Jadhav had been appointed chief captain, was sent from Satara with a considerable army and directed to levy the chauth, saradeshmukhi, and ghasdana from the Moghal districts. The was attended by his father's accountant Balaji Vishvanath who was now charged with collecting and appropriating a share of the revenue for Shahu, a situation of control which, under no circumstances, was likely to be favourably viewed by Chandrasen. The old jealousy was increased tenfold, and in a dispute about a deer run down by one of Balaji's horsemen, the suppressed hatred burst forth. Balaji was forced to flee for his life. He fled first to Sasvad in Poona but the Sachiv's agent at Sasvad did not think it prudent to protect him. With a few followers, amongst whom were his sons Bajirav and Chinmai, Bajaji attempted to cross to Pandugad, a fort in the opposite valley, but Chandrasen's horsemen were already on his track searching for him everywhere. In this extremity he contrived to hide for a few days until two Marathas, Pilaji Jadhav and Dhumal, then common cavaliers in his service, by their influence with their relations, gathered a small troop of horse, and promised at the risk of their lives to carry him and his sons to the machi or village attached to the hill fort of Pandugad. When Shahu heard of this quarrel between Chandrasen and Balaji he carefully considered the whole case and resolved to extend protection to Bajaji. Thereupon, Chandrasen demanded of Shahu that Bajaji should be given up, and in case of refusal threatened to renounce his allegiance. Shahu, though not prepared to punish this insolent demand, refused to give up Balaji and sent orders to Haibatrav Nimbalkar Sar Lashkar, then near Ahmadnagar, at once to march on Satara. Meanwhile Bajaji Vishvanath was in Pandugad surrounded by the Senapati's troops. Haibatrav, who was annoyed that he had not been made Senapati and was incensed at Chandrasen's behaviour, eagerly obeyed the order to march against him. Hearing of Haibatrav's arrival at Phaltan Chandrasen quitted Pandugad and marched to Devur about fifteen miles to the south-east. The armies met, Chandrasen was defeated, retired to Kolhapur, and from Kolhapur he went to meet Chin Kilich Khan Nizam-ul-mulk, the Moghal viceroy of the Deccan, by whom he was well received and rewarded [Grant Duff's Marathas, 189-191.]. Chandrasen for revenge and Nizam-ul-mulk who was disposed to favour the cause of Sambhai and desirous of suppressing the ravages of Shahu's officers sent an army against Haibatrav. To support him, Shahu sent forward a body of troops under Balaji Vishvanath whom he now dignified with the title of sena karte i.e. organiser of the army. A battle was fought near Purandhar in Poona, in which the advantage claimed by the Marathas is contradicted by their subsequent retreat to the Salpa pass twenty miles south of Purandhar. A detachment of Marathas from the Moghal army took possession of the Poona district. At length an accommodation was made, hostilities ceased, and the Moghals returned to Aurangabad. When the war was over the emperor Farrukhsiyar appointed Shahu to the command of 10,000 horse. But for seventeen months the policy and vigour of Nizam-ul-Mulk greatly controlled the Marathas. [Grant Duff, Marathas, Vol. I, 331.] During the rains of 1714 the Marathas resumed their depredations. All the deshmukhs anddeshpandes in the Moghal districts of Maharashtra fortified their villages on pretence of defending themselves, but they frequently joined or aided their countrymen of whatever party in escape, defence, and concealment [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, p. 325. Khandera Dabhade who acknowledged Shahu as his chief and had established himself about Nanded in Rajpipla, carried on depredations at this time in Gujarat.].
As Nizam-ul-mulk favoured the Kolhapur party, Sambhaji's influence rose and Shahu's fell. The Ghorpades, both of Kapshi and Mudhol, joined the Kolhapur party. Siddho Ghorpade, the son of Bahirji and nephew of the famous Santaji also declared for Sambhaji, but, along with his ally the Nawab of Savanur was too intent on his schemes of conquest and plunder to quit the Karnatak [About this time Siddho gained a great acquisition in the fort of Sundur, a place of singular strength within twenty-five miles of Belari. Grant Duff's Marathas. Vol. I. 325.]. Krishnarav Khatavak, a Brahman, raised to power by the Moghals, took post about the Mahadev hills within Satara limits, and without joining either Satara or Kolhapur plundered the country on his own account. Damaji Thorat, a lawless upstart of the Kolhapur party who acknowledged no chief but his old patron Ramechandrapant, levied contributions in Poona. Udaji Chavhan, another of Ramechandra-pant's officers took the mud fort of Battis Shirala about twenty miles south of Karad, and in a short time became so formidable that Shahu was glad to enter into a compromise by conceding the chauth of Shirala and Karad, which Udaji long continued to receive as a personal allowance. Several other petty wasters declared for Sambhaji. Among these the most formidable was Kanhoji Angre who then held the coast from Savantvadi to Bombay, and was spreading his power over the province of Kalyan in Thana. So great was the anarchy that, without a sudden change of fortune and greater efficiency in Shahu's government, his authority over the Marathas must soon have ceased. Balaji Vishvanath instilled some vigour into his counsels and began to lead in public affairs. He set out to reduce Damaji Thorat; but, together with his frient Abaji Purandhare, and his two sons Bajirav and Chimaji, he was treacherously seized by Thorat and thrown into confinement. After many indignities their ransom was settled and paid by Shahu who now applied to the Sachiv to suppress Thorat. The Sachiv and his manager advanced against Thorat, but they too were defeated and thrown into confinement. At the same time two other expeditions were prepared at Satara, one under the Peshva Bahiropant Pingle which went to guard the Konkan and repel Angre and the other commanded by Balaji Vishvanath was ordered to suppress Krishnarav Khatavak. Krishnarav had become so bold that he marched to Aundh about ten miles south of Khatav, to meet Shahu's troops. He was totally defeated principally through the bravery of Shripatraw, the second son of Parashuram Trimbak, the Pratinidhi, whose father had urged him to perform some action which might wipe away the misconduct of his elder brother and procure his father's release. Shahu accordingly once more restored the Pratinidhi to liberty and rank. Krishnarav submitted, was pardoned, and received the village of Khatav. This success was of considerable importance, but a like good fortune did not attend the Peshva's expedition. Bahiropant was defeated and made prisoner by Angre who took Lohagad and Rajmachi in West Poona, and was reported to be marching on Satara. All the force that could be spared was gathered to oppose him. It was placed under Balaji Vishvanath whose former connection with Angre would, it was hoped, lead to some settlement. Balaji's negotiations were successful, and Angre, on condition of large cessions [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I. 327. Angre received ten forts and sixteen fortified places of less strength with their dependent villages and was confirmed in command of the fleet and in his title of sarkhel.] in the Kohkan, gave up his Deccan conquests except Rajmachi, renounced Sambhaji, released the Peshva, and agreed to maintain the cause of Shahu. As Balaji performed this service entirely to Shahu's wishes, on his return to Satara he was received with great distinction, and in consequence of the failure of Bahiropant Pingle, that minister was removed from the dignity of Mukhya Pradhan and Balaji appointed Peshva in his stead (1714) [According to Jadunath Sarkar Balaji Vishvanath was appointed on 17th November 1713. (Sardesai - New History of the Marathas, Vol. II. p. 24.).] His friend Abaji Purandare was confirmed as his chief agent or mutalik and Ramajipant Bhanu an ancestor of the celebrated Nana Fadnavis as his fadnavis [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I. 328.]. After the desertion of Chandra Sen Jadhav, Manaji More had received clothes of investiture as chief captain or Senapati, but failed to perform the services which were expected of him. He was now ordered, with Haibatrav Nimbal-kar, to accompany Balaji into the Poona district to reduce Dannaji Thorat. As it was feared that the Sachiv, who was still Thorat's prisoner at Hingahganv in Poona, might be killed if the place were attacked,
Yesubai, the Pant Sachiv's mother, prevailed on Balaji to obtain his release before hostilities began. In this Balaji succeeded and Yesubai in gratitude made over to the Peshva the Sachiv's rights in the Poona district and gave him the fort of Purandar as a place of refuge for his family who then lived in Sasvad. Balaji obtained a confirmation of the grant of Purandar from Shahu. The force assembled by Balaji at this time was too powerful for Thorat. His fort was stormed and destroyed and himself made prisoner [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 329.].

In 1715 Haibatrav quarrelled with Shahu for not appointing him Senapati, retired to the Godavari, and was never reconciled. The Peshva induced the Moghal agent in the Poona district, a Maratha named Baji Kadam, to make over the superior authority to him, on the promise that Rambhaji Nimbalkar's jagir should be respected [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol I, 329. The Peshva suppressed sonic banditti which infested the Poona district, restored order in the villages, stopped revenue-farming, and encouraged tillage by low and gradually increasing assessments, Ditto.].

In all quarters Maratha affairs began to improve. Still after a period of such confusion, weakness, and anarchy, the rapid expansion of their power is in any view very remarkable and at first sight seems incredible. The influence of Balaji Vishvanath continued to increase and no affair of importance was undertaken without his advice. A conciliatory policy was agreeable to Shahu and dictated all Balaji's measures. The system of Shivaji was the groundwork of their arrangements; but since the time of Sambhaji (1680-1689), the necessity of preserving the Raja's supremacy by profusely issuing deeds confirming to every successful Maratha leader the possession of all the territory in which he could establish himself, was ruinous both to their union and their resources as a nation. Still the nature of the tribute which Shivaji's genius had instituted suggested a remedy for the endless divisions which every additional acquisition of territory was likely to create. The expedient adopted, which is given below, although it ensured its end only temporarily, must be considered as the most ingenious decree ever adopted by the ingenious persons of those days.

The ministry as far as practicable was composed of the old retainers, and the posts of those who adhered to the Kolhapur party were conferred on their near relations.

About this time both Parsoji Bhonsle and Haibatrav Nimbalkar died. Parsoji's son Kanhoji was confirmed by Shahu in all his father's possessions and succeeded to his title of Sena Saheb Subha, but the rank of Sar Lashkar was conferred on Davalji Somavanshi together with the right and honours of the post. Haibatrav's son, annoyed at being set aside, quitted Shahu's standard and joined Nizam-ul-Mulk. Shahu was not without ability. He was naturally generous, liberal to all religious establishments, observant of the forms enjoined by the Hindu faith, and particularly charitable to Brahmans. The Hilly west Deccan and the rugged Konkan were his birthright, but as his childhood was pleasantly spent in the pomp and luxury of the Moghal camp he had developed easy going habits. He occasionally showed violence and for a time anger overcame his indolence. In general however he was satisfied with the respect and homage paid to his person and the obedience which his ministers invariably professed to his commands. He was pleased at being free from the drudgery of business and in giving himself up to his fondness for hawking, hunting, and fishing, he did not foresee that he was delegating a power which might supersede his own. As legitimate head of the Marathas, the importance of that nation was increased by the manner in which he was courted by the Moghals; and the dignities and rights conferred upon him in consequence of his situation gave an influence and respect to the name of Shahu, which under other circumstances he could never have attained. Both the sons of Shivaji, Sambhaji and Rajaram, followed the example of their father from the period when he mounted the throne and always declared their independence. Shahu acknowledged himself a vassal of the throne of Delhi, and while styling himself king of the Marathas, affected, in his transactions with the Moghals, to consider himself merely as a zamindar or head deshmukh of the empire [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 331.].
In 1715 Farrukhsiyar, the emperor of Delhi, becoming jealous of the Sayyid brothers to whom he owed his elevation, appointed the younger Sayyid Husain Ali Khan to the viceroyalty of the Deccan, in the hopes that by separating the brothers he should weaken their power and compass their destruction. In 1716, Khandevar Dabhadhe, who had established a line of posts along the Surat-Burhanpur route and defeated two large Moghal armies, went to Satara paid his respects to Shahu, and was raised to the rank of Senapati of the empire Manaji More being removed for inability and misconduct. The Maratha officers encouraged by their success and by the secret over hires of Farrukhsiyar now extended their encroachments, and in addition to the chauth which they had agreed to receive from Daud Khan in lieu of all claims, they everywhere levied the sardesmukhi. Under these circumstances the Deccan government of Sayyid Husan Ali Khan, distracted by Maratha depredations on one side and con intrigues on the other, had recourse to negotiations with Shahi Shankaraji Malhar originally a writer under Shivaji and appointe Sachiv by Rajaram at Jinni, had retired during the siege of that place to Benares. Tired of a life so little in accord with his former habits although a very old man, Shankaraji took service with Husain Ali Khan when he was appointed to the Deccan. He soon gained the confidence of his master, and at an early period entered into a correso dence with his friends at Satara. He represented to the. viceroy that if the Maratha claims were recognised, they would have an interest the prosperity of the country; that this was the: only way to restore tranquillity, and a certain means of gaining powerful allies by whose aid he might rest secure from present intrigues, and eventually defy the avowed hostility of the emperor. Husain Ali approving of the views sent Shankaraji Malhar to Satara to arrange an alliance between the Moghals and the Marathas. This mission opened a great prospect to the aspiring mind of Balaji Vishvanath. Besides the chauth and sardeshamukhi of the six subhas of the Deccan including the Bijapur and Hyderabad Karnatak, with the tributary states of Mys Trichinopoly and Tanjore, Shahu demanded the whole of the territory in Maharashtra which had belonged to Shivaji with the exception of his possessions in Khandesh, and in lieu of Khandesh territory near the old districts as far east as Pandharpur was to be substituted. The forts of Shivneri in Poona and of Trimbak in Nasik were also to be given up. The old districts in the Karnatak were also demanded and a confirmation of some conquests lately made by Kanhoji Bhonsle the Sena Saheb Subha in Gondavan and Berar. Lastly the mother and family of Shahu were to be sent from Delhi as soon as practicable. On these conditions Shahu promised to pay to the imperial treasury for the old territory a yearly peshkash or tribute of Rs. 10 lakhs the sardeshmukhi or ten per cent. of the whole revenue he bound himself to protect the country, to put down every form of disorder to bring thieves to punishment or restore the stolen property, and to pay the usual fee of 651 per cent. on the annual income for the hereditary right of sardeshmukhi; for the grant of chauth no fee was to be paid, but he agreed to maintain a body of 15,000 horse in the emperor's service, to be placed at the disposal of thesubhedars, faudars and officers in different districts. The Karnatak and the subhas of Bijapur and Hyderabad which were then overrun by the partizans of Sambhaji Raja of Kolhapur, Shahu promised to clear of plunderers, and to make good every loss sustained by the people of those provinces after the final settlement of the treaty. Shankaraji Malhar had already sufficiently proved his desire to forward the interests of his countrymen, and Shahu appointed him (1717) to conclude the terms, which, according to the above proposals, were with some exception conceded by Husain Ali Khan.

The territory and forts not under the viceroy's control were to be recovered at some season of leisure or in any manner which Shahu might think fit. Meanwhile a body of 10,000 horse were sent to join the viceroy. Santaji and Parsoji Bhonsle, relations of theSena Saheb Subha, Udaji Pavar, Vishvasrarv and several other commanders were detached in charge of the Maratha troops for this duty. At the same time agents were sent to inquire into the state of the districts and collect the extensive shares of revenue now assigned to them, while the ministers were devising a system, for realising their claims which it was by no means so easy to realise.

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The emperor refused (1718) to ratify the treaty. An unworthy favourite encouraged him in his intrigues for the destruction of the Sayyids, he became less guarded in his measures, and as an open rupture seemed inevitable. Husain Ali Khan prepared to march for the capital and solicited aid from Shahu. He also intended to receive from Shahu a son of Sultan Muhammad Akbar then residing at the Maratha court. Such an opportunity was not neglected. Balaji Vishvanath and Khanderao Dabhade proceeded to join the viceroy with a large body of troops, for which he agreed to pay them a certain sum daily from the date of their crossing the Narmada until their return. Husain Ali Khan further promised that the treaty should be ratified and the family of Shahu released and delivered to his officers. On his departure Shahu instructed Balaji Vishvanath to endeavour to obtain the cession of the forts of Daulatabad and Chanda [Chanda is about a hundred miles south of Nagpur.] and authority to levy the tribute which had for some time been imposed by the Marathas in Gujarat and Malva. The reason for this apparently extraordinary demand was that the chief who had already levied contributions in those provinces would break in and plunder, unless Shahu could receive such an authority as must oblige them to look to him only for what they termed their established contributions, and that under these circumstances Shahu would be responsible for the protection and improvement of their territories. The combined army marched to Delhi where the wretched emperor Farrukhsiyar after some tumult stirred by the Sayyids and put to death. Two princes of the line succeeded and died within seven months. Rohsan Akhtar, the grandson of Sultan Muuazzam was then raised (1719) to the imperial dignity with the title of Muhammad Shah, but the two Sayyids held all the power. Balaji Vishvanath and his Marathas remained at Delhi until the accession of Muhammad Shâl (1720). During the tumult which preceded the confinement of Farrukhsiyar, Santaji Bhonsle and 1,500 of his men were killed by the populace in the streets of Delhi. The army was paid by the Sayyids, according to agreement, and Shahu's mother and family were given over to Balaji Vishvanath. As both the Peshva and the Senapati were anxious to return to the Deccan they were allowed to leave, and in accordance with the treaty with Husain Ali Khan, they receive three Imperial grants for the chauth, sardeshmukhi, and svarajya [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I., 337-38. When Grant Duff wrote (1826) the original grants were in the possession of the Raja of Satara. They were in the name of Muhammad Shah, dated in the first year of his reign A. H. 1131 (A. D. 1719). The emperor Muhammad Shah was not placed on the throne till 1720. During the months that intervened between the dethronement of Farrukhsiyar and his elevation, two princes had filled the throne whose names were expunged from the records.]

**Grant of Chauth and sardeshmukhi, 1720.**

The chauth or one-fourth of the whole revenue of the six subhas of the Deccan including the Hyderabad and Bijapur, Karnataks and the tributry states of Tanjore, Trichinopol and Mysore [The deed for the chauth dated 22nd Rabi-ul-Akhir A. H. 1131 granted to Shahu the fourth of the revenue of the six subhas of the Deccan simply on condition that he should maintain 15,000 horse to aid the military governors in keeping order. Grand Duff’s Marathas, Vol. 1, p. 337 note.], the sardes-mukhi or ten per cent. over and above the chauth [The sardeshmukhi grant is dated 4th Jamadi-ul-Aval or twelve days after that of the chauth. It does not specify in the body of the deed that it is granted as an hereditary right; hut the customary fee on such occasions stated on the back of the instrument as follows:

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<th>Subha.</th>
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The Sardeshmukhi was estimated at Rs. 1,80,51,730. Peshkash or establish fee on hereditary rights conferred, 651 per cent., amounted to Rs. 11,75,16,762 the immediate payment on delivering the deed to one-fourth or Rs. 2,93,79,190-8-0; the remainder payable by instalments to Rs. 8,81,37,571-8-0 The fee so calculated was commuted to Rs. 1,17,19,390 in consequence of the depopulated state of the country. Grant Duff's Marathas Vol. I. p. 338 (footnote).] and the svarajya literally, Self Rule, that is the districts held by Shivaji at the time of his death, which were granted to Shahu, excepting the detached possessions in Khandesh, the fort of Trimbak with the adjoining district, and the conquests south of the Vardha and the Tungabhadra rivers, which were not ceded. In lieu of such of these claims as lay to the north of the Bhima, districts beyond the line of forts from Tathvad to Machhindragad in Satara, as far east as Pandharapur, were wholly ceded to Shahu, and also those districts which Aurangzeb had promised to him at the time of his marriage in that emperor's camp. The country watered by the Yerla, Man, and Nira, celebrated for good horse and hardy men, the home of some of the oldest families in Maharashtra, who had not hitherto formally acknowledged the descendants of Shivaji, including the whole of the present district of Satara, was by this cession placed under Shahu's authority [The following is a list of the sixteen districts included in the grant of svarajya; Poona, Supa, including Baramati, Indapur, Wai, the Mavalas, Satara, Karad, Khadav, Man, Phaltan, Malkapur, Tarla, Panhala, Ajra, Junnar, and Kolhapur; the parganas north of the Tungbhadra including Kopal, Gadag, Haliyal, and all the forts which were captured by Shivaji; the Konkan including Ramnagar, Gandevi, Jawhar, Cheni, Bhiwandi, Kalyan, Rajpuri, Dabhul, Javli, Rajapur, Phonda, Ankola. and Kudal. Grant Puff's Marathas, Vol I, 338]. The Marathas pretended that the conquests of Berar by Parsoji and Kanhoji Bhonsle, and their right to tribute in Gujarat and Malwa were confirmed at the same time; but though some very indefinite verbal promise may have been given and Balaji Vishvanath left an agent for the purpose as is alleged of receiving the sanads, subsequent events prove the unwillingness of Delhi authorities to implement the understanding.

When Balaji Vishvanath started for Delhi, he left his divan Abaji Purandare as hismutalik or deputy in charge of his seal of office, and the duties of Peshva continued to be carried on at the Maratha court in Bajaji's name. On Balaji's return to Satara with the Imperial deed the scheme for collecting and distributing the revenue which all admit to have been projected by Balaji was examined, and the system which had already been partially introduced was now openly accepted. The sardeshmukhi or ten per cent, on the revenues of the subhas of the Deccan was first set aside and termed by the ministers the Raja's vatan, a gratifying sound to the ears of a Maratha whether prince or peasant. The imposition of the sardeshmukhi reduced to a proportionate degree the actual collections from a country the resources of which were already drained to the utmost, but the nominal revenue continued the same. To have collected even one-fourth of the standard assessment would probably at this period have been impossible but the Marathas in all situations endeavoured to secure, in lieu of their chauth, at least twenty-five per cent, of the real balances. Although they seldom could collect it, they always stated the chauth as due upon the tankha or standard assessment, because of their anxiety to maintain the dignity of what after all, came to be a paper transaction, but which always gave them a legal excuse to press their claims of receiving their dues in full. In regard to the sardeshmukhi, it suited both their foreign and domestic policy to keep that claim undefined; but their system in practice, that of exacting as much as they could, was as simple as it was invariable. Of the seventy-five per cent, which remained to the Moghals, one-third or twenty-five per cent, was received according to established usage by the fauzdar and the balance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bijapur</th>
<th>7,85,08,500</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>1</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hyderabad</td>
<td>6,48,67,483</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khandesh</td>
<td>57,49,819</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>18,05,17,294</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
was collected sometimes for the Imperial ex-chequer but generally on account of some jagirdar, to whom most of the Moghal conquests in the Deccan were assigned for the support of troops. This general mode of appropriating the revenue explains the seizures, resumptions, and cessions of territory under the name of jagir during the later wars in the Deccan between the Nizam and the Peshva. It likewise explains the practice which prevailed in many villages, even up to the British conquests, of bringing fifty per cent., of the net revenue to account under the head of jagir, for which the kulkarni in less than a century could assign no reason except the custom of their forefathers. The term svarajya or Self Rule, which in the first instance was applied to that part of the territory north of the Tungbhadra possessed by Shivaj at his death, on the return of Balaji Vishvanath was extended to the whole of the Maratha claims exclusive of the sardeshmukhi. Of these claims one-fourth or twenty-five per cent, was appropriated to the head of the state in addition to the sardeshmukhi. This fourth was known by the name of the Raja's babti. The balance was termed mokasa. Of the mokasa two shares were left at the disposal of the Raja; the one was Sahotrd or six per cent, and the other nadgaua or three pe cent., both calculated on the wholesvarajya. The balance of mokas was sixty-six per cent, of the whole of the Maratha claims exclusive of the sardeshmukhi. The sahotra was bestowed by Shahu on the Pant Sachiv as an hereditary assignment; it was collected by the Sachiv's own agents only within the territory wholly possessed by the Marathas; separate collectors were sent by the Raja to realise it in distant districts. The nadgaua was granted to different persons at the Raja's pleasure. Independent of salaries from the treasury the Pradhans had many inam villages conferred on then Balaji Vishvanath received several districts near Poona in person; Jagir, including the fort of Lohagad. The Pratinidhi, the Peshvi and the Pant Sachiv were charged with the collection of the babti on the Raja's account. Thus there were distinct agents for realising the babti and sardeshmukhi, for the Sahotra of the Pant Sachiv, for the nadgaua of the assignee to whom it belonged, and for themokasa to different officers for maintaining troops. The mokasa was distributed among a great number of chiefs as military jagir, burdened according to the circumstances with dues to the head of the state both of money and of troops. The districts of old MarathaJagirdars were freed from the chauth but they were generally liable to the payment ofsardeshmukhi, besides furnishing their quota of horse. Such jagirs, in a grant of Mokasafor a large tract were always stated as deductions and long before districts were conquered, formal grants and assignments of their revenue were distributed. Number less personal Jagirs and inams of lands of whole villages were alienate by Shahu; the former commonly required the performance of some service but the latter were entirely freehold. The Raja's authority was considered necessary to collect the revenue thus conceded, but the authority for which they were constantly petitioning was a formal affair. The revenue collectors thought that the Raja's sanad was sufficient for levying tribute in districts not specified in the imperial deeds. A district once overrun was said to be under tribute from usage; other districts were plundered by virtue of letters patent.

Particular quarters of the country were assigned to the leading officers, which, as far as they can now be ascertained, were as follows. The Peshva and Senapati charged with the command of a great proportion of the Raja's personal troops, were ordered to direct their attention to the general protection and defence of the territory. The Peshva had authority to levy the government dues in Khandesh and part of the Balaghat to the north-east of Sholapur; the senapati was vested with similar authority in Baglan and a right to realise the dues established by usage from Gujarat. Kanhoji Bhonsle the SenaSaheb Subha had charge of Berar Payinghat and was privileged to conquer and exact tribute from Gondvan to the east. The Sar Lashkar had Gangthadi including part of Aurangabad. Fateh Sing Bhonsle was appointed to the Karnatak; while the general charge of the old territory from the Nira to the Varna, and the collections from Hyderabad and Bedar were left to the Pratinidhi and the immediate agents of the Raja. The Chitnis had particular charge of several districts in the Konkan. The Pant Sachiv enjoyed the revenue of the whole Sahotra besides his old possessions in Jagir. The agents for collecting the Raja's zamindar dues were styled naib sardeshmukhs. Kanhoji Angre, retaining his districts in the Konkan, levied his chauth, as he termed it, by continuing to plunder the ships of all nations that appeared on the coast without his

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permission and would not recognise his right of sovereignty over sea. He used to pay a tribute to the Raja in guns, muskets, military stores, and ammunition. He also presented frequent nazars in articles from Europe and China; and he was sometimes charged with the very extraordinary duty of executing state criminals.

All the principal Maratha officers as a further means of preserving intercourse and union had particular claims assigned to them on portions of revenue or on whole villages in the district of each other. The greatest Maratha commanders or their principal revenue agents were eager to own their native village; but although vested with the control, they were proud to acknowledge themselves of the family of the patil orulkarkari; and if heirs to a miras field, they would sooner have lost wealth and rank than been dispossessed of such a vatan or inheritance. Yet on obtaining the absolute sovereignty, they never assumed an authority in the interior village concerns beyond the rights and privileges acquired by birth or purchase, according to the invariable rules of the country. Such is a brief outline of the system and arrangements settled by the Maratha ministry on the return of Balaji Vishvanath; and such was the mode by which a common interest was created, and for a time preserved, among the Maratha chiefs; while the character of Shahu, the influence and power of Balaji Vishvanath, the ability of his sons Bajirav and Chimaji to give a lead to the Maratha confederacy paved the way, though by gradual steps, for the supremacy of the Peshvas.

_Nizam Independent, 1720,

In 1720, Nizam-ul-mulk the governor of Malva, throwing off his dependence on the Sayyids, determined to possess himself of the Deccan. He overran Khandesh and defeated the Moghul troops under Dilavar Ali Khan at Burhanpur slaying their commander. The troops of Shahu under Kanhoji Bhonsle, the Sena Saheb Subha, and Haibatrav Nimalkar speedily joined Shankaraji Malhar who since the departure of Husain Ali Khan had lived with the deputy viceroy Alam Ali Khan as the envoy of Shahu. Khanderao Dabhade who had just returned from Delhi was likewise despatched from Satara with a body of horse. Alam Ali Khan was defeated at Balapur in Berar Payinghat by the troops of Nizam-ul-mulk, and fell surrounded by Marathas slain in his defence (10th August 1720). On this occasion the Marathas behaved as faithful auxiliaries and fought with bravery. They lost no person of note except Shahkaraji Malhar who was mortally wounded and made prisoner [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, 349.]. Soon after, events happened at Delhi by which the power of the Sayyids was destroyed, Muhammad Shah was freed from their control and Nizam-ul-mulk confirmed as viceroy of the Deccan [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 351.]. Meanwhile several important changes had taken place at the Maratha court, chiefly owing to the death of two leading ministers, Parashuram Trimbak in 1718, and Balaji Vishvanath in 1720. Shripatrao the second son of the Pratinidhi had succeeded his father Parashuram Trirhak before the return of Balaji Vishvanath from Delhi. The Peshva's health had suffered from the fatigue of the journey to Delhi and the labour he had bestowed on different arrangements after his return. He obtained leave from Shahu to retire for a short time to Sasvad in Poona where his family resided, but his constitution was exhausted and he survived for only a few days.

_Bajirav BallalPeshva, 1720-1740.

At the time of his death (2nd April 1720), he left two sons Bajirav and Chimaji. The robes of Peahvaship were conferred upon Bajirav in Shahu's camp at Masur, 30 miles east of Satara on 17th April 1720 exactly a fortnight after his father's death [Sardesai; New History of the Marathas, Vol. II, p. 66.]. The rise of Gaikvads is almost contemporary, for the troops of Khanderao Dabhade behaved with so great bravery in the battle of Bajapur and one of his officers Damaji Gaikvad the ancestor of the Gaikvads of Baroda so particularly distinguished himself on that occasion, that on his return the young Peshva Bajirav recommended him to Shahu in the warmest manner. The Raja in consequence; appointed him second in command under Khanderao with the title of Samsher

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Bahadur. Damaji died soon afterwards and was succeeded by his nephew Pilaji Gaikud. Chimaji the second son of the late Peshva, who received Supa injagir was appointed to a similar command under his brother Bajirav Abajipant Purandare, their father's chief manager, according to the rule of appointment, was reinvined by Shahu with scrupulous ceremony. During the short interval between the death of Balaji Vishvanath and the appointment of Bajirav, Abajipant Purandare transacted ordinary affairs with the seal of the late Peshva; but a great part of the business fell into the hands of Khando Ballal chitinsh and Shripatrat Pratinidhi. Khando Ballal gave his attention principally to the Angre, the Sidi, and the affairs of the Konkan; while the Pratinidhi aided by Anand rav Suinint Pradhao conducted important negotiations with Nizam-ul-mulk. Anandav's son Mahtaji was employed as Shahu's agent with Nizam-ul-mulk, who while he apprehended an attack from Husain Ali Khan, conciliated Shahu by promising to give up all that the royal grants conceded. No sooner was he apprised of the ascendancy acquired by his party at Delhi and of the loss the Marathas had sustained in the death of Balaji Vishvanath than he began to start objections to the establishment of Shahu's collectors, founded on some pretensions set up by Sambhaji and Chandrasen Jadhav. The wise precautions of Balaji Vishvanath, and the communion of interest which the distribution of the ceded revenue has produced, placed the Raja of the Marathas in a far more commanding situation than that in which he had stood during the first period of Nizam-ul-mulk's government of the Deccan. The agent remained at Aurahgabad where his arrangements would probably have been of little avail, but a vast army of Marathas that was assembling in the Gangthadi under the Sar Lashkar Sultani Nimbalkar inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Moghals on 15th December 1720 and it was this show of force that ultimately has tend the delivery of orders on the part of Nizam-ul-mulk to allow Raja Shahu to establish his collectors. A fresh order or farman obtained by the Maratha, agent at Delhi from Muhammad Shall opportunely arrived to remove from Nizam-ul-mulk the appearance of having yielded to menace, and afforded an opportunity of evincing the promptitude with which he obeyed the imperial commands [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 354.].

Bajirav soon alter his appointment as Peshva set out with an army for Khandesh where he levied his Mokasa although not without opposition. From the period of his accession he gave a considerable portion of his attention to extending Maratha conquests to the north, and his aims were early turned to Malva. Circumstances generally obliged him to return yearly to Satara and Poona. During the three expeditions, before the rains of 1724, though he had sent detachments into Malva, it is not ascertained that he crossed the Narmada in person until the end of that year; nor did he remain in Malva for any length of time until upwards of eleven years after his accession as Peshva. Affairs in the Deccan required his presence, and with the intrigues of Nizam-ul-mulk and domestic opposition, restrained both his ambition and enterprise. At different times before the year 1724 Bajirav had defeated the Subheddr of Burhanpur and an officer named Daud Khan sent against him by Azim-ulla Khan from Malva. In one of these battles two of Bajirav's officers who afterwards rose to high rank first came into notice. One was Malharji Holkar a Shiledar or self-horsed trooper who commanded a party of his own horse. He was a Maratha Dhangar, a native of the village of Hol on the Nira, of which his father was chaugula or Patil's assistant. He had served under Kanthaji Kadam Bande one of the Raja's officers and had gathered a small body of horse. The other officer was Ranoji Shinde descended from a younger branch of the family of Kanhairkhd a village fifteen miles east of Satara. The Shindes according to local legends have been distinguished horsemen since the time of the Bahamani dynasty. There are two Maratha families or rather clans named Shinde, the one distinguished by their hereditary patil village of Kanhairkhd and the other by the title of Ravirav. Both families claim Rajput descent. Those of Kanhairkhd had a mansab under Aurangzeb and Shinde's daughter, who was given in marriage by that emperor to Shahu, died in captivity at Delhi. Shinde remained faithful to the Moghals, and, as his fate was never known, it is conjectured that he was killed in some distant country possibly with Azam Shah in the battle of Agra in 1707. The family had fallen into decay and Ranoji who revived its fame was reduced to a state of abject poverty serving as a bargir or rider first in the troop of Balaji Vishvanath and afterwards in that of Bajaji's son. To contrast this original with his subsequent condition, he is said

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to have carried the Peshva's slippers, and to have been marked by Bajirav as fitted for a place of trust by the care he took of his humble charge.

Another officer who gained fresh honour about this time was Udaji Pavar Vishvasrav. His father was first raised by Ramchandrapant Amatya when he governed the country during the siege of Jinji, and the young man joined Shahu and obtained the command of a considerable body of horse. He was employed on various services and appears to have been an active partisan. Like most contemporary Maratha leaders of experience, such as Kanthaji Kadam Bande, Pilaji Gaikvd, and Kanhoji Bhonsle, he calculated on the surest advantage in the most distant ventures where his appearance was least expected. He made incursions into Gujarat and Malva, plundered Gujarat as far as Lunavada, and found Malva so drained of troops that he was able to remain some time in the country intimating to the Raja that if supported, he might collect the chauthand sardeshmukhi in every direction. How long he maintained his station in the country on his first inroads is uncertain, but it is probable that he was obliged to retire from Dhar, a fortress in the west of Malva where he first established himself, upon the appointment of Girdhar Bahadur, whose exertion in the defence of Malva was the chief cause which prevented the Marathas getting a firm footing in that province for more than ten years after the accession of Bajirav.

The progress of Udaji Pavar, the successes of Kanthaji Kadam Bande and Pilaji Gaikvd in Gujarat, and the dissensions between Nizam-ul-Mulk and the Imperial court opportunely occurred to favour the Peshva's views of spreading Maratha conquests in North India. Bajirav who was early trained by his father to business was bred a soldier as well as a statesman. He united the enterprise, vigour, and hardihood of a Maratha chief with the polish, astuteness, and address of a clever diplomat. He was fully acquainted with his father's financial schemes and chose the part of the plan which was calculated to direct the predatory hordes of Maharashtra in a common effort. The genius of Bajirav enlarged his father's schemes, and unlike many belonging to his caste, he had both the head to plan and the hand to do. To the unceasing industry and minute watchfulness, he added a judgment that taught him the leading points of importance which tended to spread Maratha sway. Bajirav's views of spreading Maratha power in Upper India were at first disapproved by Shahu, and from prudence as well as rivalry were opposed by Shripatrav, the Pratinidhi. Jealousy in public places is a passion which some persons can rarely command or hide. This rivalry between Bajirav, the Konkanasth Peshva and Shripatrav, the Deshasth Pratinidhi probably tended to preserve the Raja's ascendency longer. The Peshvas first proposal for exacting what he called the established tribute from Malva and extending Maratha conquests into North India was violently and for a time successfully opposed by the Pratinidhi. Shripatrav represented it as rash and imprudent. He held that, though the head of the State might not be called to account for casual inroads, to allow the Peshva to make raids must draw on the Marathas the whole power of the empire, and precipitate hostilities with Nizam-ul-Mulk whose victorious army was still at their gates; that so far from being prepared for resistance there was a total want of regularity even in their arrangements, that they could scarcely quell a common insurrection; and that to enter on a war before they had secured what had been ceded was the extreme of folly and of rashness. The Pratinidhi added that he was a soldier as well as the Peshva, and when expedient as ready as Bajirav to head an expedition; that after they had established their collectors and arranged other parts of the country it would be advisable, before pursuing their conquests in the north, to reduce the Karnatak and to recover the countries conquered by Shivaji; that Fatehsing Bhonsle's troops could scarcely venture to cross the Krshna, and that the first efforts should be made in that quarter.

These were probably the real opinions of Shripatrav. The wisdom of Bajirav was of a higher order. He comprehended the nature of predatory power; he perceived its growth in the turbulence and anarchy for which the system of distributing the revenue was the first remedy; he foresaw that confusion abroad would tend to order at home; that as commander of distant expeditions he should acquire the direction of a larger force than any other chief of the empire; that the resources of the

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Deccan would not only improve by withdrawing the hordes of horse which unprofitably consumed them, but must fall under the control of that person who could most readily procure employment and subsistence for the troops. While Bajirav concealed his private designs and partly admitted the justice of Shripatrv's views, he endeavoured by his commanding eloquence to arouse enthusiasm or ambition in Shahu. He went over the conquests of Shahu's famous grandfather and reminded him of the powerful kings and the mighty emperor with whom Shivaji had successfully contended. He painted the present condition of India, the weakness, indolence and imbecility of the Moghals, and the activity, energy and enterprise of the Marathas. If, he said, the great Shivaji had been of the same opinion as the Pratinidhi, he would have thought it necessary before venturing into the Karnatak to reduce bijapur and Golkonda. As to their domestic quarrels beyond the Krshna, it would be time to think of them hereafter; by the Raja's good fortune every desire would be accomplished. Bajirav ended a speech of considerable length, with the words: Now is our time to drive strangers from the land of the Hindus and to gain undying renown. By turning our efforts to North India the Maratha flag shall fly from the Krshna to the Attak. You shall plant it, replied Shahu, in the Kinnar Khand beyond the Himalayas; a noble son of a worthy father. Let us strike, said Bajirav, at the trunk of the withering tree; the branches must fall of themselves.

At what time Shahu's consent was obtained is not known. The form of obtaining the Raja's consent on all such occasions was rigidly observed by the Peshvas at a stage when their supremacy was far advanced. By virtue of that authority and their stationasmukhya pradhans or chief ministers, even when their usurpation became complete, it befitted their constitutional status to act as nominal servants and real masters to rule the Maratha chiefs as the delegate of their prince [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. T. 362].

During the early years of his Peshvaship, Bajirav had to tread the ground very carefully; for Bajirav knew that Niam-ul-Mulk was not the man who would easily forget that the Marathas had helped Alam Ali at Balapur. He had also to encounter Mubariz Khan who had been specially commissioned by the previous Emperors to punish the Marathas for their encroachments and who therefore bore a bitter enmity towards them. Bajirav had to make a choice and to decide whom to placate and whom to antagonise. A personal diplomatic meeting with Nizam-ul-Mulk on 4th January 1721 at Chikalthan, east of Chalisganv yielded no fruitful result. At this hour Nizam-ul-Mulk was called to Delhi by the Emperor for accepting Wazirship. After some hesitation he decided to go' to Delhi entrusting his charge of the Deccan to Mubariz Khan. (21st October 1721). He, however, soon realised that he could not hold his position in the flippant atmosphere of Delhi politics and decided to choose the earliest opportunity to return to the Deccan with a view to hold almost an independent position of power there, although he would not mind nominally acknowledging the suzerainty of the Emperor. Accordingly, resigning hisWazirship on 27th December 1723 he marched straight to the South, informing the Emperor that he felt it his imperative duty to drive the Marathas from Malva and Gujarat. By long and rapid marches he reached Ujjain. The enraged Emperor decided to punish the rebel Nizam-ul-Mulk and called upon Mubariz Khan and Raja Shahu to do their best to put him down with all the force at their command. This proved a welcome opportunity for Bajirav, who proceeded to the north, crossed Narmada on 8th May and arrived in close proximity to the Nizam's camp at Sihore. Mubariz Khan was for some time undecided as to what course he should take, whether to obey the imperial orders and fight the Nizam or to befriend him. Nizam however took his own decision to placate the Marathas and light with Mubariz Khan. At this hour Mubariz Khan also had opened negotiations with the Marathas when he discovered that he had to face Nizam-ul-Mulk. This gave an opportunity to the Marathas to raise their demands and gain supremacy not only in the Deccan but also in Malva and Gujarat. There was a formal meeting between Nizam-ul-Mulk and Bajirav at Nalchha near Dhar on 18th May 1724 where usual diplomatic formalities were undergone but ultimately each one was left guessing as to what course the other would follow. Nizam now lost no time in proceeding to the south and met his rival Mubariz Khan in the battle of Sakharkhedla on 30th September 1721 where
he gained a decisive victory and Mubariz Khan was killed. The Emperor now made a virtue out of necessity and confirmed Nizam as the Subedar of the Deccan and appointed Girdharbahadur as the Subedar of Malwa. The battle of Sakharkhedla is a turning point in the history of the Later Moghals as it marks the gradual disintegration of the Moghal Empire; for, Nizam henceforth no longer cared to receive orders from Delhi and followed his own policy in maintaining his own position.

In 1725, Hamid Khan, the uncle of Nizam-ul-Mulk, for the aid he gave him against Mubariz Khan, granted the chauth in Gujarat to Kanthaji Kadam Bande and Pilaji Gaikvad, who proceeded to levy their assignments. The division of the money led to perpetual disputes. Pilaji, as the agent of Dabhade, Senapati, considered himself the superior authority in Gujarat and Kanthaji as an officer of the Raja despised his pretensions. An agreement was signed by which the chauth east of the Mahi was assigned to Pilaji and that to the west to Kanthaji [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, 365.] Meanwhile Bajirav took advantage of the confusion caused by Moghal dissensions to carry his arms into Malwa, where, though opposed by Raja Girdhar, he was successful for two seasons in obtaining plunder and contributions. It is probable that Nizam-ul-Mulk against whom the Imperial forces were acting in Gujarat, may have connived at his incursions, but there is no proof of any direct communication with the Peshva. Bajirav, by virtue of the authority vested in him by Shahu granted deeds to Pavar, Holkar, and Shinde to levy chauth and sardeshmukhi and to keep half the mokasa in payment of their troops. In 1726, the peshva with a large army under Fatehsingh Bhonsle, marched into the Madras Karnatak, plundered the districts, and levied a contribution from Seringapatam. The Marathas lost a number of men without gaining the expected advantages. Bajirav had objected to the expedition, and was dissatisfied with the result, and on returning to Satara he found more serious reasons of dissatisfaction in the measures pursued by the Pratinidhi. The cause of his displeasure originated in the artful schemes of Nizam-ul-Mulk, which, but for the penetration and vigour of Bajirav, would probably have unlinked the chain by which Balaji Vishvanath had joined the interests as well as the inclinations of most of the Hindu chieftains of the Deccan [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, 367.].

In 1727 Nizam-ul-Mulk, though relieved from immediate apprehensions from the Delhi Emperor Muhammad Shah whose power was daily declining, became alarmed at the spreading power of the Marathas. He beheld in their systematic and persevering encroachments on the divided revenue of the Deccan and the Karnatak, the extinction of his own resources as well as those of the empire, and took measures to avert these evils by endeavouring to consolidate his own power and to create divisions among the Marathas. In these measures he overlooked the ability of his opponent Bajirav and little thought that the pursuit of his own schemes should strengthen the power of the Peshva. He had fixed on Hyderabad, the ancient capital of the Kutb Shahi kings, as fittest for the seat of his new government, and was anxious on any terms to remove the Maratha collectors from that quarter. Although Nizam-ul-Mulk had confirmed the Imperial grant in Shahu's favour, a great deal of what was yielded was not actually given up. Numerous points had remained unadjusted. Shahu's part of the agreement to prevent plundering was not fulfilled and constant discussions were the consequence. A new authority for a part of the old territory was granted by Nizam-ul-Mulk, which particularly specified the fixed personal jagirs that Shahu agreed to exempt from sequestration. Jagir assignments in the old territory about Poona which the Nizam had given to Rambhaji Nimbalkar one of the disaffected officers who had joined him, were exchanged for new grants to the eastward about Karmala, a measure on the part of Nizam-ul-Mulk particularly conciliatory to Shahu. After this a settlement was concluded through the Pratinidhi by which Shahu agreed to relinquish the chauth and sardeshmukhi in the neighbourhood of Hyderabad. An equivalent in money was to be paid for the chauth, and for the sardeshmukhi Shahu received some jagir territory near Indapur in Poona of which district he was an hereditary deshmukh [Half of this deshmukhi was bought by Shahaji Bhonsle, the father of Shivaji after he entered the service of Mahmud Adil Shah. Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 369, note 2.], and a jagir in Berar was
Nizam-ul-Mulk began by formally bearing the claims of Sambhaji in a demand made for an
equal division of the revenue; and according to a prevalent custom in the Deccan, sequestrated
the property in dispute by removing the collectors of the sardeshmukhiand displacing the mokasadars
of Shahu until their respective rights should be adjusted. Assuming this privilege as viceroy he
perceived his mistake, and sought to amend it by writing to Shahu and the
Pratinidhi that he was solely actuated by a wish to benefit the Raja in order to prevent the
usurpation of the Konkani Brahman by whose creatures every situation was filled; that the
mokasadars and collectors of the sardeshmukhi had been replaced by others belonging to the Raja's
relation, Sambhaji, whom he had appointed the Raja's deputy, as Sardeshmukh of the six subhas of
the Deccan; and that the Raja when freed from the control of the Konkani Brahman might
afterwards appoint agents entirely of his own selection. But Shahu was too shrewd to be misled by
such specious pleas and far from falling a victim to the cunning plans of creating a rift between him
and Bajirav in this manner, they resolved to teach Nizam lesson. Both parties prepared to attack
each other as soon as the rains should subside and enable their horse to cross the rivers. In the war
that ensued, Bajirav ravaged Jalna and Mahur, made a lightening dash into Gujarand Khandesh
and finally inflicted a severe defeat upon Nizam at Palkhed near Paithan in 1728, forcing him to
agree to negotiations. Bajirav demanded that Sambhaji should be sent to his camp; that security
should be afforded for the future collection of the Maratha shares of the revenue by giving up
several fortified places; and that all arrears not yet realised should be made good. Nizam-ul-Mulk
agreed to all the articles except that of delivering up Sambhaji. Bajirav pointed out that he was a
near relation of the Raja's and that he would be treated with equal respect. It was at last settled that
Nizam-ul-Mulk should guarantee his safe arrival in Panhala, when Shahu should be at liberty to
take what steps he might think proper for the settlement of their family dispute. Battle of Palkhed is
thus an important landmark in the history of the Marathas, as it once for all settled the dispute
between Bajirav and the Pratinidhi, prevented the Nizam from making pretensions to playing the
role of a middleman between the rival, parties at the Maratha Court and finally led the Maratha
nobility to look to Bajirav as the maker of Maratha destiny.

Bajirav was then negotiating with Sar Buland Khan who was then the Subhedar of Gujarat,
in hopes of obtaining the cession of the Chauth and sardeshmukhi of that province. After the
ratification of the treaty with Nizam-ul-mulk, Chimaji Appa, the Peshva's brother marched with large army and exacted a heavy contribution from Petlad and plundered Dholka, but on promising that if the chauth and sardeshmukhi were yielded the districts should be secured from depredation, Sar Buland Khan agreed to the Peshva's proposals, and in 1729 granted the sardeshmukhi or ten per cent, of the whole revenue both on the land and customs except the port of Surat and the district round it, together with the chauth or one-fourth of the whole collections on the land and customs except Surat, and five per cent. on the revenues of the city of Ahmadabad.

In 1729, Muhammad Khan Bangash, the new governor of Malva having entered Bundelkhand and established himself in the territory of Raja Chhatrasal, the Rajput Prince solicited aid from Bajirav. Aid was readily granted. Bangash Khan was reduced to the greatest distress and the province was evacuated by his troops. Chhatrasal in return for this service conferred on Bajirav a fort and district in the neighbourhood of Rs. 2¼ lakhs of yearly revenue. Grant Dulf's story that Chhatrasal adopted Bajirav as his son, and at his death, which happened soon after, bestowed on him one-third of his possessions or an equal share with his two sons Jagatraj and Hirdesa is not borne out by reliable records [D. V. Potdar's essay in Historical and Economic studies p. 7.]. In 1734, Raja Jaysingh was appointed to the government of the provinces of Agra and Malva and nothing could be more favourable to the views of Bajirav. As Jaysingh was situated, the honour of the Rajput was at variance with the subsisting arrangement between him and the Marathas. This may account for his hesitating to comply with their demands, but he at last came to an agreement with Bajirav and yielded him the government of Malva. in the following year, and for the time the emperor, by Jaysingh's persuasions, tacitly acquiesced in the arrangement [Grant Dulf's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 382.].

During the Peshva's absence Kanhoji Bhonsle, the Sena Saheb Subha had been accused of disobedience and confined at Satara, and Raghuji the son of Kanhoji's cousin Bimbaji had been appointed Send Saheb Subha in his stead (1729). Raghuji had accompanied Shahu in his excursions and by his boldness and skill as a hunter had ingratiated himself with Shahu-and obtained a great ascendancy over him. Shahu married him to the sister of one of his own wives of the Shirke family, which, except their having the same surname, and that possibly they may have been originally relations and rivals for the hereditary right or patril of their villages, is the only connection which can be traced between the Bhonsle families of Satara and Nagpur [Grant Dulf's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 384. There is a tradition of their having been rivals in hereditary dispute which may have been invented to prejudice the Raja of Satara against the Bhonsles of Nagpur and to Prevent their desire to adopt any member of that family. It is a point of honour to maintain the hereditary difference,]. On receiving thesanads for Berar, Raghuji gave a bond to maintain a body of 5,000 horses for the service of the State, to pay yearly a sum of Rs. 9 lakhs and exclusive of ghadsana or forage money, a tribute which since the time of Rajaram, the Send Saheb Subha had been allowed to reserve, and also to pay to the head of the government half of all other tribute, prize, property, and contributions. He also bound himself to raise 10,000 horses when required and to accompany the Peshva or to proceed to any quarter where he might be ordered. This arrangement was effected during the absence of Shripatrav Pratiniidhi who had been sent into the Konkan by the Raja. The Pratiniidhi being the friend of Kanhoji Bhonsle endeavoured to obtain some mitigation of his sentence, but failed. Kanhoji, who was an officer of great enterprise died at Satara in 1734, after having lived there for about four years a prisoner at large [He had made some partial conquests in Gondvan and headed one incursion into Cuttak,].

While Bajirav's presence was necessary in the north to support Chimaji in Gujarat, Sambhaji Raja of Kolhapur, instigated by Udaji Chavhan refused to listen to overtures made by Shahu and encamped on the north side of the Varna with all his baggage, women and equipments, and began to plunder the country. The Pratiniidhi surprised Sambhaji's camp and drove them to Panhala with the loss of the whole of their baggage. Many prisoners were taken, among others Tarabai and her
daughter-in-law Rajasbai the widow of Shivaji of Kolhapur. Both these persons were, placed in confinement in the fort of Satara (1730). This defeat brought on an immediate accommodation between the two brothers. Although Shahu was victorious he arranged a ceremonious meeting with his brother and conciliated him. Except some forts, the Maratha districts and claims in the tract of which the rivers Varna and Krshna to the north and the Tungbhadra to the south as the boundaries were wholly ceded to Sambhaji. Kopal near the Tungbhadra was relinquished by Shahu in exchange for Ratnagiri, and the territory of the Konkan, extending from Salshl to Ankola in North Kanara was given over to Sambhaji. In exchange for these places in the south Miraj, Tasganv, Athni, and several villages along the north bank of the Krshna and some fortified places in Bijapiir were given to Shahu. The fort of Vadgany occupied by Udaji Chavhan on the south bank of the Varna was destroyed. This treaty of Varna, (13-4-1731), as it is called was an offensive and defensive agreement between the two brothers and provided for the division of further conquests to the south of Tungbhadra which, on co-operation, were to be equally shared. Grants of inam land or hereditary rights conferred by either party within respective boundaries were confirmed.

Although enemies were not wanting to detract from the reputation of the Peshva and to extol that of his rivals, the success of the Pratinidhi did not materially affect the ascendency which Bajirav had attained; but Nizam-ul-Mulk was still bent on opposing him and found a fit instrument for his purpose in Trimbakrv Dabhade. Ever since the Peshva had obtained the deeds from Sar Buland Khan, Dabhade had been negotiating with other Maratha chiefs and assembling troops in Gujarat. At length finding himself at the head of 35,000 men he had resolved to march for the Deccan in the next season.

Bajirav was well aware of the Senapati's enmity, but was not alarmed by his preparations until he discovered that Nizam-ul-Mulk was to support him in the Deccan. On learning their intention he at once determined to anticipate them, though, when joined by all his adherents, his whole army did not amount to more than half of that of Dabhade. Dabhade gave out that he was proceeding to protect the Raja's authority, and was supported by Pilaji Gaikvd, Kanthaji and Raghujj Kadam Bande, Udaji and Anandrv Pavar, Chimnaji Damodar and Kuvr Bahadur with many others. Bajirav proved that Dabhade Senapati was in alliance with Nizam-ul-Mulk and declared that he was leagued for the purpose of dividing the Maratha sovereignty with the Raja of Kolhapur, a measure inconsistent with sound policy and contrary to the divine ordinances of the Shastras.

The preparations of Nizam-ul-Mulk hastened the march of Bajirav, and as his army, though so inferior in number, was composed of the old paga horse or the Raja's house-hold troops and some of the best Maratha mankaris, he moved rapidly towards Gujarat. At the same time he began negotiating from the day he left Poona and continued until the hour of attack. In the battle which took place (1st April) between Baroda and Dabhv in Gujarat, the death of Trimbakrv Dabhade the Senapi and many who commanded under him left complete victory to Bajirav with almost unquestioned leadership of the Maratha confederacy. A treaty was concluded in August and at the close of the monsoon the Peshva returned to Satara. He would have punished Nizam-ul-Mulk's treachery, but the Nizam warded off the blow which he could with difficulty have withstood by directing its aim against the head of the empire. Bajirav, readily agreed to the Nizam's views. It suited his favourite policy, and it gave employment to persons likely to disturb the domestic arrangements he aimed at establishing. Troops were immediately sent towards Malva under his brother Chimaji while he himself remained for a time engaged in the interior arrangements of government at Poona and Satara. Such appear to have been the rise and progress of the events and intrigues which ended in a secret compact between Bajirav and Nizam-ul-mulk which secured to Bajirav supremacy as Peshva and to the Nizam a kingdom in the Deccan.

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The victory over Dabhade, like the issue of every civil war, left impressions on the minds of many not easily effaced. The Peshva adopted every means of conciliation in his power. He continued Dabhade's charitable practice called dakshina of patronising Shastris and Vaidiks according to their merit and feeding thousands of Brahmins for a few days at Poona. Yeshvantrav, the son of Trimbakrav Dabhade, was raised to the rank of Senapati, but being too young to take the management on himself, his mother Umabai became his guardian and Pilaji Gaikvad their former Mutalik or deputy was confirmed in that situation with the title of Sena Khas Khel or Captain of the Sovereign Tribe in addition to his hereditary title of Samsher Bahadur. An agreement was drawn up under the authority of Shahu and subscribed by the Peshva and Senapati, that neither party should enter the boundary of the other in Gujarat and Malwa. Within the limits of Gujarat the Senapati was to have entire management, but he bound himself to pay one-half of the revenue to government through the Peshva. All contributions levied from countries not specified in the deeds given under the authority of Sar Buland Khan were to be made over to the Raja after deducting expenses [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 378.].

Perceiving Bajirav's complete ascendancy, the appointment of the Hindu prince Abhaysingh to supersede Sar Buland Khan, the imbecility of the emperor, and the treachery as well as venality of his courtiers, and knowing also that he had rendered himself in the highest degree obnoxious, Nizam-ul-Mulk had good grounds for apprehending that the Peshva might be able to obtain the vicerealty of the Deccan. The plan which under these circumstances he adopted belongs to the higher order of politics. It seems to have been framed for the purpose of diverting the Marathas from destroying the resources of his own country and of making his own power a balance between that of the emperor and the Peshva. Before invading Malwa in person Bajirav had an interview with Nizam-ul-Mulk and endeavoured to induce him to advance a subsidy for the aid he was affording, but the Nizam considered the inducement sufficiently strong without paying his auxiliaries. The districts in Khandesh were to be protected by the present agreement of the Peshva in his passage to and from Malwa and nothing more than the usual tribute was to be levied in the six subhas of the Deccan, a proposal to which Bajirav readily acceded. Bajirav on crossing the Narmada. assumed command of the army in Malva and sent his brother and Pilaji Jadhav back to Satara to maintain his influence at court and to concert measures for settling the Konkan which was very disturbed. In Gujarat Pilaji Gaikvad, who was assassinated by Abhaysingh's emissaries, was succeeded by Damaji (1732).

Kanhoji Bhonsle's disobedience and his consequent confinement at Satara, as well as Pratinidhi's sympathy for him have already been referred to above. Whether Nizam-ul-Mulk had made any preparations to take advantage of that situation is uncertain; but Chimaji Appa reasonably felt that Nizam meditated an attack. He therefore pitched his camp about forty miles east of Satara, leaving Pilaji Jadhav with an incomconsiderable body of horse being the only troops at Satara in the immediate interests of the Peshva. When Bajirav advanced into Malva, it was his design to engage the Raja's mind with petty affairs in the Konkan. Divisions of authority, contending factions and the turbulent disposition of some of its inhabitants afforded ample field within the small tract from Goa to' Bombay for engaging and fatiguing attention. Savant, the principal deshmukh of Vadi occupied his hereditary territory in that quarter but having suffered from Kanhoji Angre's attacks before the late peace (1730) between the Rajas of Satara and Kolhapur he always bore an enmity to Angre's family. Kanhoji Angre's death happened in 1728, and all attempts to reduce his power before that time on the part of the English, the Portuguese, and the Dutch had failed. In the quarrels between his sons which followed Kanhoji's death, Bajirav helped Manaji and obtained from him the cession of Kotaligad in Thana and Rajmachi in Poona. The Sidi, besides defending against the Marathas, the districts which had been placed under his charge by Aurangazeb, including Mahad, Raygad, Dabhool and Anjanvel, frequently levied contributions from Shahu's districts. As force was not likely to prevail, the Pratinidhi, Jivaji Kanderav Chitnis, and others of the Raja's ministers formed schemes for ruining the Sidi by intrigue. For this purpose the Pratinidhi gained one Yakub Khan, a

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daring pirate who possessed the entire confidence of the Sidi. To aid this scheme, a force was sent into the Konkan in 1733 under the Pratinidhi, his chief agent Yamaji Shivdev, and, Udaji Chavhan. The intrigues were unsuccessful, and war ensued in which the Pratinidhi was worsted and the fort of Govalkot in Ratnagiri though strongly garrisoned was disgracefully surprised and taken. Chimaji Appa incurred the Raja's displeasure for not sending assistance to Shripatrav after repeated orders. Pilaji Jadhav was at length despatched, but as none of the other officers at Satara would undertake to support the Pratinidhi except on condition of receiving the conquered districts in jagir, he was compelled to return to Satara, with great loss of reputation. About this time the Sidi died and a quarrel ensued between his sons. Yakub Khan immediately embraced the cause of Sidi Rehman one of the sons and called on Shahu for support (1735); but nothing could be done until the return of Bajirav, who, after leaving Holkar and Shinde in Malva, returned to the Deccan, and on crossing the Godavari intimated to the Raja that he should march straight to Danda-Rajpuri. All the disposable infantry were directed to join the Peshva, and Pilaji Jadhav was sent off, reinforced with a body of horse, to support Malharrav Holkar in Malva. Sidi Rehman and Yakub Khan joined Bajirav who began operations by attacking some of the forts. Fattehsing Bhonsle and the Pratinidhi proceeded to co-operate, but the only help they gave was to recover Shivajis capital Raygad, the commandant of which had been previously corrupted by Yakub Khan. The Peshva reduced the forts of Talja and Ghosalsa and besieged Janjira but was obliged to listen to overtures made by the besieged, who ceded to the Marathas the forts of Raygad, Talja, Ghosalsa, Avchitgad, and Birvadi. After this successful close of hostilities, Bajirav, with additional power and influence, returned to Satara and was appointed Subheddr of the late acquisitions [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 389.] . Holkar completely overran Malva and the country south of the Chambal and took possession of several places. Afterwards, on the persuasion of Kanthaji Kadam Bande, he made an incursion into Gujarat, and they both levied contributions as far as the Banas and plundered several towns to the north of Ahmedabad including Idar and Palanpur.

In 1736, Bajirav, owing to the vast army he had kept up to secure his conquests and to overcome his rivals, had become deeply involved in debt. His troops were in arrears; the bankers to whom he already owed a personal debt of many lakhs of rupees, refused to make further advances, and he complained bitterly of the constant mutinies and clamours in his camp which occasioned him much vexation and distress [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 390. "I have fallen into that hell of being beset by creditors, and to pacify sawkars and shiledars I am falling at their feet till I have rubbed the skin from my forehead." Thus wrote Bajirav to his mdhapurush, the Svami of Dhavadshi, a village within a few miles of Satara. The Svami was a much venerated person in the country. The Peshva's letters to the Svami detail the actions of his life in a familiar manner without disguise and are invaluable. Ditto, Vol. I, p. 387.] . Part of the distress originated in the high rates of interest which he was obliged to pay in order to outbid Nizam-ul-Mulk and secure the best of the Deccan soldiery. He levied the chauthand sardeshmukhi in Malva and applied through Raja Jaysingh for their formal cession in that province, and likewise for a confirmation of the deeds granted by Sar Buland Khan for Gujarat. The Turani Moghals who formed a considerable party in the ministry were decidedly against a compromise so disgraceful. With the object of achieving his purpose Bajirav started on a campaign towards the north. First, he wanted to estimate the attitude of the Rajputs and therefore proceeded through Malva and reached Udaipur in February, 1736. The Rana received him very, warmly and agreed to pay a lakh and a half annually as chauth. During his tour through Rajputana, presents and tributes poured upon Bajirav from all quarters. Khan Daman, the Mir Bakshi of the Moghals, who was usually guided by Jaysingh sent five to ten thousand rupees every day. On the 4th of March, Bajirav met Jaysingh who offered to pay five lakhs chauth annually for Jaipur and promised to obtain from the Emperor written giants for the provinces of Malva and Gujarat. Efforts were now made to arrange for Bajirav's personal meeting with the Emperor who however not caring to meet Bajirav in person at Delhi sent his own agent Yadgar Khan to Jaysingh with certain proposals tending to effect as advantageous a bargain as possible. Bajirav at once rejected the offer and communicated his counter proposals through his own agent.
Dhondo Govind. The Emperor was displeased at this and declined to reply. Bajirav knew that the Emperor could not be persuaded otherwise except by a trial of strength and he decided to take up the challenge. However as the season was far advanced he retired to the Deccan only to come back again early in January 1736 with all the contingents of Maratha Sardars gathering round his standard. As the advance party under Malharraob. Holkar crossed Jamuna and got into the Dodbevidently for forage and plunder, they were suddenly attacked by the party of Vazir Sadat Khan and driven away. In the scuffle that ensued a number of Maratha soldiers were killed and those that were overtaken by the Moghals were slaughtered. The Vazir became so elated with this success that he wrote boastful letters to the Emperor informing him as to how Marathas had been signal defeated and driven away. When Bajirav heard of this he resolved to teach the Emperor a wholesome lesson by himself falling upon Delhi and burning its outlying parts. In two long marches he reached Delhi on 28th March but on a second thought desisted from any destructive operations. The presence of Bajirav at the gates of Delhi was enough to strike terror in the palace and there was a great commotion in the city. Thereupon Bajirav withdrew a little distance to Jhil Lake to allay the scare that had been created. A force of 8,000 soldiers despatched by the Emperor against him was completely defeated. No further trial of strength ever took place. Upon a promise of obtaining the government of Malva and Rs. 13 lakhs Bajirav set out on his return to Satara, where he paid his respects to the Raja and immediately proceeded into the Konkan to repulse an attack of the Portuguese on Manaji Ahgre (1737). The Peshva succeeded and took Manaji under his protection on condition of his paying a yearly sum of Rs. 7,000 and presenting annually to the Raja, foreign articles from Europe or Ghina to the value of Rs. 3,000 more. The war with the Portuguese led to the invasion of Salsette, and Bajirav, to secure his conquests in Thana and maintain the war against the Portuguese, entertained some Arabs and a very large body of infantry principally Mavlis and Hektaries. News from Delhi obliged him to withdraw part of his forces from the Konkan.

In the meanwhile the Emperor sent earnest appeals to Nizam to come to Delhi for saving the situation and was granted all his demands to persuade him to take up the task of warding off the Maratha danger from the north. Nizam now went back upon his promise that he had given to Bajirav and proceeded to the North. In fact Bajirav had a shrewd suspicion of this development as the two met each other when Bajirav was going to the south and Nizam to the north apparently on a spacious plea of offering his submission to the Emperor. Bajirav therefore lost no time to proceed to the north again as soon as the rainy season was over. He assembled all the troops he could collect and by the time he reached the Narmada found himself at the head of 80,000 men, though Yeshvantrav Dabhade and Raghujii Bhonsle had not joined him (1738). Proceeding further Bajirav with his skillful maneuvering operations was successful in confining Nizam in the fortress of Bhopal and prevent him from gathering supplies from outside. Finding himself in a tight corner Nizam at last sued for peace and on the 7th January 1738 signed a convention at Doraba Sarai, 64 miles north of Sironj, promising in his own handwriting to grant to Bajirav the whole of Malva and the complete sovereignty of the territory between the Narmada and the Chambal. To obtain a confirmation of this agreement from the Emperor, and to use every endeavour to procure the payment of a subsidy of Rs. 50 lakhs to defray his expenses [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 399.], the Peshva remained for a time levying contributions south of the Chambal and carrying on negotiations at court where the threatened invasion of Nadir Shah was creating alarm. At the same time the war with the Portuguese was being vigorously carried on by the Peshva's brother Chimaji and several forts in Thana were taken by the Marathas. Raghujii Bhonsle made an incursion to the north as far as Allahabad, defeated and slew the Subhedar Shuja Khan and returned loaded with booty. These expeditions undertaken without regular sanction were highly resented by Bajirav. He marched from Poona for the purpose of punishing Raghujii's misconduct and sent forward Avji Kavde to plunder in Berar. Avji was defeated by Raghujii in the end of February 1739. Bajirav was preparing to avenge his loss when news reached him of the arrival of Nadir Shah, the defeat of the Moghals, the death of Khan Dauran, the capture of Sadat Khan, and finally that the victorious Persian was dictating the term of ransom at was defeated by Raghujii in the end of February 1739.
The subsequent intelligence which he received at Nasirabad in Khandesh informing him of the imprisonment of the Emperor, the plunder of Delhi, and the dreadful massacre of many of its inhabitants seemed for a time to overwhelm him. Our quarrel with Raghují Bhoumsle is insignificant, said the Peshva; the war with the Portuguese is as naught; there is but one enemy in Hindustan. He appears to have conceived that Nadir Shah would establish himself as Emperor, but he was not dismayed when he heard reports that a hundred thousand Persians were advancing to the south. Hindus and Musalmans, said Bajirav, the whole power of the Deccan must assemble, and I shall spread our Marathas from the Narmada to the Chambal. He called on Nasir Jung the Nizam's second son to arm against the common foe, and Chimaji Appa was ordered to desist from the Konkan warfare and join him with all speed. Chimaji was now in possession of the whole of Salsette and had begun the siege of Bassein. Notwithstanding offers of submission, Chimaji prosecuted the siege and on the 16th of May Bassein fell. Holkar and Shinde as soon as Bassein fell were sent to join Bajirav with all speed, but by that time news arrived of the retreat of Nadir Shah. Nadir Shah restored the throne to its degraded owner and wrote letters to all the princes of India announcing the event. Among others, he addressed a letter to Shahu and one to Bajirav. He informed Bajirav that he had reinstated Muhammad Shah and now considered him as a brother; that although Bajirav was an ancient servant possessing a large army, he had not afforded the Emperor assistance; but that all must now attend to Muhammad Shah's commands for if they did not he would return with his army and inflict punishment upon the disobedient [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 405.].

Shortly after the departure of Nadir Shah, Bajirav sent a letter to the, Emperor expressive of his submission and obedience, and a nazar of 101 gold mohars. This was acknowledged in suitable terms and a splendid khillat was sent in return [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 406. A khillat comprehends the shirpa or head to foot dress, that is clothes for the turban, trousers, girdle and gown complete, and jewels, horse, elephant and arms according to circumstances and rank of the parties. Bajirav received two ornaments of jewls for the turban and a pearl necklace together with a horse and an elephant.]. He was assured by the Emperor that the rank, possessions, and inheritance already conferred on him would be confirmed, and that he might depend on finding his interests best promoted by continuing steadfast in his duty to the Imperial Government.

Although no new subhedar nor any deputy of Nizam-ul-Mulk was appointed to Malva, no sanad was sent conferring the government on Bajirav. This omission the Peshva considered a breach of faith on the part of Nizam-ul-Mulk; but as the Nizam's army was still in Hindustan, and as some of Bajirav's best officers and troops were in the Konkan he deferred enforcing his claims until a fitter opportunity. In the meantime he was busy arranging the affairs of the province of Malva and strengthening his connection with the Rajput princes in the western quarter along the banks of the Chambal from Kota to Allahabad, but especially with the Rajas of Bundelkhand.

These arrangements to secure the northern frontier were preparatory to a war with Nizam-ul-Mulk or an expedition into the Karnatak. The late success against Nizam-ul-Mulk, his departure from the terms of agreement, his great age, the probability of contentions among his sons encouraged or stimulated the Peshva to attempt the subjugation of the Deccan. The deficiency of his resources was the chief obstacle which deterred him from this undertaking. On the other hand the prospect of contributions and plunder by which he might liquidate his debts and perhaps some secret encouragement from Arkot, where according to Colonel Wilks the Marathas were invited by the Divan of Safdar Ali, were strong allurements for venturing into the Karnatak. But Bajirav was critically situated, and circumstances compelled him to choose the Deccan as the theatre of his operations. Dabhade's or rather the Gaikvad's party who possessed very considerable resources was always hostile to the Peshva; Raghují Bhoumsle was jealous of the Brahman ascendency; he meditated a revolution by getting the Raja into his own power; and as Shahu had no prospect of an heir, Raghují might have contemplated the acquisition of Maratha supremacy by being adopted as
his son. Fattehsingh Bhonsle, the only Maratha likely to supersede him in the Raja's choice, possessed neither ability nor enterprise, and had failed to create power by acquiring popularity among the soldiery. Raghuji had many difficulties to overcome in prosecuting a scheme of the kind. Although a party existed hostile to the Peshva, Bajirav's friends and dependents surrounded the Raja and possessed his ear, if not his entire confidence; not could Raghuji Bhonsle or Damaji Gaikvad concert a plan or transact the slightest business without its being known to Peshva's men. Should Bajirav quit the position which he occupied between the territories of those two, there would be no obstacle to their uniting against him. The subsisting difference between Raghuji and Bajirav arose from Raghuji's having plundered the province of Allahabad and not having joined Bajirav when he was ordered according to the terms on which he held his lands and title. The Peshva affirmed that Raghuji had no authority to levy contributions north of the Narmada and declared his determination, at the time of marching from Poona in the end of 1738, to enforce restitution not to the owners but to the Maratha State and to punish the aggression. A temporary compromise took place on the arrival of the Persians at Delhi; but the dispute was unsettled and nothing but a sense of injury to their mutual interests prevented an open war.

The state of affairs laid the foundation of schemes which had a great effect in extending the spreading but unstable power of the Marathas. Though there are few direct proofs to illustrate this part of their history, it is certain that Bajirav and Raghuji had a meeting and that they were reconciled, and there is reason to suppose that Bajirav unfolded as much of his schemes to Raghuji as were necessary to engage his co-operation, and the plunder of the Karnatak, an eventual addition to his own territories in the Deccan, and a future partition of Bengal and North India may have been urged by the Peshva to excite Raghuji's ambition and cupidity. In this conference may also be seen the real source from which a host of Marathas were poured into the Karnatak.

In prosecution of his plans of conquest in the Deccan, Bajirav seizing the opportunity afforded by the absence of Nizam-ul-Mulk at Delhi, about the end of 1739 began operations against the Nizam's son Nasir Jung. The war proved unprofitable and the Marathas gladly entered on terms of accommodation and a treaty was concluded at Mungi-Paithan by which both parties pledged themselves to maintain peace and mutually to refrain from plundering in the Deccan. Handia and Khargon, districts on the banks of the Narmada, were conferred on Bajirav in jagir, and the Peshva without visiting Poona or Satara, in great vexation amounting almost to despair, set off with his army towards North India [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 411. Thus he wrote to his mahapurushabout this time: I am involved in difficulties in debts, and in disappointments and like a man ready to swallow poison. Near the Raja are my enemies, and should I at this time go to Satara they will put their feet on my breast. I should be thankful I could meet death.].

Bajirav's Death1740.

In the meantime Manaji Angre attacked by his brother had applied to the Peshva's son Balaji Bajirav, generally called Nana Saheb, who was with the Raja in the neighbourhood of Satara. Five hundred men were sent to support the garrison and an express despatched to Chimaji Appa for instructions. Chimaji had ordered his nephew to repair to Kolaba in person and applied to the Governor in Council at Bombay with whom he had concluded a treaty and maintained a friendly intercourse since his late campaign in the Kohkan to support the garrison at Kolaba. The English and Balaji had succeeded in humbling Sambhaji, Manaji's brother when Chimaji Appa joined them. They were concerting plans for the reduction of Revdanda when news reached them of the death of Bajirav which happened on the banks of the Narmada on the 28th of April 1740. On receiving the intelligence, Shankaraji Narayan was appointed Subedar of the Kohkan and Khanduji Mankar was left in command of a body of troops, while Chimaji Appa and his nephew, after the usual mourning ceremonies, returned to Poona and shortly after to Satara. Bajirav left three sons Balaji Bajirav, Raghunathrao afterwards so well known to the English, and Janardan Baba. who died in early
young. He also left one illegitimate son by a Muhammadan mother, whom he bred a Musalman and named Samsher Bahadur.

*Balaji Bajirav Peshva, 1740-61.*

The army which entered the Karnatak under the command of Raghunji Bhonsle was composed of troops belonging to the Raja, the Peshva, the Pratinidhi, Fattesingh Bhonsle, and various chiefs of lesser note. The Ghorpades of Sondur and Guti were invited to join by letters from Shahu and the Peshva; and Murarrav the grand-nephew of the famous Santaji Ghorpade and the adopted son and heir of Murarrav of Guti appeared under the national standard for the first time since the death of his distinguished and ill-requited relation. The whole force amounted to 50,000 men. Dost Ali, the Navab of the Karnatak, fell and the Divan was made a prisoner. After this, the Marathas began to levy contributions all over the Karnatak until bought off by the Navab's son and heir Safdar Ali, with whom, before retiring, they entered into a secret compact to destroy Chanda Saheb then in possession of Trichinopoly, while the main body of his army remained encamped on the Shivyanga. Raghunji Bhonsle returned to Satara and endeavoured to prevent Balaji Bajirav's succession as Peshva by proposing Babuji Naik of Baramati, a connection but an enemy of the late Peshva, for the vacant office. Babuji Naik was possessed of great wealth and his enmity to Bajirav arose from a very common cause that of having lent money which his debtor could not repay. Raghunji's party used the irritated creditor as their tool and proposed to Shahu that he should be raised to the vacant Peshvaship. But Shahu turned a deaf ear to Raghunji's proposals and Balaji Bajirav was almost immediately invested with the robes of Peshvaship on 25th June, 1740. Raghunji, on finding his schemes abortive, proceeded towards the Karnatak to reap the expected harvest at Trichinopoly accompanied by Shripatrav, the Pratinidhi and Fattesingh Bhonsle. Trichinopoly surrendered on the 26th of March 1741, and Chanda Saheb was brought a prisoner to Satara where he remained in the custody of an agent of Raghunji Bhonsle's till he was set free in 1748 [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 422. Chanda Saheb or Husain Dost Khan does not appear to have been confined in the fort nor to have endured a close imprisonment, but merely to have had an attendant guard wherever he went. This supposition is confirmed by the ease with which Dupleix appears to have intrigued with him during his term of imprisonment.]. Murarrav Ghorpade was left in command of the fort of Trichinopoly, and a part of his garrison was composed of infantry belonging to the Peshva. Their expenses were defrayed by Shahu, besides which it was settled that Rs. 20,000 of the share of tribute from the province of Arkot should be annually paid to Balaji Bajirav.

One of the first acts of the new Peshva was to forward petitions to Delhi respecting various promises made to his father. These applications were transmitted through Jaysingh and Nizam-ul-Mulk. A supply of ready money was what Balaji most earnestly craved and Rs. 15 lakhs as a free gift were granted by the Emperor. Proposals for an agreement were then drawn up in the joint names of the Peshva and Chimaji Appa, in which they asked to have the government of Malva, which, on the death of Bajirav, was conferred on Azam-ulla-Khan. If the government of Malva was granted, they promised to pay their respects to the Emperor; to prevent any other Maratha crossing the Narmada; to send a body of 500 horse under an officer of rank to remain in attendance on the Emperor's person; and to ask no more than the gift of money already bestowed. They agreed to send 4,000 horse for service who would punish refractory landholders as far as their numbers would enable them, and they promised not to sequestrate the rent-free lands or jagirs assigned for charitable or religious purposes. No notice seems to have been taken of the application. But Balaji, whose disposition was conciliatory, was anxious to have the government of Malva conferred as a right according to the treaty with his father. With this object when Nizam-ul-Mulk was marching to the Deccan, in order to suppress his son Nasir Jung's revolt, Balaji paid (1741) him a respectful visit near the Narmada and sent a body of his troops to join him. At this time he sustained a great loss in the death of his uncle Chimaji Appa which happened at the end of January 1741. Eleven days before this event, Khanduji Mankar under Chimaji's direction had reduced Revdanda, the last place

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remaining with the Portuguese between Goa and Daman. Chimaji Appa from his successes against the Portuguese has earned a reputation among the Marathas for his ability to conduct military operations. He is also highly respected for his purity of private life, particularly in singular contrast in that respect, to his elder brother.

On the death of his uncle, the Peshva returned from the northern districts and spent nearly a year in civil arrangements at Poona and Satara. Continuing to show the greatest respect for the Raja, he obtained from Shahu a grant by which the whole territory conquered from the Portuguese was conferred on him, and also, except in Gujarat, the exclusive right of collecting the revenues and of levying contributions north of the Narmada. In 1742, Bhaskarpant, the Divan of Raghuji Bhonsle of Berar, carried his arms eastwards, but the Peshva, eager to establish his power over those territories for which the authority obtained from the Raja was as usual assumed as a right, marched though late in the season, towards Hindustan and made himself master of Garha and Mundela before the rains set in. He was obliged to encamp on the banks of the Narmada during the rainy season, and probably meditated an expedition into Allahabad when he was called upon to defend his rights in Malva which was invaded by Damaji Gaikvad and Baburav Sadasiv. This inroad seems to have been instigated by Raghuji to obstruct the Peshva's progress eastward; and on Balaji’s arrival in Malva the army of Gujarat retired. On this occasion Anandrv Paar was confirmed by the Peshva in the possession of Dhar and the surrounding districts, a politic measure which not only secured Pavar in his interests, but opposed a barrier on the western side of Malva to incursions from Gujarat. Since the Peshva's arrival at Mundela a negotiation had been going on between him and the Emperor through the mediation of Raja Jaysingh supported by Nizam-ul-Mulk. The chauth of the imperial territory was promised and akhillat more splendid than had ever been conferred on his father was transmitted to Balaji. It does not appear that any deed for collecting this general chauth was ever granted by Muhammad Shah; sums of money and convenient assignments were the mode of payment. The object in the pending treaty was on the Peshva's part to obtainsanads for the promised government of Malva, and on the part of the court of Delhi to procrastinate and to widen the breach between the Peshva and Raghuji Bhonsle.

In the meantime Bhaskarpant had invaded Bihar. The Maratha army consisted of 10,000 or 12,200 horse and report had swelled their numbers to nearly four times that number. Bhaskarpant obtained the possession of the town of Hugh' and most of the towns from Katva to the neighbourhood of Midnapur fell into the hands of the Marathas. Raghuji also advanced to Bengal. The Emperor ordered Safdar Jung the Navab of Oudh to drive out Bhaskarpant, and at the same time applied to Balaji Bajirav to afford his aid. As inducements to the Peshva an assignment for the arrears of chauth due from Azimabad was sent to him by the Emperor and an assurance of confirming him in the government of Malva. The reward was prized too highly and the service was too desirable to be refused. On Balaji's approach, Raghuji decamped and retreated towards the hills. Balaji overtook, attacked, and defeated Raghuji's army. Bhaskarpant retreated through Orissa and Balaji returned to secure the long-promised government. The Peshva's conduct left no reasonable excuse on the part of Muhammad Shah for refusing to perform the engagement; but to save the credit of the imperial name, the feeble palliative of conferring the appointment on the Peshva as the deputy of Prince Ahmad, the Emperor's son, was adopted. The rest of the treaty differs little from the former proposals made in the joint names of Balaji and his uncle Chimaji, except that instead of 4,000, Balaji promised to furnish 12,000 horse the expense of the additional 8,000 being payable by the Emperor. Jaysingh, between whom and Balaji the most friendly intercourse subsisted, was guarantee for the observance of treaty with Muhammad Shah, and Malharrav Holkar, Ranoji Shinde, and Pilaji Jadhav declared in due form that should the Peshva recede from his duties they would quit his service. The Peshva returned to Satara to pay his respects and go through the form of producing his accounts of the revenue. These accounts were made out by the Peshva as a general in command of a body of the Raja's troops [Grant Ouff's Marathas, 259. It is a remarkable fact that
after the Rajas of Satara had become perfect ciphers in the Maratha Government, the Peshva's accounts continued to the last to be made out in the manner described.]

In 1744 Raghují Bhonsle sent agents to the Peshva assuring him of his sincere desire of reconciliation and of his conviction that the plans of Bajirav were those best suited to his own and to the real interests of the Maratha nation. He continued the same profession with apparent sincerity, but as he was on full march towards Satara, the Peshva thought it necessary to be on his guard, particularly as Damaji Gaikvad was also approaching. The Pratinidhi had become infirm by sickness, but his mutalik Yamaji Shivdev was an active and an able man, adverse to the Peshva's supremacy, and, although not leagued with Raghují, intimately connected with the faction of Dabhade. Under these circumstances Balaji Bajirav had to choose between a war with the Maratha chiefs or the resignation of Bengal to Raghují. The question did not admit of hesitation; he chose the resignation of Bengal to Raghují. At the same time as it was understood that the country north of the Mahanadi as well as of the Narmada was comprehended in his agreement with the Emperor, he made a merit of conceding his right to levy tribute to Raghují, and a secret compact in which the Raja was used as a mediator was finally concluded. The object of the contracting parties seems avowedly to have been not so much an alliance as an agreement to avoid interference with each other. The Rajas authority was in this instance convenient to both. A sanad was given to the Peshva conferring on him his original mokasa, all the Jagirs bestowed on himself or acquired by his father or grandfather, the governments of the Kohkan and Malva, and the shares of revenue or tribute from Allahabad, Agra, and Ajmer; three sub-divisions in the district of Patna, Rs. 20,000 from the province of Arkot, and a few detached villages in Raghují's districts. On the other hand, it was settled that the revenues and contributions from Lucknow, Patna and lower Bengal including Bihar should be collected by Raghují who was also vested with the sole authority of levying tribute from the whole territory from Berar to Cuttack. It was also agreed that Damaji Gaikvad should be obliged to account to the Peshva for the amount of the contributions he had levied in Malva, but nothing was urged at this time respecting the large arrears due by Dabhade to the head of the government. It does not appear that any settlement was concluded but Damaji seems to have remained in the Deccan, although his presence was much required in Gujarat. The Peshva's southern and eastern boundaries in North India were well defined by the Narmada, the Son, and the Ganga but the sanad delivered on this occasion authorised him to push his conquests northwards as far as practicable[Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 432.].

Raghují Bhonsle was intent on reviving his lost footing in Bengal; and the Peshva in order to excuse himself to the Emperor for not acting against Raghují remained in the Deccan. As soon as the season opened Bhaskarpant was sent with 20,000 horse into Bengal by Raghují, but along with twenty officers was treacherously murdered on 30th March 1744 by Alivardi Khan in an entertainment near Kalva and the army retreated to Berar in great confusion. Raghují himself proceeded to the scene of action, and, although partially defeated near Murshidabad while returning, succeeded in maintaining his hold over Orissa. Shortly after Raghují had entered Bengal, Balaji Bajirav went (1745) to Malva, addressed letters to the Emperor full of assurances of perpetual fidelity, but excused himself from paying his respects in the royal presence. The Peshva also sent his agents to Alivardi Khan demanding chauth in accordance with the Emperor's grant. Thus the Navab now came to be pressed between two enemies, the Bhonsle and the Peshva. In 1747 Alivardi Khan was once again severely defeated by Raghují's son Janoji at Burdvan. The menace of Bhonsle's invasions thus continued to hang over Bengal till at last the Navab came to an accommodation with him by a solemn treaty concluded in March 1751 by which Navab agreed to part with Orissa and pay twelve lakhs of rupees annually by way of chauth to be collected from Bengal. As for Peshva's claims it appears they were never implemented, on the plea put up by the Emperor that Peshva had failed to protect Alivardi Khan from the attacks of Bhonsle. Soon after 1747 Peshva came to be far too preoccupied with the affairs at Satara to be able to pursue matters relating to Bengal.
In 1746 the Peshva sent his cousin Sadashiv Chimaji Bhu accompanied by Sakharam Bapu, the writer of Mahadajipant, Purandare, on an expedition into the Karnatak to punish some of the deshmukhs who had driven out the posts of the Peshva's old creditor Babuji Naik Baramatikar. That person by the interest of Raghjuji Bhonsle had obtained the chaouth and sardeshmukhi between the Krshna and Tungbdhara in farm from the Raja for the yearly sum of Rs. 7 lakhs; but the opposition he experienced and the heavy charges for maintaining the troops totally ruined him in a few years. The expense of the present expedition added to his embarrassment, but he would not, as was proposed to him, agree to give up the contract in favour of Sadashiv Chimaji. Sadashiv Chimaji levied contributions as far as Tungbdhara and reduced Bahadur Bhenda to which the Marathas had a claim of long standing. On Sadashiv Chimaji's return from this expedition, he was invested by the Raja with the same rank as had been enjoyed by his father, that is second-in-command under the Peshva, and being ambitious and bolder than his cousin, the Peshva, he began to assume considerable power. He chose as the writers Vasudev Joshi and Raghunath Hari, two able men brought up under Kanhoji Angre. In 1747 the Peshva himself concluded a new and more specific agreement with the Rajas of Bundelkhand, by which, after deducting the district which had been ceded to the late Peshva, one-third of the territory estimated at Rs. 16½ lakhs was made over to Balaji Bajirav besides a like share from the profits of the diamond mines of Panna. During this period of comparative tranquility the Peshva encouraged agriculture, protected the villagers and grain merchants, and improvement was everywhere visible. But about this time events occurred in North India, in the Deccan, and in the Madras, Karnataka which were the forerunners of fresh troubles and great revolutions in every part of India.

In 1749, eastern part of the Deccan which was completely drained of troops presented an inviting field to the Peshva, but domestic arrangements of the utmost importance demanded his presence at Satara. Raja Shahu had for some years been in a state of mental imbecility brought on, it was said, through grief for the death of his youngest wife Sagunabai of the Mohite family [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol I, p. 441]. Shahu was for some time afflicted with that harmless silly madness which is sometimes ludicrous, even whilst it excites commiseration. It first appeared on an occasion when he had to receive a visit from two Maratha Sardars in full darbar, by his dressing out his favourite dog in gold brocade, covered with jewels and putting his own turban on the dog. He never resumed any covering for his head after he recovered his senses. This dog had once saved his life when hunting a tiger, and amongst other freaks, he issued sanads conferring a jagir upon him, and entitling him to use a palanquin in all which the Raja was humoured and palanquin establishment kept. As his health declined, Shahu recovered the use of his intellect [Shahu had some wit and his reply to a letter about this time from Raja Jaysingh of Jaipur shows that he retained it to the last. The Raja asked what he had performed for the Hindu faith and what charities he had bestowed, I have, replied Shahu, conquered from the Musalmans the whole country from Rameshwar to Delhi and I have given it to the Brahmans. Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol I, p. 441.], and the dependents of the Peshva about his person urged him to adopt a son. The Raja on the loss of his only child, some time before his derangement, contrary to all his former invectives against him had declared that he would adopt Sambhaji Raja of Kolhapur provided he had issue. As Sambhaji had no children, it was proposed that an inquiry should be made for some lineal descendant of Vithoji, the brother of Maloji, the grandfather of the great Shivaji. Search was accordingly made, but none was discovered. It was then suggested that he should take the son of some respectable shiledar of the patil family. This proposal, Shahu said, he had a strong reason for declining. For some time he thought of adopting one Mudhoji who was the son of Sagunabai's sister and who belonged to the Bhonsle family of Nagpur. Tarabai who had been all the while carefully watching this course of events was quick to see that there was a golden opportunity for her to fish in the troubled waters. She declared that she had a grandson Ramraja, [His real name was Rajaram, but as Tarabai according to Hindu custom would not utter the name of her husband, she transposed the terms and made it Ramraja.] Shivaji's posthumous son born in 1726 [Exact birth date of Ramraja is not available: See Sardesai, Marathi Riyasat, Vol VI, Peshwa Balaji Bajirav (1749-61),

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at Panhala whose life she had managed to save by the exchange of another infant born at the same time. Because of the probable danger to his life the prince's existence was kept a secret by getting him conveyed out of the fort of Panhala and sent to a sister of Bhavanibai. The child was subsequently carried to Tuljapur and thence to Barsi in Sholapur district, where he was brought up in obscurity. The exchanged infant, said Tarabai, soon expired and as it was widely taken to be the death of the prince, his existence elsewhere remained a well guarded secret. Such an assertion on the part of Tarabai, did not of course meet with universal credence. Even Shahu at first hesitated to put implicit faith in the story, but after satisfying himself with some proof and words of faith he came to be inclined to accept the story as true. It was, however, loudly asserted by the partisans of Sambhaji that the so-called son of Shivaji was spurious and plans were pursued to oppose his claims to Satara. The elder surviving wife of Shahu, Sakvarbai of the Shirke family, on being acquainted with the declaration on the part of Tarabai which deprived her of all change of power, also incited Sambhaji to oppose the alleged grandson of Tarabai whom she declared an impostor. She promised to aid Sambhaji to her utmost, and engaged Yamaji Shivdev in her cause. Jagjivan, the younger brother of Shripatrav who had been appointed Pratinidhi on the death of Shripatrav in 1747, also promised her all the support in his power. Damaji Gaikvd gave his assent to the proposal, and emissaries were despatched into the Ghatmatha and the Kohkan, a tract possessing ever prone to solidery, to raise men and be prepared for her purpose. Balaji Bajirav repaired to Satara with an army of 35,000 men, to guard his own interest as also to prevent any untoward development. While the interested parties were thus busy in their own plans Shahu lay on his death bed (1749) vigilantly attended by Sakvarbai, who as has been pointed out was opposed to the accession of Ramraja. The Peshva, however, caught an opportunity to obtain a secret interview with Shahu whose inclinations he promised to honour and give effect to. The Raja therefore signed a note empowering the Peshva to govern the whole Maratha confederacy (Rajmandal, as it is actually called in the note) on condition of his not entertaining the claims of Sambhaji and assuring the Peshva that whosoever comes as Chhatrapati would continue him in the office of the Peshva [Sardesai (New History of the Marathas' Vol. II, p. 272-73. The text of the note is published in Kavyetihas Sangraha).]. This paper also directed that Kolhapur State should always be considered an independent sovereignty; that the jagirdars now existing were to be confirmed to the holders, leaving power to the Peshva to conclude such arrangements with the jagirdars as might be beneficial for extending Hindu power, for protecting the temples of the God, the cultivators of the fields, and whatsoever was sacred or useful [The question whether Ramraja was or was not the son of Shivaji II and whether the deed of cession to the Peshva, was or was not really executed by Shahu is one that has been much discussed; and the historians Mountstuart Elphinstone and Grant Duff take opposite sides' the former doubting and the latter, on the whole maintaining the genuineness of both the letter and the deed. (Elphinstone's History of India, IV edition, p. 642; Grant Duff's Vol. I, p. 443 note). Subsequent research in Maratha history has tended to support Grant Duff in this controversy. It is sufficient to state that Ramraja was eventually acknowledged by the Marathas as the adopted son and successor of Shahu.]. The Peshva now resolved to act decisively yet cautiously. [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 442. The following letter from Sadashiv Chimaji to the Peshva throws very useful light on the situation. After compliments: It seems impossible to judge of what will be the result of all this. The Bai's doings are not to be depended upon; keep continually on your guard. The Bai is not a person to blunder in that which she sets about. Let nothing induce you to act contrary to what has hitherto been professed, or let anything appear respecting your intentions; but in the event of the Raja's decease, you must take the upper hand of all. While the Raja is in existence, do not allow so much as a grain of oil-seed to appear different in your conduct. As matters proceed continue to write to me constantly. Despatched 16th Saval.] Although the knew Tarabai's capacity of intrigue very well he considered it most expedient to support the assertion of Tarabai although he might have his own doubts about her avowals, for he knew that the voice of the country was too strong and an heir of the house of Shivaji would have been joined by thousands. Sambhaji at this stage was out of the picture and Sakvarbai would have liked to adopt a scion from the Nagpur branch because she could only thus maintain her supremacy after the death of her.
Shahu's Death 1749.

Shahu breathed his last on 15th December, 1749. Tarabai came down from 1749 the fort to have a last look at him. Govindrav Chitnis went and conversed with her. She advised Govindrav to arrange that Sakvarbai should become sati [Sardesai: New History of the Marathas, Vol. II, p. 274.]. The Chitnis reported this proposal to the Peshwa who consulted the Pratinidhi, Fattehsingh Bhonsle and others. They unanimously supported Tarabai's suggestion about Sakvarbai becoming sati. Her brother Kanhoji Shirke was sent for. He went and communicated the proposal to his sister. Sakvarbai had not yet recovered from the first emotions of consternation and rage at finding her plans frustrated for, within a few moments of Raja's death a body of horse had galloped into the town of Satara. Every avenue about the town was occupied by troops and a garrison of the Peshva was placed in the fort, while party was detached to reinforce the escort of Ramraja who had not arrived when Shahu died. In this situation as she revolted in her mind the proposal of her brother, she came to the conclusion that if she refused and lived after her husband she would have to suffer untold miseries at the hands of the Peshwa who was strong enough to control the situation. The brother returned and communicated her assent. Then preparations were made. Along with Sakvarbai two of Shahu's concubines, Lakshmi and Sakhu, also burnt themselves on the same pyre [A statue of Shahu was afterwards erected on the burning ground where it still stands. Grant Duff is of opinion that Kanhoji was promised by the Peshwa that ajagir would be given to him in the Konkan, if he persuaded his sister to burn herself not only for the honour of Shirke family but for the honour of all India under the sway of the late Raja. He further avers that many of the men of those times who knew the secret did not look upon the Salt as in conformity with their faith and always mentioned the incident with detestation; (Grant Duff Vol. I. p. 444) but Sardesai differs and says 'When she saw that she could not manage to snatch power out of the Peshwa's hands she preferred to die.' (Sardesai: New History of the Marathas p. 274).].

Ram Raja 1749-1777.

Balaji Bajiroa Peshva, 1740-61.

Immediately after Shahu's death the Peshva put Sakvarbai's partisans, the Pratinidhi and his Mutalik Yamaji Shivdev, under arrest. Orders were also sent in his name to Yeshvantrav Dabhade and Raghujir Bhonsle requiring their presence at Satara. Yeshvantrav Dabhade had become totally imbical from debauchery, and as had probably been foreseen neither Dabhade nor Damaji Gaikvd the commander of his army attended. Most of the other jagirdars were present, but if any were disposed to resist the Peshva's authority, they remained passive until they should see what part Raghujir Bhonsle would play. Raghujir's ambition was now controlled by the caution of age and the teaching of experience. He was not only intent on directing yearly raids into Bengal, but owing to the absence of his son Janoji in the Karnatak with 10,000 horse and to the number of troops which he was compelled to leave in his own territories he arrived at Satara in the month of January 1750, with a force of only 12,000 men. His disposition was pacific towards Balaji but he made some demur in acknowledging Ram Raja. He required, in testimony of his being Bhonsle and the grandson of Rajaram, that Tarabai should first eat with him in presence of the caste, deposing on the food they ate together that Ram Raja was her grandson. When this was complied with in the most solemn manner, Raghujir declared himself satisfied; and after a long conference with the Peshva he gave his assent to the propriety of the plans submitted for his consideration. As a proof of the good understanding which subsisted between them, Balaji took occasion to proceed in advance to Poona,
leaving the Raja in Raghuji's charge, and requesting that he would accompany him to Poona with the whole of the jagirdars, for the purpose of concluding the arrangements made by the will of the late Raja, Shahu. It may also be noted that in the note left by Shahu, Raghuji had been expressly excluded from succession. From this period (1750) Poona took the place of Satara as the main centre of activities of the Marathas.

In the success of his schemes, Balaji almost overlooked Tarabai, who though upwards of seventy years of age, soon convinced him that it was dangerous to slight a woman of her spirit. On pretence of paying her devotions at her husband's tomb in Sinhgad near Poona she went there and endeavoured to persuade the Pant Sachiv to declare for her as head of the Maratha empire [As Sinhgad belonged to the Sachiv and afforded a centre for intrigue against the Peshva, he categorically demanded possession of that fort from the Sachiv. The Sachiv refused to do so and was at once arrested. The fort was surrounded on 6th July and Sachiv was set free. (Sardesai—New History of the Marathas, Vol.II,p.291).]. Balaji, after much persuasion, induced her to come to Poona, and having flattered her ambition with the hope of a large share in the administration, at last obtained her influence with Ram Raja in confirming the many schemes he had now to carry into effect. Raghuji Bhonsle received new deeds for Berar, Gondvan, and Bengal, and some lands which had belonged, to the Pratinidhi adjoining Berar. The title deeds for half of Gujarat were sent to Yeshvantrav Dabhade, which, as he had never yet accounted for a share of the revenue to the state, gave Damaji Gaikvad to understand what he might expect from the growing power of the Peshva. The whole of Malwa estimated to yield about Rs. 150 lakhs of yearly revenue except about Rs. 10 lakhs was divided between Holkar and Shinde, and Rs. 74½ lakhs were conferred on Holkar and Rs. 65½ lakhs on Shinde. The remaining Rs. 10 lakhs were held by various Jagirdars of whom Anandra Pavar's share was the most considerable. All of them were subservient to the views of the Peshva and from them he had no opposition to fear. Balaji Bajirav, without intending to employ them, confirmed the eight Pradhans, and for a short time nominated Gangadhar Shrinivas as Pratinidhi; but on the application of Raghuji Bhonsle and of some other Jagirdars, when about to return to their districts, he made them a promise to release Jagjivan Parashuram and accordingly restored him to his rank and liberty. As the Raja's establishment was to be much reduced, and it was necessary to secure in his interests such of his officers as he could not employ, the Peshva reserved a great part of the Pratinidhi's lands as jagirs and assignments to the persons in question, particularly the tract west of Karad between the Urmodi and the Varna where he apprehended an insurrection supported by the Raja of Kolhapur. Fattesingsh Bhonsle the adopted son of Shahu was confirmed in the possession of his jagir, in various minor claims, in shares of revenue, and in the title of Raja of Akkalkot, which, except the detached claims alluded to, were being enjoyed by his descendants till the time of merger. An appointment created by Shahu for a relation of the Mantri, and which was termed Ajahut sardeshmukh or general agent for collecting the sardeshmukiwas nominally preserved; but jagir lands were assigned in lieu of the right of interference in the collection of the ten per cent, on the six sabhas of the Deccan. The appointment of Sar Lashkar was taken from the family of Somvanshi and given to Nimbaji Naik Nimbalkar. All these changes and appointments were made in the name of Ram Raja, but it was now well understood that the Peshva's authority was supreme in the state and generally admitted without dissatisfaction. Yamaji Shivdev, who recovered his liberty at the same time with the Pratinidhi, threw himself into the fort of Sangola near Pandharpur where he raised an insurrection and made head against the Peshva until he was suppressed by the Peshva's cousin Sadashiv Chimaji. In the measures which have been detailed the Peshva owed much of his success to his Divan Mahadajipant, who, next to his cousin Sadashivraj, possessed the greatest influence over Balaji Bajirav of any of his advisers. Sadashivraj on his expedition to Sangola was accompanied by Ram Raja for the purpose of giving Yamaji Shivdev no excuse for resistance. During their stay at that place, the Raja is said to have agreed to renounce the entire power and to lend his sanction to whatever measures the Peshva might pursue, provided a small tract round Satara was assigned to his own management, conditions to which Balaji subscribed but which actually were never realised. The Raja under a strong escort returned
In 1751, when the Peshwa left for Aurangabad, to support the claims of Ghazi-ud-din, the elder son of the Nizam to the viceroyalty of the Deccan, Tarabai sounded Ram Raja, in regard to his assuming the control usurped by his servant Balaji the Peshva; but not finding him fit for her purpose, she pretended to have had no serious intentions in the proposal. At the same time she sent messengers to Damaji Gaikvard, representing the unguarded state of the country and recommending his immediate march to Satara to rescue the Raja and the Maratha state from the power of the Peshva. Damaji at once acted on this request and Tarabai, as soon as certain accounts were received of the Gaikvand's approach, invited the Raja into' the fort of Satara and made him prisoner. She then reproached him with his want of spirit; regretted that she had ever rescued him from a life of obscurity for which only he could have been destined; declared that he could not be her grandson or the descendant of the great Shivaji; that he was neither a Bhonsle nor a Mohite, but a baseborn Gondhali changed in the house where he had been first conveyed [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 452. Ram Raja was first concealed in the house of a Gondhali or a gondhal dancer.], and that she would make atonement on the banks of the holy Krishna for ever having acknowledged him. She ordered the Havildar to fire upon his attendants, most of whom unconscious of what had happened remained near the gate of the fort; and she directed the guns to be pointed at the houses in the town below belonging to the partisans of the Peshva. Trimbakpant dominonally called Nana Purandare, Govindraor Chitnis, and the officers in the Peshva's interests at Satara were at first disposed to ridicule this attempt as that of a mad old woman, but, on hearing of the approach of Damaji Gaikvard from Songad, they quitted the town and assembled troops at the village of Arla on the banks of the Krshna. On the advance of the Gaikvard by the Salpa pass, although they had 20,000 and their opponent only 15,000 men they made an irresolute attack and retired to Nimh about eight miles north of Satara where they were followed the next day, attacked, and defeated by the Gujarati troops. Damaji Gaikvard immediately went to pay his respects to Tarabai, and several forts in the neighbourhood were given to her. Satara was well stored with provisions, and the Pratinidhi promised to aid Tarabai's cause. News of these proceedings recalled the Peshva. Before he returned Nana Purandare had redeemed his lost credit by attacking and compelling the army of Damaji Gaikvard to retire to the Jore Khora (Jore valley) about twenty-five miles north-west of Satara where they expected to be joined by the Pratinidhi from Karad and by troops from Gujarat. In this hope they were disappointed; and as Shankarajipant Subhedar of the Konkan was assembling troops in their rear and the Peshva's army which had marched nearly 400 miles in thirteen days was close upon them, Damaji sent a messenger to treat with Balaji. Balaji solemnly agreed to abide by the terms proposed and enticed Damaji to encamp in his neighbourhood, where, as soon as he got him into his power, he demanded the payment of all the arrears due from Gujarat, and the cession of a large portion of his territory, Damaji represented that he was but the agent of Dabhade the Senapati, and had no authority to comply with what was required. On this reply the Peshva sent private orders to seize some of the family of the Gaikward and Dabhade who lived at Taleganv in Poona, and treacherously surrounded, attacked, and plundered the camp of Damaji Gaikvard and sent him into confinement at Poona [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 453. In consequence of this treachery, it is said that Damaji ever after refused to salute the Peshva except with his, lefthand.]. This defeat of Damaji, instead of damping the spirits of Tarabai, only served to incense her still more. The imprisonment of Ram Raja was made more strict. Guards and servants were made to suffer indescribable hardship on ground of suspicion. Pratinidhi was deprived of his post on ground of incapacity. At the same time she started a low intrigue with the Nizam's Court offering the
Peshvaship to his minister, Ramdaspant. It is difficult to understand how in all this she was serving the Maratha State although on the authority of Grant Duff it must be stated that Marathas of the times were strongly of opinion that she was the rightful regent and that Balaji had usurped the sphere of power and influence that was her due. Perplexing as the affair was Tarabai's conduct in the end proved advantageous to the Peshva as it took from him the odium of being the first to confine the Raja to' the fort of Satara. Tarabai did not merely confine Ram Raja to the fort. His prison was a damp stone dungeon and his food was of the coarsest grain. Damaji Gaikvad was the only man whom the Peshva dreaded, but as he was now a close prisoner at Poona, Balaji proceeded towards Aurangabad in prosecution of his engagements with Ghazi-ud-din. Ramdaspant, Raja Ragunathdas as he was also called, the Divan of Salabat Jung opened a communication from Ahmadnagar with Tarabai and Sambhaji of Kolhapur. [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. I, p. 454.]

During Balaji's absence at Aurangabad Tarabai occupied the districts of Wai and Satara aided by 5,000 or 6,000 Marathas and Ramoshis whom she had entered in her service. A large force was sent to invest Satara and starve her into submission. Anandraw Jadhav, the commandant of the fort, convinced of the folly of resistance, formed the design of carrying the Raja out of her power. When this came to her knowledge she ordered him to be beheaded; a sentence which the garrison executed on their own commander, as well as on several others subsequently implicated in a like scheme. Baburav Jadhav, a person unconnected with the late commandant and a relation of the Jadhavs of Sindkhed was appointed to the command of the fort. In 1753, the Peshva before leaving for the Karnatak endeavoured to pave the way to a compromise with Tarabai. On his march to the Karnatak he sent to assure Tarabai that if she would submit, the control of the Raja's person and establishment should remain at her disposal. To this Tarabai would not listen to unless Balaji Bajirav would come to Satara, acknowledge her authority, and give, such personal assurances as would satisfy her. [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, p. 464.] Encouraged by the approach to Poona of Janoji Bhonsle the son and heir of Raghju Bhonsle, and on assurances of safety and protection from the Peshva, Tarabai, leaving the garrison of Satara and the custody of Ram Raja's person to Baburav Jadhav repaired to the Peshva's capital accompanied by Bimbaji Bhonsle the youngest brother of Janoji who had attached himself to her party and married one of her relations of the Mohite family. At Poona Tarabai was received with so much attention and consideration that she agreed to the Peshva's proposals as formerly made, provided he would promise to accompany her to the temple of Jejuri and there solemnly swear to abide by his present declarations. The Peshva consented on condition that Baburav Jadhav should be dismissed to which Tarabai reluctantly agreed. This reconciliation between Tarabai and the Peshva was the result of great tact and restraint on the part of the Peshva with which he tickled womanly pride and showed to her the futility of any opposition to his designs. Ram Raja however as per conditions of agreement with her continued to remain in confinement, even in later years up to the time of her death which took place in 1761. On the whole it must be said that Ram Raja was a prince deficient in ordinary ability, and the miserable thraldom he underwent during the long confinement broke his spirit and ruined his health. [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, p. 472.]

Before Shahu's death (1749), little improvement had taken place in the civil administration of the country. Balaji Bajirav (1740-1761) appointed fix mamlatdars or subhedars each of whom had charge of several districts. The territory between the Godavari and the Krishna including the greater part of Satara, the best protected and most productive under Maratha rule, was entrusted to the Peshva's favourites and courtiers some of whom were his relations. They held absolute charge of the police, the revenue, and the civil and criminal judicature, and in the most cases had power of life and death. They were bound to furnish regular accounts, but they always evaded settlement. They governed by deputies and remained at court whether in the capital or in the field in attendance upon the Peshva. Their districts were in consequence extremely ill-managed and in very great disorder; the supplies furnished for the exigencies of the State were tardy, and in comparison with the established revenues, insignificant. The beginning of a better system is ascribed to Ramchandra

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Baba Shenvi and after his death Sadashivrav Bhuu improved on his suggestions. Balaji Bajirav Peshva was sensible of the advantage to be gained from bringing the collectors under control. He had not sufficient energy for the undertaking himself, but he supported his cousin's measures. Panchayats, the ordinary tribunals of civil justice began to improve, because the supreme power if it did not always examine and uphold their decrees, at least did not interfere to prevent the decisions of the community. Most of the principal Brahman families of the Deccan date their rise from the time of Balaji Bajirav. In short the condition of the whole population was in his time improved and the Maratha peasantry sensible of the comparative comfort which they then enjoyed have ever since blessed the days of Nana Saheb Peshva.

**Battle of Panipat, 1761. Madhavrav Peshva 1761-1772**

In 1761 the Marathas sustained the crushing defeat of Panipat, and Peshva Balaji who never recovered from that terrible blow died on June 23,1761. Immediately after his death Madhavrav the second son of the Peshva Balaji Bajirav, then in his seventeenth year, went to Satara accompanied by his uncle Raghunathrav and received investiture as Peshva on 19th July, from the nominal Raja, who remained in precisely the same state of imprisonment under the obdurate Tarabai, until her death on 9th December 1761 at the age of eighty-six at Satara. To the last moment she maintained her inveterate hatred against Balaji Bajirav and Sadashivrav, declaring that she died contended having lived to hear of their misfortunes in the battle of Panipat and their death. Thereafter the Peshva Madhavrav I formally crowned Ram Raja at Shahunagar on 23rd March 1763 [ Shahu Roznishi 99].

At first the management of affairs was entirely in the hands of Raghunathrav: but Madhavrav the young Peshva, soon became desirous of having a share in the administration, and disputes arose between him and his uncle. The latter retired and having obtained help from the governor of Aurangabad and collected a large force of Marathas, marched on Poona, defeated his nephew's army and again took charge of the Government. Soon after this Madhavrav acquired the management of the Government, and kept on good terms with his uncle till A. D. 1768, when Raghunath retired from court raised a force and encamped near Dhodap in the Chandar range; but he was soon defeated and taken prisoner, and was kept in custody till the close of Madhav's reign. (Dekhan History, Musulman and Marathas, Part I, by W. W. Lock p. 603, Sardesai—New History of Marathas, pp. 468-72). Since then his lot became much improved, although he was not allowed to assert himself as Chhatrapati, a role for which he possessed neither the training nor the capacity. He was only allowed to appoint agents for the management of his patil dues in several villages and the collection of his other hereditary claims as deshmukh of Indpaur. [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, p. 533.]

In 1762, [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, p. 538.] Raghunathrav, who had assumed chief control over the young Peshva, displaced Shrinivas Gahgadhar, more commonly known by his original name Bhavanrav, who had succeeded his uncle Jagjivan Pratinidhi, and raised his infant son Bhaskarrav to the dignity of Pratinidhi and appointed Naro Sharikar Raja Bahadur to the office of mutalik, which was in effect conferring the office of Pratinidhi upon him. In 1763, when this and other acts of Raghunathrav had made him unpopular, Raja Pratapvant Vittal Sundar a Yajurvedi Brahman the Divan of Nizam Ali, persuaded his master that he had now an opportunity of completely reducing the Marathas, and that his best policy was to overthrow the power of the Peshva, to depose Ram Raja as unfit to govern, and to appoint Janoji Bhonsle to act in his place. To this scheme Janoji readily agreed, but Nizam Ali, whose duplicity rendered him true to no plan while his minister was negotiating, secretly renewed a correspondence with the Raja of Kolhapur, by which he intended to have an eventual competitor in reserve in case Janojis claims should prove inconvenient. [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, p. 540. The letters were addressed to Jijibai the widow of Sambhaji who acted as regent during the minority of her adopted son named Shivaji.] Everything
seemed to promise success. Bhavanrav the dispossessed Pratinidhi and many of the Peshva's officers joined the Nizam and hostilities were renewed. In the war which followed Janoji deserted and the Nizam was severely defeated at Rakshashbhuwan on 10th August 1763 his Divan Vitthal Sundar being found among the slain. Throughout the battle the young Peshva particularly distinguished himself both by personal energy and judicious support which he sent not only to his uncle but to different points of the attack. Nizam, therefore entered into a treaty with Raghunathrav, who was much aided by the young Peshva. Bhavanrav was restored to the rank of Pratinidhi upon the death of Bhaskarrrav which happened about the same time. [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. I, p. 543.] Peshva Madhavrav after regaining his power from Raghunathrav seized every interval of leisure to improve the civil government of his country. In this laudable object he had to contend with violent prejudices and with general corruption; but the beneficial effects of the reforms he introduced came to be universally acknowledged, and his sincere desire to protect his subjects by the equal administration of justice reflects the highest honour on his reign. His endeavours were aided by the celebrated Ram Shastri Prabhune a resident of the village of Mahuli near Satara. By 1772 the supremacy and gradual usurpation of the Satara Raja's authority also superseded that of the other Pradhans as well as of the Pratinidhi. Forms of respect instituted with their rank were maintained, but they were only of importance in the state according to the strength and resources of their hereditary jagirs and of a superior description of soldiery, who, on pay much inferior to what they might elsewhere have obtained, adhered to some of them, with that pride in their chief, which caught the fancies of men in all countries and dignified military vassalage. Of all these personages at the period of Madhavrav's death, Bhavan-rav, the Pratinidhi was the most considerable both for the greater number of his vassals and for his warlike character.


Madhavrav died in November 1772, and Narayanrav his younger brother early in December repaired to Satara where he was invested as Peshva by the Raja. Next year (1773) the commandant of Raygad in Kolaba who was in rebellion against the Peshva, on being required to surrender replied that he held the fort for the Raja of Satara and would maintain it against the Peshva until the Raja was released. On this an order was caused to be written from Ramraja to the commandant who then surrendered the fort to the Peshva [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. II, p. 2.]. On the murder of Narayanrav in the same year, Amrav the adopted son of Raghunathrav attended by Bajaba Purandare was despatched to Satara for the robes of office for Raghunathrav which was accordingly given [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. II, p. 6-7.]. In the troubles which followed, the ministers who had sided with Garagabai, the widow of Narayanrav were on the point of releasing the Raja of Satara as a measure calculated to insure them the aid of many of the Maratha soldiery who were discontented or neutral. But the retreat of Raghunathrav caused them to abandon the design. In April 1774 as a son and heir was born to Gangabai, Sakharam Bapu and Nana Fadhnis were deputed by Garagabai to receive the robes of office for her son which were sent from Satara by the Raja in charge of Madhavrav Nilkanth Purandare. [In August 1773 a disturbance arose among some of the troops of Poo and their leaders burst into the palace; Narayanrav took refuge with his uncle Raghunath but was followed and murdered in his presence and there was reason to believe that Raghunath was implicated in the murder (Dekhan History p. 604), Sardesai-New History of Marathas, Vol. III pp. 26-27).]

Death of Ram Raja 1777.

[Originally contributed by Mr. J. \( V. P. \) Muir-Mackenzie, C. S.] In the reign of Madhavrav Ballal (1761-72) Tasgahv and its neighbourhood were taken from Kolhapur and added to the Peshva's territory as jdgirs of the Patwardhans. In 1777 they were temporarily recovered for Kolhapur but Mahadj Shihde succeeded in preventing their permanent loss. At the close of the year (1777) Ram Raja died at Satara having previously adopted a son of Trimbakji Raja Bhonsle a patil
of the village of Vavi a descendant of Vithoji, the brother of Maloji, the grandfather of the great Shivaji. Trimbakaji Raja commanded a body of 200 horse with which his son served as ashiledar when chosen as heir to the throne but, similar to his predecessor with no power to assert himself. He was styled Shahu Maharaj [On account of the prevailing ideas as regards purity of blood there was a general feeling that there were only a few old families, with whom the Raja of the Marathas could intermarry. Until a long time afterwards the Raja of Satara would have thought himself degraded by a marriage with the daughter of Nimbalkar and Jadhav although from them Shivaji was descended from the maternal line. This feeling, probably sanctified and strengthened by the Upadhyas and Shastris, explains the reason why it was scarcely known that Shahu was married in Aurangzeb's camp to a daughter of Shinde of Kannairkhed. See also Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. II, p. 69.]. At the same time Bhavanrav Pratimidhi died and was succeeded by his son Parashuram. In 1788 Bajaba Purandare was confined in Vandan by Nana Fadnis as one of Raghunathrav's chief adherents. In 1790 Parashuram Bhau was occupied near Tasganv raising levies for the Maratha contingent to the army engaged in the first English campaign against Tipu. Two battalions of Bombay Native Infantry with Artillery arrived at Ktimta near Tasganv on the 18th of June travelling by Sangameshvar and the Amba pass. They seem to have remained in this neighbourhood some three weeks.

In 1792 the phantom Raja of Satara gave the formality of his permission to the Peshva to assume the dignity of Vakil-ul-Mutlak bestowed on him by the no less phantom Moghal emperor of Delhi.

**Bajirav Peshva, II 1796-1818.**

The Rastes of Wai seem at this time to have exercised great influence in the court of the Peshva at Poona where they sided with the ministerial party against the encroachments of Mahadji Shinde. In the September 1795 Parashuram Bhau, after taking part in the battle of Kharda and the subsequent arrangements returned to Tasganv. Throughout this year, owing to the dread that Mahadji Shinde intended to make the Raja an instrument for suppressing the Peshva's ascendancy, Nana Fadnis almost entirely confined the Raja to the fort of Satara, where not even his relations were allowed to visit him. Parashuram Bhau was also summoned in haste from Tasganv to Poona to cope with the difficulties which had arisen over the succession due to the suicide of Peshva Madhavrav. Nana's proposal that Bajirav Raghunath should succeed occasioned a rupture with Shinde. On the advance of Shinde's army Nana Fadnis repaired in alarm to Satara with some idea of restoring the Raja to supremacy. But, owing to his recent treatment of him, Shahu had no confidence in Nana and Nana retired to Wai. From Wai he returned to Satara to receive the robes of investiture for Chimaji Appa the Peshva set up by Shinde's general Baloba as a rival to Bajirav Raghunath, but suspecting designs against him on the part of Baloba, Nana remained at Wai. Chimaji was installed in May and a pretence made at a reconciliation between Nana and Baloba. But Haripant the eldest son of Parashuram Bhau who was bringing the message crossed the Nira on his way to Wai at the head of four or five thousand horse [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. II, p. 260.]. Nana took alarm and fled to Mahad in Konkan throwing a strong garrison into Pratapgad. Nana's intrigues were successful in gaining Shinde to his cause, but his partisans in Shinde's camp betrayed the conspiracy from want of caution and part of them had to take refuge in the hills south of the Nira. The troops met at Wai and shortly afterwards 10,000 men were gathered in the Sahyadris and declared for Bajirav. In October the army was joined by the regular battalions in the Peshva's service under Mr. Boyd. Baloba was aided by Shinde and the army marched for Poona with Nana at its head in Bajirav's interest. The Patwardhan estates near Tasgaiv were attacked by the Kolhapur Raja at Nana's instigation and Parashuram Bhau was made prisoner. Owing to Bajirav's treachery this triumph was shortlived, and, in 1797, Nana was arrested in Poona, and subsequently taken to Ahmadnagar as a prisoner, on 6th April 1798. The Raja of Satara at the same time seized the fort and confined Nana's agent. But to the Peshva's disgust, when Shivram Narayan Thatte came to receive charge, the Raja, instigated by Shinde refused to give up the fort. Madhavrav Raste, was
sent against the Raja but had to retire to Maleganv. Parashuram Bhau, who was then confined at Wai was released on promise of quelling the disturbance. He soon assembled a considerable force and advanced to Satara in the height of the rains crossing the Vena by an unknown ford. The Raja had only a small force which was overcome after a slight struggle in the suburbs. The Raja, who had thrown himself into the fort, surrendered for want of provisions. His brother Chitursingh as he is popularly called, escaped to Kolhapur closely pursued by a body of Raste's troops joined by others of the Pratinidhi which encamped near the Varna for more than a year. In 1798 they were cut off almost to a man by four hundred horse reinforced from Kolhapur. Chitursingh next made a raid as far as Pal and took all the guns and dispersed the whole of a force of over 2,000 men collected by Raste. He again retreated to the Varna and kept 7,000 men continually on the move throughout the Satara territories. The Kolhapur forces also attacked and pillaged Tasganv the capital of Parashuram Bhau's jagir. Parashuram Bhau was determined to avenge the wrong and organised an extensive campaign against Kolhapur towards the end of 1798. Parashuram Bhau fixed his camp at Pattankudi near Nipani abut 30 miles south of Kolhapur. This was suddenly attacked by Chhatrapati on 16th September 1799 when Parashuram Bhau taken unawares was killed fighting for life. This only served to concentrate all the forces of the state in the effort to reduce Kolhapur which was only saved by distractions at the Peshva's court in Poona. The southern part of Satara must have formed the principal base of these operations which included the investment of the town of Kolhapur by the armies of the Peshva.

This struggle of the two Chhatrapatis of Satara and Kolhapur with their common enemies was in a sense an effort to make themselves free from the thraldom and subordination in which they had been held long by the Peshvas. The only function that the Satara Chhatrapati was at this time called upon to perform was to supply robes of Peshvaship to anybody at a requisition coming from Poona at the sweet will now of Nana, then of Bajirav, again of Shinde or Parashuram Bhau, whether the person to be so invested had fitness to rule the state or not. The Chhatrapati and even more than he, his brother Chitursingh were smarting under these painful conditions. Kolhapur also was being constantly harassed by the Patvardhan Sardars of the Peshva. It was no wonder therefore that the two should have combined in a common cause and put up a strong resistance. It cannot however be said that it was any grand piece of diplomacy to bring about a revolution in the Maratha confederacy by which the Chhatrapati could assert his own position in the Raj Mandal. Such a plan even if it were carried out with tact, had little chance of success in those troubled times. As it was, it was no more than a struggle to fish in troubled waters and at best a desperate effort to take mad revenge against their immediate opponents.

In 1802, after Bajirav's flight from Yeshvantrav Holkar, Shahu of Satara was reluctantly induced by the persuasion of Chitursingh to invest Vinayakraov the nephew of Bajirav as Peshva; but this step proved to be of no avail as towards the end of November 1802 Bajiraw put himself under British protection, a step which changed the whole character of the Poona situation. In 1803 when General Wellesley advanced on Poona he was joined by the Patvardhans and the Patankars among other jagirdars of the Satara territory.

After the war of 1803, the territories of the Peshva suffered considerably from plundering insurgents and freebooters. The distress was also aggravated by a famine in the Deccan through deficiency of rain which destroyed vast numbers of men and horses, but by the end of 1804 British supremacy had restored order. That year the country of the Patvardhans about Tasganv was in a state of considerable disturbance which was not quelled till an arrangement was effected in the interests of Bajirav by Khanderva Baste. In 1805 the district was the scene of ravages by Fattehsingh Mane a general of Holkar's with an army of 10,000 men. He was defeated by Balvantrav Fadnis Mutalik of Karad aided by Chintamanrav Patvardhan.
Pratapsinh 1810-39.

The young Pratapsinh, Parashuram Shrinivas, was at this time at Karad, under the restraint of his Mutalik or deputy whose doings were supported by the mother of the Pratapsinh and connived at by the Peshva. In 1806 a quarrel ensued, and Bapu Gokhale the Peshva's general was sent with troops to enforce submission, while the Pratapsinh was confined in the mud fort of Masur. Next year the Pratapsinh was rescued by Tai Telin, his mistress, the wife of an oil-seller. In 1807 this woman gained possession of the fort of Vasota in the extreme west of Javli and from it descended on Masur and rescued the Pratapsinh. The Pratapsinh declared for the Raja of Satara and against the Peshva. Many of the people of the district rose with him but his excesses and inability disgusted them. Bapu Gokhale again went against him; and a slight engagement ensued near Vasantgad. The Pratapsinh was severely wounded and carried to Poona; and his estates sequestrated. His mistress still held out and Bapu Gokhale had to take the hill forts one by one advancing by the Koyna valley. He met with no difficulty except at Vasota which held out under Tai Telin for eight months. On 4th of May 1808 Shahu [The famous Chitnis Bakhar was written by Malharrav Ramrav Chitnis at the instance of Shahu but the work was completed only after his death.] the Raja of Satara. died and was succeeded by his son Pratapsinh. Bapu Ghokale was allowed by the Peshva to take all the benefit of these conquests. He levied heavy exactions over the whole district and seized all the Pratapsinh's jewels and private property. In 1811 the Peshva demanded back his territory, which, with that usurped by the Patvardhans and Rastes, was brought under his control by British influence, while Rastes estate was finally sequestrated by him in 1815. The same year Trimbakji Dehgle was sent into confinement at Vasantgad for allegedly instigating the murder of Gangadhar Shastri, the Baroda minister, and was then delivered to the custody of the British Government. He afterwards escaped and infested, among other places, the Mahadev hills, supported by the Mangs and Ramoshis.

Trimbakji Dengle's Insurrection, 1817.

Trimbakji Dengle on being given up to the British Government was confined in Thana. He escaped and retired to the hills near Shingnapur in east Satara. Early in January 1817 he was at Phaltan, and constantly changing his residence between that place and Pandharpur, extended his range as far as the Mahimangad and Tathvad forts. On the 29th January he had 500 men near Berad in Phaltan and Nateputa in Malsiras, 300 near Shingnapur, 600 near Mahimangad, and 400 near Phaltan, a total 1,800 men almost all foot and the bulk of them Mangs and Ramoshis. Upto the 18th of February cavalry and infantry continued to join them near Shinganapur while the 18th of March was fixed for the outbreak. Trimbakji's head-quarters were at Berad in Phaltan, where he used to sleep in the forest guarded by five hundred Ramoshis. In spite of the large number of troops who were collected, the Peshva denied the existence of any insurrection or gathering of armed men, and though he sent Bapu Gokhale into the district with troops they professed to hear no news of insurgents. On the 7th of March after the serious messages addressed to the Peshva by Mr. Elphinstone the troops were partly dispersed. In April the operations of Colonel Smith drove the insurgents from their haunts in Shingnapur, and when Colonel Smith left for Poona, a detachment under Major Mac Donald prevented their remaining in Man or in Jath State. In May Pandavagad was taken by the so-called rebels. But Mr. Elphinstone suspected collusion on the part of the Peshva's officers for the purpose of eventually delivering the forts to Trimbakji. The Peshva made the rising a pretext for gaining Mr. Elphinstone's acquiescence to his taking the forts while his forces assembled near Satara. The Peshva's plan was thought to be to retire to Satara with his brother, with whom he had effected a reconciliation, and thence to Vasota or to Dharavad in the Karnatak with a force of 10,000 horse and foot under Naropanwant Apte. He relied on a successful resort to the old Maratha style of warfare as well as on the improbability, as he believed, of the English proceeding to extremities. In May followed the treaty of Poona and subsequently General Smith's troops were drawn to the North Deccan in operations against the Pendharis. Soon after the Peshva had an interview with Sir John Malcolm at Mahuli at which Sir John misled by the Peshva's professions advised him to

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recruit his army. All this time the Peshva was actively engaged in his schemes against the British and while at Mahuli appointed Gokhale leader of all his measures investing him with full powers of government by a formal writing under his own seal confirmed with an oath. He did this not only in pursuance of his own policy, but also as security to the chiefs who were afraid to stand by him on account of his vacillation.

Pratapsinh Imprisoned in Vasota.

To aid his preparations Bajirav gave Gokhale as much as one crore of rupees and he made the Raja of Satara privy to his designs against the English, but having discovered that he was plotting with the English, Bajirav sent him and his family to Vasota, a remote hill fort on the edge of the Sahyadris. The recruiting and arming of forts rapidly proceeded, the Peshva returned to Poona, and his power was destroyed on the 5th of November in the battle of Kirkee.

Battle of Kirkee, 5th November 1817.

General Smith arrived at Kirkee on the 13th and took Poona on the 17th. The Peshva fled towards Satara. After securing Poona General Smith followed on the 22nd. On the 26th he reached the Salpa pass, halted there on the 27th, and on the 28th ascended the pass without opposition. On the top he was attacked by six hundred horse with a few rockets. But the advance soon drove them back with loss. They gathered strength as they retired, and towards the close of the march showed three to five thousand on the front and as many more in the rear. Galloper guns, that is light field pieces, were opened in the evening with great effect. The second battalion of the 9th Regiment under Major Thacker had the rear guard and masked a galloper gun under a division of auxiliaries which the Marathas were preparing to charge. It opened with grape and did great execution. Throughout the day the Marathas lost about one hundred and twenty men while General Smith had only one havildar and a sepy slightly wounded. The next day the Marathas appeared to be somewhat hesitating in the morning but in the evening showed about five thousand horse out of range. Taking advantage of a rise in the ground the English pushed their guns on, within range. They opened with great effect upon the Marathas who stood in a group and inflicted a loss of many men and horses. The war, however, could not be brought to a decisive end because the Marathas would not give a straight fight and that the English suffered from a want of cavalry to keep them at a distance, while the grain supplies for their followers ran short, and owing to the close order which had to be kept on the marches which began at two or three in the morning, the camps could not be reached till two or three in the afternoon. General Smith was now close on the Peshva who till then had remained at Mahuli. From Mahuli Bajirav fled to Pandharpur. He had sent for the Raja of Satara from Vasota but had to start before he arrived. It was not till the middle of December that he was joined by the Raja and four thousand horse under Naropant Apte who had escorted the Raja from Vasota. The Peshva after going as far north as Junnar again turned south and the Raja was with the Peshva at the famous battle of Koregavan on the Bhima river.

Pursuit of the Peshva, 1818.

On the 5th of January 1818 the Peshva was fleeing towards Satara and General Pritzler taking up the pursuit marched direct upon Mahuli by the Salpa pass. He met with a body of the Marathas on the 8th of January close to Satara and killed and wounded sixty men, and took thirty horses and six prisoners. On the 12th General Smith was near Phalan and was moving south-east towards Shingnapur where he intended to cross the Man near Marde opposite Mhasvad. Thus he and General Pritzler pursued the Peshva in hopes of intercepting him if he again turned north. General Smith was just outside the eastern boundary of the district while General Pritzler went by the usual route to Tasganv. On the 17th of January about ten thousand horse of Gokhale's army in two divisions attempted a reconnaissance of General Pritzler's camp. The cavalry under Major Doveton charged them three times and put them to flight, their loss being forty killed and wounded.
The day after, part of Prizler's army was placed under General Smith while Pritzler still moved down the right bank of the Krshna. About the same time the Peshva turned north passing Pritzler to the west reached Karad on the 23rd. On 23rd General Smith also turned northwards after the Peshva reached Kavthe two miles south of Tasganv. About half-way on the march his rear guard was closely pressed by the whole of the Maratha light division not less than fifteen thousand strong and commanded by Appa Desai, Trimbakji Denge, Vinchurkar, several of the Patvardhans, and Gokhale himself. The ground being confined and intersected by water-courses General Smith took ground and moved out to drive off the Marathas. The latter kept their ground firmly for some time behaving with much more spirit than usual. Five six-pounders and a howitzer were kept firing on them for some time and their losses were considerable. Meanwhile the Peshva had succeeded in passing General Pritzler and his force in the west and on the 23rd was at Karad. By the 27th General Smith's division had reached Pusesavali while the Peshva was six miles from Mahuli. The Marathas under Gokhale five thousand strong contended themselves with harassing the troops on the march. General Smith was only six miles from Mahuli by sunset the next day. The Peshva had arrived at noon. He left at once in the morning of the 29th and did not stop till he reached Hanbad six miles from the Nira bridge. Here his advance guard fell in with a force under Captain Boles. He instantly moved on and at 8 p.m. reached Phaltan leaving many tired men and camels at Hanbad. He only stayed two hours at Phaltan and marched again in the direction of Pusesavali. He halted about sixteen miles further on. He had marched about eighty miles in forty hours and in consequence had got separated from his baggage. He afterwards turned south-east and on the 30th reached Nateputa. Smith started in pursuit of the Peshva on the 29th.

*Bajirav Peshva II 1796-1818.*

The light division of Gokhale's force attempted to pass him by the short route by Koreganv in order to join the Peshva but he managed to intercept them and they had to take a more circuitous route further west, as General Smith neared the Salpa pass. Part of them made another push at a point where the valley is some five or six miles wide, probably not far from Deur. General Smith had just pitched his camp. Gokhale's division was advancing along the opposite side of the valley. The 2nd Cavalry and the Horse Artillery supported by the Grenadiers of the 65th Regiment and part of the Light Infantry were immediately ordered under arms and proceeded with the intention of cutting off this body as they passed between them and the hills. Seeing this the Marathas kept close under the hills and upon the advance of the cavalry and horse artillery at a gallop fled in the greatest consternation to avoid the charge. Their rear was driven back by the road by which they were advancing, while the main body pushed on at speed for some miles. A few with part of the baggage which had preceded the horse took refuge in the hills and numbers crawled up to the top by a path which from below appeared almost perpendicular. The grenadiers and part of the Light Battalion went up and took part of what remained, killing such of the armed men as offered resistance. The rest under Gokhale moved by the Khambatkl pass and were joined next day by a body of troops from the eastward below the pass. After waiting at Khandala Gokhale again retired above the Khambatkl pass. On the 30th General Smith joined Colonel Boles with his reserve at Lonand. He had marched five hundred and seventy miles in forty days with only three halts. General Pritzler returned by the same route after having been driven as far as Galgala in Bijapur, and had marched three hundred miles in eighteen days and altogether twenty-three days without a halt.

*Satara Surrendered to the British, 10th February, 1818.*

The scattered English forces were determined to effect a meeting. With this object General Smith again moved south on the 4th of the February and reached Rahimatpur on the 6th. Here General Pritzler joined him from the south and on the 8th, the united force went to Satara, and the fort surrendered on the 10th. General Smith then turned towards Pandharpur. At Ashta Bapu Gokhale was overtaken by him and was killed in a stiff action on 19th February 1818. With the

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death of his faithful commander, the Peshva lost all hope of recovering his position. He did not wait to witness the result of the action but fled away hurriedly with his wife and three ladies riding with him in a male attire. The Raja of Satara and his party left helpless on the camping ground with all Bajirav's treasure valued at about one crore fell into his (General Smith) hand. General Smith wrote the following hurried note to Elphinstone, " I send you a private account of our good luck as the Raja's family is with me and the poor Gokhale is to be roasted this evening with all ceremony. For he really fought like a soldier. I entreat you to relieve me of the Raja's family as I cannot keep up any useful pursuit with them." Elphinstone met General Smith at Belsar on 4th March and took charge of the Raja, who was not a little happy at his deliverance [Sardesai: New History of the Marathas, Vol. III, p. 493.]. For long since the murder of Gangadhar Shastri Patvardhan and the state of panic following the murder, Pratapsinh and his mother had made secret approaches to the Resident, requesting his help against Bajirav's plans.

Mr. Elphinstone's Manifesto.

In order to hasten the destruction of the Peshva by inducing his subordinates to quit his service, Elphinstone under orders from the Governor General issued the following proclamation dated 11th February 1818 stating the British case against Bajirav.

"In 1796, from the time when Bajirav ascended the throne, his country had been a prey to faction and rebellion and there was no efficient government to protect the people. That in 1802 when Bajirav was driven from Poona he took refuge at Bassein, and entering into an alliance with the British Government, early in 1805 was restored to his full authority and the supremacy of the British in the Deccan ensured peace. In 1803 when Bajirav was restored the country was wasted by war and famine, the people were reduced to misery, and the government drew scarcely any revenue from its lands. From that time, through British protection, in spite of the farming system and the exactions of Bajirav's officers, the country had completely recovered, and Bajirav had accumulated those treasures which he was now employing against his benefactors. The British Government not only kept peace within the Peshva's possessions but maintained his rights against his enemies abroad. It could not, without injury to the rights of others, restore his authority over the Maratha chiefs, which had expired long before its alliance with him, but it paid the greatest attention to satisfy his admissible demands and in spite of many difficulties succeeded in adjusting some and putting others in a train of settlement. Among these were Bajirav's claims on the Gaikvad. The British Government had prevailed on the Gaikvad to send his prime minister to settle Bajirav's demands, and they were on the eve of adjustment with great profit to the Peshva, when Gangadhar Shastri, the Gaikvad's agent was murdered by Trimbakji Denge, the Peshva's minister, while in actual attendance on his court and during the solemn pilgrimage of Pandharpur. Strong suspicions rested on Bajirav, who was accused by the voice of the whole country, but the British Government unwilling to credit such a charge against a prince and an ally contended itself with demanding the punishment of Trimbakji. This was refused until the British Government had marched an army to support its demands. Yet it made no claim on the Peshva for its expenses and inflicted no punishment for his protection of a murderer; it simply required the surrender of the criminal, and on Bajirav's compliance it restored him to the undiminished enjoyment of all the benefits of the alliance. Notwithstanding this generosity Bajirav immediately began a new system of intrigues and used every exertion to turn all the power of India against the British Government. At length he gave the signal for disturbances by fomenting an insurrection in his own dominions, and prepared to support the insurgents by open force. The British Government had no remedy but to arm in turn. Its troops entered Bajirav's territories at all points and surrounded him in his capital before any of those with whom he had intrigued had time to stir. Bajirav's life was in the hands of the British Government, but that Government, moved by Bajirav's professions of gratitude for past favours and of entire dependence on its moderation, once more resolved to continue him on his throne, after imposing such terms on him as might secure it from his future perfidy. The principal of these terms
was a commutation of the contingent which the Peshva was bound to furnish for money equal to the pay of a similar body of troops. When this was agreed to, the British Government restored Bajirav to its friendship and proceeded to settle the Pendharis who had so long been the pest of the peaceable inhabitants of India and of none more than of the Peshva's subjects. Bajirav affected to enter with zeal into an enterprise so worthy of a great government. He assembled a large army on pretence of cordially aiding in the contest, but, in the midst of his professions, he spared neither pains nor money, to engage the powers of Hindustan to combine against the British. No sooner had the British troops marched, towards the haunts of the Pendharis, than he seized the opportunity to begin war without a declaration and without even an alleged ground of complaint. He attacked and burnt the house of the British Resident, contrary to the laws of nations and the practice of India, plundered and seized peaceable travellers, and put two British officers to an ignominious death in the vicinity of Taleganv. Bajirav himself found the last transaction too barbarous to avow; but, as the perpetrators were still unpunished and kept their command in his army, the guilt remained with him. After the beginning of the war, Bajirav threw off the mask regarding the murder of Gangadhar Shastri and avowed his participation in the crime by uniting his cause with that of the murderer. By these acts of perfidy and violence, Bajirav had compelled the British Government to drive him from power and to conquer his dominions. For this purpose a force had gone in pursuit of Bajirav which would allow him no rest, a second was employed in taking his forts, a third had arrived by way of Ahmadnagar, and the greatest force of all was entering Khandesh under the personal command of His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop. A force under General Munro was reducing the Karnatak and a force from Bombay was taking the forts in the Konkan and occupying that country. In a short time no trace of Bajirav would remain. The Raja of Satara, who had always been a prisoner in Bajirav's hands, would be released and placed at the head of an independent state of such an extent as might maintain the Raja and his family in comfort and dignity. With this view the fort of Satara had been taken, the Raja's flag had been set up in it, and his former ministers had been called into employment [Elphinstone's motive in not annexing the Maratha power completely can be guaged from his own words. Says he, summarising the British situation at the time, "We never before attempted the complete conquest of a country. Even Mysore was saved by the creation of a Raja. If we fail, (in following such a policy), Sindia will go to war, Holkar rebel, Sikhs and the Gurkhas join in, Haidarabad burst out. The flame expands to other provinces, some fundamental point is touched and our whole Empire tumbles down like a pack of cards. It certainly is a bad' plan to swallowmore than we can digest. By destroying and diminishing so many states, we have increased the sources of discord, which it was our object to remove." (Colebrooke's Life of Elphinstone, Vol. II pp. 40-44)]. Whatever country was assigned to the Raja would be administered by him and he would be bound to establish justice and order. The rest of the country would be held by the Honourable Company. The revenue would be collected for the Government but all real and personal property would be secured. Allvatan and inam or hereditary lands, varshasans or yearly stipends, and all religious and charitable establishments would be protected, and all religious sects tolerated and their customs maintained as far as was just and reasonable. The revenue-farming system would be abolished. Officers should be forthwith appointed to collect a regular and moderate revenue on the part of the British Government, to administer justice, and to encourage the cultivators of the soil. They would be authorized to allow remissions in consideration of the circumstances of the times. All persons were forbidden paying revenue to Bajirav or his adherents or aiding them in any way. No reduction would be made from the revenue on account of such payments. Vatandars and other holders of land were required to quit his standard and return to their villages within two months. The Jamindars would report the names of those who remained and all who failed to appear in that time would forfeit their lands and would be pursued without remission until they were crushed. All whether belonging to the enemy or otherwise, who might attempt to lay waste the country or to plunder the roads would be put to death whenever they were found."
Pratapsinh Restored, March 1818.

This proclamation sealed Bajirav's fate. The British installed Chhatrapati Pratapsinh [Blacker's Maratha War, 256.] in his seat at Satara and Captain Grant Duff [He was originally Captain Grant. He later added 'Duff' to his original name and hence is known as Grant Duff.] the author of the History of the Marathas, was placed with him to aid his councils and direct his conduct. This singular act of diplomacy for a time created an impression that the British looked upon Bajirav as their enemy and that they had no designs against the Chhatrapati whose family had been raised from hereditary confinement to power. Besides Pratapsinh who was in the prime of life, it included two brothers Chitursingh and Shahaji and their mother. Pratapsinh was described by Elphinstone as a young man of about twenty, [Pratapsinh was born on 18th January 1793.] good humoured and frank and not destitute of intelligence. His mother, who was more ambitious, made large claims stating that she expected that the family would be re-established on the footing it enjoyed in its time of greater fortune [On the 29th of March 1818, Mr. Elphinstone rode with the Raja through the lower part of the valley of Satara. Groves of mango trees, chimps of cocoa-palms so uncommon above the Sahvadris, here and there fine tamarind or pimpal trees throwing their deep shade over a temple by the Krishna, and the picturesque hills that surrounded the whole made this the finest part of the Peshwa's country, if not of India. The Raja went into Satara with the pomp of a prince and the delight of a schoolboy. Colebrooke's Elphinstone, II. 30.].

On the 29th of March 1818 after a two days' halt, part of the reserve marched from Satara and on the 30th camped at some distance on the high road towards Vasota [Blacker's Maratha War, 295-98. The force assembled for this service included two corps of Europeans, the flank battalion of the Bombay European Regiment, half a battalion of European Rifles, four battalions of Native Infantry of the line, that is the 2nd battalion of the 12th Madras, the 2nd battalion of the 7th, and the 2nd battalion of the 9th Bombay, and an auxiliary battalion from Poona. To this force was attached 700 Poona Auxiliary Horse and four companies of Pioneers. The ordinance included twenty-nine pieces, of which four were iron eighteen-pounders and two were iron twelve-pounders. There were one ten-inch and four eight-inch mortars, two heavy five and a half inch howitzers, and two brass twelve-pounders. The rest were field guns and light howitzers. Colonel Dalrymple of the Madras establishment commanded the artillery of which there were 270 Europeans and 317 Natives of both Presidencies. Captain Nutt of the Bombay establishment was Chief Engineer.] which had been Pratapsinh's prison and where some of his family were still confined. Vasota stands on one of the Sahyadri hills about 3,000 feet high on the Konkan side and about 2,000 feet above the Deccan plain. Like most Maratha hill-forts it was commanded from neighbouring hills. Its greatest strength lay in its height and in the difficulty of approach. In almost every direction it was surrounded by inaccessible mountains, except a few passes so narrow and rugged as to be easily defended, and extremely difficult though in no way strengthened by art [From the camp near Sudoli, twelve miles from Vasota, Mr. Elphinstone wrote (3rd April): The pass is now a good open road to the top. The scenery was less romantic and the fort less alarming than before. The descent was worse than the ascent. Along the bank of the Koyna, where there was a good road, there were occasionally fine views of the water bordered with trees and surrounded by woody hills. The scenery was romantic. Dr. Coats compared it to Malabar and General Pritzler to St. Domingo. The road to Vasota lay along a valley between high mountains and was quite secluded, as if no one were within a hundred miles. The hill sides had a variety of summits and ravines. In some places were craggy rocks intermingled with trees; in others appeared smooth summits covered with the richest and greenest foliage: in some the forest was on fire, and gusts of smoke drawn through the leafless trees; in others the fire was spent and there remained only the blackened ground and scorched trunks. Towards the west of the valley the bottom and sides of the hills were covered with brushwood or with tall pine-like trees, but all the upper part of the mountain was bare rock or withered grass. The whole was closed by Vasota. Colebrooke's Elphinstone, II. 31-32.]. On the 31st, under Colonel Hewett's command, a detachment of six companies of the European flank battalion, two companies of Rifles, and flank

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companies of the 2nd battalion of the 12th and 7th Bombay Native Infantry, was sent forward to Vasota about twenty miles west of Satara. In the afternoon Colonel Hewett's detachment reached Induli, a small village within two miles and a half of Vasota, and drove in an outpost of the garrison. Two companies of the Seventh were left in possession of the fort, and the rest of the force returned to Tambia, five miles from Vasota as there was no nearer place fit for encampment. The investment was put off till the first of April, when three outposts were established, one at old Vasota at a distance of 700 yards and commanding the place, the second at the same distance and commanding the road to the gateway, and the third to the right of it at a distance of no more than 400 yards from the walls. A summons was sent to the commandant, but it was refused admittance. On the first and second all the Pioneers and litter-bearers were engaged in making a road. On the 3rd, the headquarters of the division were moved forward to Tambia, and with the help of elephants the mortars and howitzers were brought across the hills to the same place. Next day a strong working party was employed on the pathway to old Vasota to complete the work begun on the first, and some light guns and ammunition were got up. The Raja Pratapsinh, some of whose family were prisoners in the fort, arrived in the camp, and a detachment of rifles and auxiliary horse was sent into the forests to search for eighteen elephants which their keepers had carried off from Pandavgad immediately before that place was reduced. On the fifth the battery from old Vasota opened with good effect and one of the largest buildings in the fort was fired by the bombardment. The garrison returned a few shots from their large guns, but kept up an unremitting fire from their wall-pieces and small arms and were all day busily employed in improving their defences. The bombardment continued on the 6th. As it was found that the arrangements were insufficient to intimidate the commandant, the Pioneers were directed to complete the road from the camp for the advance of the battering guns. This proved unnecessary. On the following morning the garrison surrendered unconditionally and a company of Bombay Native Infantry took possession of the fort. The loss of the enemy amounted to seventeen killed and wounded and that of the British force to only four. Among the prisoners set free were two officers Cornets Morison and Hunter, who were restored to freedom after an almost hopeless confinement. They were the first to meet the party advancing to receive possession of the place, among whom were some intimate friends, but so greatly had their past hardships changed them that they were scarcely recognised. The members of Pratapsinh's family were also set free and accompanied the chief to Satara. Much importance was attached to the fall of Vasota which was one of the Peshva's treasure-houses and one of his strongest forts. The 7th was spent in the removal of the mortars and guns from the batteries back to the park and in preparing to re-cross the mountains. The passage was effected during the two following days and on the 10th the force returned to Satara having reduced the fortress of Parali by detaching a party of infantry under a native officer to whom it surrendered. The detachment of rifles and auxiliary horse, which had been sent off a few days before rejoined with the elephants they had gone in search of, after a long and most fatiguing march among the hills. With the usual ceremonies, which the general and the leading officers attended, the Commissioner formally seated Pratapsinh on the masnad or pillow of state. On the 11th of May a halt was called during which visits of ceremony were exchanged with the Raja, and on the 12th the force began its return southward by the valley of the upper Krishna to reduce more forts during its progress to join Brigadier-General Munro from Satara. On the 13th of May the encampment was at Masur, which, as well as the hill fortress of Vasantgad, surrendered in the course of the day. On arriving at Karad on the 14th the garrison of Kole and Sadashivgad abandoned those places. At Kopargahv, on the following day, the submissions of Machhindragad, Battis Shirala, Islampur, Vahghi, and Valva, were received. Garrisons were established in all these as well as in other places. From Valva the force marched without halt by Islampur, Ashta, and Siredeva, to Nagar Manoli, General Munro's headquarters which were reached on the 22nd. Dategad, Makrandgad, Pratapgad, Bhairavgad, and Jangli Jaygad, also surrendered. The rapid fall of so many places bore out the truth of the well-known saying that forts quickly fall when there is no army to keep the field. The garrisons seemed to want only a pretence for surrendering.

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Strong military forces were stationed at Satara and Karad. Shortly after a conspiracy was discovered for the release of Chitursingh, the murder of all Europeans at Satara and Poona, the surprise of some of the principal forts, and the possession of the Raja's person. The plot was suppressed and several of the conspirators executed. On the 25th of September 1819 a treaty was concluded under which Pratapsinh agreed to hold his territory in subordinate co-operation with the British Government. He was neither to increase nor to diminish his military force without its sanction, and as a fundamental condition he was positively forbidden to hold any intercourse with persons not his subjects except through the Resident at Satara. The British Government charged itself with the defence of his territory which was to be managed by a British Agent till the Raja had acquainted himself with the business of Government [Grant Duffs Marathas, Vol. II, p. 525.]. Their lands were restored to the great Jagirdars and in most cases at their own request they were placed under the Raja of Satara. By the treaty of 1819 Raja Pratapsinh was formally installed as ruler of a territory which included the whole of the present district of Satara except the sub-division of Tasganv which then formed part of the Patvardhan estates. The Satara chief held in addition what are now the sub-divisions of Sangola, Malsiras, and Pandharpur in Sholapur, and part of the Bijapur district in the neighbourhood of and including the city of Bipapur. [The Ramoshis who served in the inferior ranks of Police in the Marathi administration in Satara played an important part under the leadership of Chitursingh, An official letter from Bombay (23rd February 1822) refers to the errors of assessment. The turbulence of the people along with the factors, inherent in the transfer of power led to the ruling of the Ramoshis. They proved to be so turbulent that the Government was forced to condone many of the crimes and even placated them by land grants and recruiting them as hill police (S. B. Chaudhuri—Civil Disturbances pp. 155-56). In 1845 Koli outrage spread into Purandhar and Satara whose headquarters were in the hilly country to the northwest of Poona. (S. B. Ghaudlmrī—Civil Disturbances p. 168).]

These arrangements did not meet with ready approval from the Maratha public of those days, as the Chhatrapati, was now reduced to a position of a petty chieftain. Captain Grant who had been appointed as his Resident and guardian was himself assisted by Balaji pant Natu who had been for many years a confidential agent and an informer of Elphinstone. From the very beginning Raja Pratapsinh took a dislike to Natu who was known to be selfish and intriguing.

Captain Grant Duff found Pratapsinh naturally intelligent and well disposed, but surrounded by profligate men bred among intrigues and ignorant of every thing except court etiquette [Grant Duff's Marathas, Vol. II, p. 519.]. All went well so long as Captain Duff remained in sole charge. In 1822 Pratapsinh was freed from tutelage, and a fresh treaty was concluded in which special stress was laid on the articles regarding foreign intercourse. For a time things went well. In 1829 Sir John Malcolm admired the condition of the country, the chief's devotion to business, and his promotion of useful works. Besides building of a road to Mahabaleshvar and part of that to Poona by the Salpa pass, he also provided funds for the dam and lake at Mahabajesvar, and at Satara he made the water works by which the town is supplied from springs in the neighbouring hills of Yavteshvar. He built some large public offices and a fine palace and pleasure gardens and arranged that his territory should be surveyed by Captain Adams. In 1825 Bishop Tleber wrote that the chief was a well disposed young man of good understanding. His country was peaceable, orderly, and as prosperous as could be expected after the famine. He was so ardent a professed lover of peace as almost to bring his sincerity in question [Journal, II. 212.]. In November 1826 Mr. Elphinstone wrote: He is the most civilised Maratha I ever met, has his country in excellent order, and everything to his roads and aqueducts in a style that would credit a European. I was more struck with his private sitting room than anything I saw at Satara. It contains a single table covered with green velvet at which the descendant of Shivaji sits in a chair and writes letters as well as a journal of his transactions with his own hand [Colebrooke's Elphinstone, II. 187-188.].

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How Raja Pratapsinh gradually developed an anti-British prejudice is an interesting question which has given an undeserved notoriety to his career. A prisoner of the Peshva during his boyhood, he contracted no vice and grew up to be a plain soldier, generous and outspoken in his manners and punctilious in the observance of the rules of his caste and religion. He was never afraid of giving out whatever was uppermost in his mind, a trial which perhaps ill-accorded with his position as a vassal of the British power. One notices this conflict in his inner thoughts in the entries he has made in his diary, which Captain Grant advised him to write every day regularly and which is now preserved in volumes in the Peshva's Daftar at Poona. He has herein occasionally reproduced his conversation with the Governors and British officials of note. The diary discloses his kindness to his younger brother and his fondness for hunting. He opened schools in his territory and thus made the first beginning of popular education in Satara. Captain Grant retired in 1822 but Pratapsinh long continued his contact with him by regular correspondence. He often ordered from England rare articles and curios of foreign manufacture making regular remittances for their cost. He was made a member of the Royal Asiatic Society of England. Thus he received quite a healthy start in life with a distinct promise of increasing advancement in the future. His senapati Balasaheb was a spirited youth devoted to his master and acted as his executive officer [Sardesai: New History of Marathas, Vol. III. p. 511-512.].

At the instance of Colonel Briggs, the next Resident, Pratapsinh built as has been said above a strong permanent road to the plateau of Mahabaleshvar which formed a part of his dominion and in which was established a suitable summer resort for European and Indian visitors. The road was later extended to Mahad and the sea coast on the west. This hill resort of Mahabaleshvar was handed over to the British Government by a special agreement executed in 1829. A bazar was opened on the hill and given the name of Malcolm Path. In return, the fort of Pratappad, with the shrine of Bhavani founded there by Shivaji, was handed over to the Raja's possession. The Governors of Bombay paid visits to Pratapsinh at Satara and complimented him on the healthy progressive line of his newly established rule. The home authorities in England appreciated his services by sending him a jewelled sword with a laudatory certificate in 1835. By the time these tokens reached India, the relations of the Raja with the Government of Bombay had become strained and the tokens were withheld. This development deserves to be explained.

The condition in the treaty of 1819 restraining Pratapsinh from communication with the outside world was found irksome and prevented the Raja, from undertaking even marriage negotiations and ceremonal exchanges outside his own jurisdiction. The regimes of the first four Residents, Grant, Briggs, Robertson and Lodwick ran fairly smooth but when Col. Ovants took charge in 1837 the habitual cordiality between the two began to wane. In fact even before these Raja Pratapsinh had been rather cold shouldered by sir Robert Grant, the then Governor of Bombay. It. appears that he was instrumental in withholding from the Raja some of the decisions of the Court of Directors which had been in Raja's favour and also managed to postpone forwarding to the court of Directors, some of the representations made by the Raja through him, taking care all the while to conceal his real intentions behind a facade of ceremonious and courtly behaviour. The Raja thereupon resolved to make the representation direct to the Court of Directors in England through his own accredited agent. This upset Sir Robert Grant very much and he argued that the Raja's action in sending his agent direct to the Directors without Resident's knowledge was contrary to the treaty of 1822. Whether through the encouragement of his masters or through sheer vicious ambition Balajipant Natu was engaged in concocting evidence of Raja's complicity in this or that subversive action and the Raja became a suspect in the eyes of his masters.

In November 1835 Balajipant Natu informed Colonel Lodwick that Pratapsinh was in the habit of talking of the probable fall of the British Government and making other treasonable remarks. Balaji had also heard rumours of a plot among the chiefs which he thought that Pratapsinh might be induced to join. Colonel Lodwick regarded these accusations as the result of intrigue and
did not report them to Government. Colonel Lodwick no doubt had some idea of the discontent brewing in the Raja's mind. Pratapsinh wrote in his diary of 4th April, 1837 stating that the Resident asked him to omit the words, 'This is pressure of the English, would like to commit suicide. Pratapsinh, however refused to accede to his suggestion' [ Vide selections from Peshva Dafter Vol. 42 p. 100.]. According to General Lodwick the Raja's feelings were embittered by delay in settling the question of his rights to the lapsed estates of the great Jagindars, and that he was further annoyed by the Government's refusal to pay a return visit to him at Satara. Again it was further reported that he communicated direct with various Europeans and natives in Bombay and that his disloyalty and bad faith went further. His minister Govindrao was employed to interview Shaikh Gulamsingh and Guljar Missar, two Subhedars of the 23rd Regiment then at Satara and tempt them from their allegiance. On the 21st of July, 1836 one Antajpant took the Subhedars to the minister's house, and they were shown to Pratapsinh who secretly recognised them. Ten days later Antaji told them that the Raja called them to private interview. During August, matters went no further. On the 8th of September, the Subhedars were summoned in disguise to the Raja who told them that the signal for rising was to be disturbances in Bombay and Belganv, the arrival at Satara of an army from Hyderabad, and at the Narmada of an army from Hindostan. On the 18th of September Antaji met the Subhedars for the last time and had a long and treasonable conversation with them. Next day Antaji was enticed into the lines and arrested, and when Pratapsinh was told of the accusations against him the minister was given up. On the 10th of October 1836 a commission consisting of Colonel Ovans, Mr. Willoughby, and the Resident Colonel Lodwick met to inquire into the extent of the conspiracy and of Raja's connection with it. The procedure of the inquiry was defective in many respects. For although the Raja asked times without number for copies of the evidence of the witnesses who appeared before the Commission to make the statements implicating him in the crime, they were never supplied to him on the ground that the Commission was a secret one and hence no part of its proceedings could be made public. The Commission fully believed the Subhedars statements. They were satisfied that Pratapsinh secretly recognised the Subhedars and afterwards held private and treasonable conversations with them. That Pratapsinh was party to a conspiracy was for the Commission, proved beyond doubt. As to the extent of the conspiracy, it appeared that during the interview hints were thrown out, of aid from Shinde and of a Moghal emissary. Some attempt also was made to show that Pratapsinh had been in communication with Mudhoji Bhonsle, the ex-Raja of Nagpur, and that he even thought of corresponding with Russia. The commission rejected the evidence of so widespread a plot as untrustworthy, and held that, though there could be no doubt of the Raja's hostile feelings to the British Government, he had no defined or intelligible plan of action. Much of this disloyal conduct was due to exaggerated notions of his consequence and to the designs of evil men by whom he was surrounded. Of the minister Govindrao's and Antaji's guilt there could be no doubt. Both were imprisoned, the minister at Ahmadnagar.

More Charges Against Pratapsinh.

Colonel Ovans further brought forth an evidence of a bundle of letters seeking to prove that contrary to the belief of the Commission, Pratapsinh had communicated both with the Viceroy of Goa and with Appa Saheb, the ex-Raja of Nagpur. The Goa intrigues, it was alleged, had began as far back as 1826-27 when a certain Nago Devrav was sent to Goa to conduct communications with the Portuguese Viceroy Dom Manoel. In that year a draft treaty was prepared at Satara. Negotiations were continued till 1828-29, and an agent named Erculana Dettora was sent to Satara to ascertain whether Pratapsinh acknowledged Nago Devrav as his agent. He returned with presents and satisfactory assurances from Pratapsinh. The object of the intrigues with Goa was to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with Portugal against the British Government. The principal conditions of the alliance proposed by Pratapsinh were: That Portugal was to furnish an army for the recovery of the territories which formerly belonged to the Marathas; that Pratapsinh was to bear the cost of the army, and that when the conquest was completed the Portuguese were to be rewarded.
in money and territory and a portion of their army was to be subsidised at Satara. The evidence sought to prove that Pratapsinh hoped to gain possession of the whole territories which had been under the last Peshva Bajirav and additional conquests in Southern India. The evidence further suggested that the participants in the plot also entertained an idea uniting, France, Russia, and Austria in the alliance against the English. It should, however, be remembered that none of the documents presented bore either the signature of Pratapsinh or Dom Manoel. Seven of the letters alleged to have been written by the Raja and three of them said to have been written by the Portuguese Governor to be in the same handwriting, which almost convincingly proved their forged character. The seals on the letters going from Pratapsinh were found to have been faked ones. It is further worthy of note that the British government never once registered any complaint to the Government of Portugal for the serious subversive activities in which the Portuguese Governor at Goa was alleged to have been involved. In spite of all this, the Commission no doubt was convinced that the evidence was conclusive enough. Pratapsinh and probably the agents on his side, were said to have believed that their scheme was feasible, and that the Portuguese Viceroy and his agents, besides their feeling of hostility to the English, encouraged and continued the plot for the sake of Pratapsinh's large disbursements. The last act of this alleged conspiracy was a mission of Madhavrav Shirke on the departure of Dom Manoel in 1835-36. The whole was said to have been disclosed by voluntary information after the seizure of the minister Govindrav in the Subhedars' case. The third intrigue attributed to Pratapsinh was with Appa Saheb, the ex-Raja of Nagpitter. Though he was destitute and under restraint in Jodhpur, the alleged plan was that Appa Saheb should raise Rs. 20lakhs to enable the Portuguese to replace him in power. At Satara the intention to link this with the Goa conspiracy was evident, but no direct communications between Goa and Jodhpur were proved. Once Appa Saheb Mahadik of Tarle took a sword of the Bhonsles to Appa Saheb at Jodhpur and brought back a mare and letters. The exchange of letters lasted over about eight years, and the correspondence ceased only with the seizure of the minister Govindrav at which time a messenger of Appa Saheb was found hid at a village near Satara. In addition genuine letters were said to have been discovered from Pratapsinh to the native soldiery urging them to rise. As the Bombay Government was thus feverishly busy in collecting evidence against Pratapsinh he saw no prospect and hope of his obtaining any justice at the hand of the Authorities of Bombay. He therefore tried to represent his case to the Governor-General at Calcutta and the Directors of the East India Company in England. In Bombay there were many Englishmen of unimpeachable character who were quite convinced of the innocence of the Raja. Amongst them were Dr. Milne, Captain Cogan and Mr. Mac-donald, the editor of the Bombay Gazette. Dr. Milne wrote several letters to the Governments of Bombay and India but no attention was paid to them. The only accredited agents of the Raja sent to England to represent his case were four in numbers viz. Syed Mir Afizil Ali, Yeshvantrav Raje Shirke, Bhagvahtrav Vitthal and Rango Bapuji. Of these four, the first did nut present his ease although his departure to England proved to he a cause of a great annoyance to the Authorities in India. Great obstacles were placed in the way of the other three and much delay was caused; but they overcame all difficulties and reached England only to find that the Directors of the East India Company would not recognise them and bade them return whence they came unheard [Of the four agents that went to England to plead the case of Satara, Rango Bapuji deserves a place of honour. He reached there in 1839 and spent fourteen years of his life in England, unceasingly advocating the cause first of the Pratapsinh, so long as he lived and then of his adopted son Shahu. Even after the death of Shahaji alias Appasaheb, and the subsequent annexation of Satara, Rango Bapuji persisted in his efforts writing with sincerity and vigour that made the persons in power restive in their position. In one of his letters addressed to Right Hon. J. C. Hemes he says "I suppose yourself an English gentleman, dwelling at Peking for the same time as I have dwelt in London and advocating among the Chinese as I have humbly done here............the stainless innocence of your Queen who had been secretly accused and deposed by a Chinese Emperor ". (Basu: Story of Satara, p. 338). He knocked at the doors of both the Houses of Parliament and at last became literally penniless losing his own money in the cause; but alas with no effect ! It must however be said to the credit of a few Englishmen of note, that they admired his unaltering
devotion to his master and presented him with a silver casket on which the names of the subscribers have been inscribed. The disappointed Rango Bapuji reached India in 1854, the British Government having paid him Rs. 25,000 and his passage money, perhaps to make themselves free from the activities of one who may be described as the first great foreign ambassador of India. As a result of the inquiry carried on by the Commission in its own way both the Government of India and the Court of Directors held that the evidence of Pratapsinh's guilt was complete.

Pratapsinh Deposed. September 1839.

Pratapsinh was therefore called for a final explanation of his conduct. In the course of his reply, Pratapsinh made no real attempt to meet the charges because he had not been allowed to sec and examine the original copies of the evidence brought against him. Sir James Carnac, Governor of Bombay (1839-1841) more than once asked him to bind himself strictly and in good faith to act up to the articles of 1819. Pratapsinh refused to promise this, because he felt that any binding of that character indirectly meant an acceptance of the charges levelled against him. To agree, he said, would lower him to the position of Mamlatdar. British Government felt that the Raja had shown such ingratitude and ill-feeling towards the British Government, and that he was so lull of absurd ambitions and pretensions that it would be misplaced clemency to overlook his treason and his want of contrition. On the 5th of September 1839 Pratapsinh was deposed. He was thereafter deported to Kashi, his jailors inflicting heart rending hardships upon him and his suite, during the long overland journey. Balasaheb, the chief commandant of the Raja could not bear the strain of the journey and died on the way, his pregnant wife giving birth to a posthumous child on a road side at Sahgvi in Khandesh district. A request for a halt on the way for the purpose was refused and the party marched on. On the deposition of Pratapsinh, Lord Auckland, the Governor-General, proposed that the Company should resume the state. But the Court of Directors decided to give it into the hands of the Raja's younger brother Shahaji as the other brother, the gallant Chitursingh, had died in 1821.

Pratapsinh dragged a wearisome existence at Kashi till his death on the 14th October 1847. On 2nd December 1844 he addressed a strong remonstrance to the Governor-General Lord Hardinge, in which he forcefully described the unjust treatment meted out to him. The document is a rare specimen of language and argument, having been drafted by Pratapsinh's agent George Thompson.

The deposition and persecution of Chhatrapati Pratapsinh released a wave of discontent and revolt all over the country. The region round about Satara was naturally much affected and a chain of disturbances followed the deposition. They were inspired and organised by Dharav Pavar of Karad. The most noteworthy of these revolts was planned and executed by Narsappa Dattatraya Petkar, alias Nimbaji or Narsingrav of Islampur. He had an interview with the Chhatrapati at Nimb when the latter was on his way to Kashi. Later he contacted an Arab jamadar, Koberan, another Arab, Talib bin Ali and with their help collected over a thousand men at Raichur, led an attack against the fort of Badami in 1841. captured it and hoisted the flag of Satara Raja on it. Thereupon Company's divisions from Dharvar and Belganv suddenly rushed to the place and recaptured the fort. Narsingrav was sentenced to transportation for life and he died in 1862 in Ahmadabad jaii. In the course of another similar attempt under the leadership of one Jagmohan and Benarban (Brindaban?) Colonel Ovans, the Satara Resident was waylaid and put into confinement for about two weeks. The rising was suppressed in 1844. It is however difficult to say what part Chhatrapati Pratapsinh played in these attempts. [History of Freedom Movement in India: Bombay Government Publication, pp. 55-56.]

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Shahaji 1839-48.

Although Government were convinced of the clearness and completness of the evidence against Pratapsinh there were not a few who made every effort to discredit the discoveries of the Resident Colonel Ovans. The principal informants, even Colonel Ovans himself, were accused before the Court of Directors of taking bribes to trump up a case against Pratapsinh, and the chief papers were said to be forgeries. Shahaji the successor to the chiefship hated his brother Pratapsinh, and Pratapsinh's advocates declared that many of the accusations brought against their client were due to Shahaji's malice and ambition; Pratapsinh's case was taken up as has been said above by Dr. Milne, ex-president of the Medical Board of Bombay, and a pensioner of the Bombay Government, as also by several proprietors of East India Stock, and General Lodwick the former Resident of Satara. The cry reached Parliament. But the explanations of Colonel Ovans and his colleagues in the Commission of 1836 were considered entirely satisfactory. Nothing came of the agitation except three years delay between Pratapsinh's conviction and his punishment.

Till the end Pratapsinh's management of the state was excellent. His strength and practical sense as a governor only highlights his desire to be given a fair trial. His schemes, however, unlikely to succeed, were viewed by Government as neither the blind follies of an ignorant tool nor the empty aspirations of a visionary.

After his succession to power Shahaji's submissive attitude in resigning all his claims over the Jagirdars as also his loyalty to the British Government strongly contrasted with Pratapsinh's insistence on asserting his claims and his unceasing efforts to seek a fair trial.

Under a treaty dated the 4th of September 1839 all the provisions of the treaty of 1819 not expressly repealed were confirmed. The chief change was that the great estate-holders or Jagirdars were placed under the direct control of the British Government instead of under the chief of Satara. Shahaji built and supported a civil hospital and schools and was liberal in expenditure on roads, bridges, and other public works which were executed out of the balance found in Pratapsinh's treasury and by savings in the military establishment. He abolished transit duties and introduced the Company's rupee. The rite of sati or widow-burning had become very common under Pratapsinh's administration, and in spite of the Resident's remonstrances, British subjects had been allowed to come to Satara to perform the rite. On his accession Shahaji of his own accord abolished sati by proclamation and at a later period interfered to prevent a woman burning herself. During the first Afghan war (1841-42) Shahaji offered his troops, and during the 1845 insurrection in Kolhapur and Savantvadi he kept his territories in order, sent a detachment of his troops to act against the rebels, and did valuable service by forwarding supplies and keeping open communications. His expenditure on public works including those above named amounted to nearly Rs. 11 lakhs. Of this, nearly Rs. 2 lakhs were for improving the Satara water works and another Rs. 2 lakhs for two fine bridges across the rivers Vena and Krishna on the Poona road by the Salpi pass. He also finished the magnificent court room and buildings known as the New Palace and now used as the Satara court of justice. In March 1848, in the midst of his plans of usefulness, Shahaji was attacked with serious illness. He for some time had taken under his protection a boy of obscure birth on whom he had conferred the name of Balvantrav Bhonsle and the title of Rajadnya. On the 1st of April as his sickness increased Shahaji sent for the Resident Mr., the late Sir Bartle Frere, and more than once engaged in long conversation with him regarding the succession. He expressed the wish to make so extravagant a provision for Rajadnya that Mr. Frere formed the idea that he was anxious to adopt him as his son. Mr. Frere remarked that so low born a child was unsuitable to succeed him, and Shahaji stated that he intended to choose from any branch of the Bhonsle family except those of Kolhapur, as they had married into the less pure family of the Shindes and of Vavi. Bocause his brother Pratapsinh had adopted a boy from their family, he expressed a strong unwillingness to

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recognise Pratapsinh's adopted son. He hinted that if he was suddenly overtaken by death he would adopt and trust to the generosity of Government to recognise adoption.

Shahaji's Death. 5th April 1848.

On the 5th of April the Resident left for Mahabaleshvar. He was brought back by a note telling him that the Raja despaired of life and had declared his purpose of adopting a son. The adoption took place in the presence of Dr. Murray, the Civil Surgeon of Satara. The lad who was named Venkaji, was of the house of Shedganv which traces its origin to Shariftji the uncle of the great Shivaji. The Raja made Dr. Murray write in English, as he spoke in Marathi, a memorandum of his adoption of Venkaji whom he named Venkaji Raja after Shivaji's younger brother. There can be no doubt that all through these proceedings Shahaji was anxious to defer to the British Government in every possible way, and that nothing but the near approach of death led him to make an adoption without their sanction.

Mr. Frere arrived at Satara at ten in the evening. He went straight to the palace and explained to the Ranis and assembled chieftains that the decision of the Supreme Government must be awaited as to the course of succession; that till then he could not recognise the adoption; and that the government of the Satara territory would be conducted by the same agency as before under the Resident's control. All expressed their confidence in and willingness to defer to the wishes of the Supreme Government. On the 12th of April 1848 the Resident wrote to Government, 'No act is so trifling but' it has been interpreted in various ways, favourable or unfavourable to the continuance of the state, according to the hopes or fears of the party. Government will not be surprised at this when it is considered that the bread of almost every one in the city depends more or less on this decision. Besides the holders of land and other grants who may feel more or less secure according to the tenure on which they hold, at least 10,000 persons are supported directly by salaries from the court, and most of these have probably many dependents. Few of the people of Satara, even of those whom the change would not directly affect, would be indifferent to the passing away of Shivaji's dynasty.'

Intrigue was at once opened with Pratapsinh's family at Panares. Reports were circulated and letters written stating that the late Raja had asked the Resident to send for Pratapsinh's adopted son, that, though this was not the case, Pratapsinh's choice was nearer by blood to the Raja's line than Shahaji's choice, that Babajipant forced Shahaji to adopt Venkaji, and that Shahaji was insensible when the adoption took place. The presence of Dr. Murray and the precautions taken by the Raja and the Resident in specifying the Raja's intentions gave the lie to these reports. The British Government had to decide what was to be done with Satara, Their decision turned on three leading points: (1) Was Shahaji's adoption valid without recognition by the British Government?, (2) If it was not valid was the Bombay Government bound in justice or expediency to recognise it? and (3) What were the claims of Pratapsinh's adopted son and the members of the house of Shahaji? The opinion was generally accepted that as regards private estates the adoption was valid without the recognition of Government. Whether the adoption was valid as regards the political powers conferred by the treaty of 1819 was a point on which opinions differed. All members of the Government both of Bombay and India held that the sanction of the paramount power was required to render an adoption to a principality valid. But Sir George Clerke, Governor of Bombay (1847-1848) held that in the case of Satara the right of sanction could not without injustice be exercised to the extent of forbidding adoption. The other members of the Bombay Government and all the members of the Government of India were of opinion that to confer or to withhold the sanction was at the option of the British Government as the paramount power, and that the only question was one of expediency. On financial, military, and political grounds it was decided that it was regarded as expedient to withhold the sanction of Government to the adoption [Some light is thrown on the so-called grounds of expediency through a letter dated 24th December 1847 written by Sir John

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Hobhouse, the President of the Board of Control to Lord Dalhousie the Governor-General. Says the President "The death of the ex-Raja of Satara certainly comes at a very opportune moment. The reigning Raja is, I hear, in very bad health and it is not at all impossible we may soon have to decide upon the fate of his territory. I have a very strong opinion that on the death of the present prince without a son no adoption should be permitted, this pretty principality should be merged in the British Empire; and if the question is decided in my day I shall leave no stone unturned, to bring about that result.]. It was thought that the country would benefit by the annexation of Satara, and that the condition of the Deccan no longer made it necessary to maintain native states like Satara as a safety valve for characters who would be discontented under direct British rule.

It was held that no other members of the family of Shivaji had any claim to the succession. The treaty of 1819 was with Pratapsinh and his heirs and successors. All his ancestry were passed by, no right was confirmed to them. The other branches of the family could have no pretension to the territorial rights which were created in favour of Pratapsinh. The arrangement of 1839 especially admitted Pratapsinh's brother Shahaji to that settlement, and the adopted son of the last recognised possessor of the throne must have a better right than the adopted son of the deposed chief or of any other claimant. When the discussion was shifted to England certain advocates argued that political powers conferred on the Satara state differed from the tenure of all those persons to whom the right of adoption to territorial possessions had been refused, and that, as regards Satara, the title of Paramount Power as applied to the British Government was misplaced. That therefore if the adoption were legal according to the usages of the state it was valid independent of British sanction. It was further argued that if British sanction was required it was contrary to the treaty to refuse if; that even if the adoption was invalid for want of sanction or for any other cause, the collaterals had claims under the treaty, the terms of which did not necessarily restrict the succession to lineal heirs and that at any rate the claims of collaterals should not be barred without giving them a chance of stating them. The able management of the state by both Rajas, and the loyalty of the second Raja, were urged as reasons for showing consideration to Shahajis wishes. A well governed state, it was argued, was a source of strength to the British empire. Only five members of the Court of Directors dissented from the annexation of Satara.

**BRITISH RULE**

1848-1947.

Satara Annexed, 1st May 1849.

**EARLY IN MAY THE RESIDENT RECEIVED A LETTER DATED THE 1ST MAY 1849,** stating that it had been resolved that from failure of heirs the Satara territory had lapsed to the power which had bestowed it. On the 6th of June following Mr. Frere reported to Government that the Notification of the annexation had been received loyally but despondently by the subjects and servants of the late Raja. The senior Rani protested strongly but showed no active opposition to the decision of Government.

Every thing went quietly till May 1850 when the decision of Government as to the provision to be made for the family of the late Raja was communicated to the Ranis. They rejected the terms offered, and stipulated for the continuance of the household of the late Raja in their service, and intrigued in the hopes of gaining indirectly what they failed to procure by direct means. Finally they withdrew their demands and their affairs were settled in December 1851. Their lands and allowances and the private property left by Shahaji, valued at upwards of 15 lakhs were restored and distributed among them in proportions fixed by Government, and separate apartments in the palace were assigned to each of the Ranis and to their adopted son Venkaji Raje. Besides a large
amount of jewels, furniture, and equipages, the Rains gave to Venkaji the whole of their hereditary lands and villages yielding a net yearly revenue of over Rs. 20,000 and added to it portions of their own allowances which raised his income to more than Rs. 60,000 a year. The parties interested were satisfied and all excitement was allayed. Every individual belonging to the household of the late Raja, not retained in the service of their Highnesses the Rani of Balvantrav Bhosle, the boy whom the late Raja had taken under his protection, was pensioned, employed, or discharged with a gratuity. Since the settlement of their affairs their Highnesses the Rani abstained from giving further trouble to Government. The final arrangement made may be thus summarised. The late Raja's private debts amounting to Rs. 2,35,450 and the expenses attending his visit at Kolhapur amounting to a further sum of Rs. 58,750 were discharged by advances from the public treasury. A balance of Rs. 25,000 remaining in the hands of the architect of the new palace was assigned for the improvement of the aqueduct built by Shahu Raja of Satara, and a further balance of Rs. 35,860, chiefly saving out of the pay to his late Highness's cavalry, was also devoted after the manner of the late Government to public works. The yearly life allowance of Rs. 1,00,000 settled on the Rani was divided among them in the following proportions. Rs. 45,000 to the senior Ram, Rs. 30,000 to the second Rani, and Rs. 25,000 to the third Rani. The private movable and immovable property was unreservedly given up by Government to the Rams and they were allowed to keep a life possession of the old and new palaces, which with all other public buildings were declared to be the property of Government. Balvantrav Bhosle was allowed to keep property worth about Rs. 1,42,470 that had been given to him, and in deference to the wishes of His late Highness a further monthly allowance of Rs. 600 was settled on him. Pratapsinh's widow and adopted son were each allowed monthly pensions of Rs. 1,200 and the widow was also granted a sum of Rs. 12,000 to meet the expenses of her journey from Banares to Satara where the Governor-General had allowed her to live. She reached Satara in 1854 and lived in the same palace together with the widow and the adopted son of ShahajT. To Gojrasahcb, Pratapsinh's daughter and only child was assigned a monthly pension of Rs. 1,200 with a monthly remainder of Rs. 1,000 to her male heirs. On her leaving Banares for Satara in October 1848, the Government of India granted Gojrasaheb Rs. 20,000 to meet the expenses of her journey, as well as several months’ arrears amounting Rs. 9,000 on account of herself and followers. On the death of the lady, on the 30th of August 1853, Government granted her family the sum Rs. 5,000 to meet the cost of her funeral rites.

Uprisings, 1857.

From 1849 Satara was directly under the British Government though the Regulations were not introduced till 1863. No signs of discontent appeared till the disordered state of the country during the 1857 uprising stirred some members of Pratapsinh's family to seditious intrigue. No outbreak occurred at Satara during the uprising, but evidence was discovered of a widespread conspiracy only a week before the date fixed for the rising. A Ramoshi named Nana Raghu Chavhan, who about 1831 had received Rs. 10,000 from Government for the arrest of the great Ramoshi bandit Umaji Naik, told a dismissed agent of the Pant Sachiv that a conspiracy was on foot in Satara. The Pant Sachiv's agent told Mr. Rose, the District Magistrate on the 10th June 1857. Inquiry showed that armed Marathas had gathered at Bagarvadi a village near Bhor, the Prant Sachiv's capital, that they had started for Satara, and had arranged for Ramoshi and others to follow them. As there was a large Ramoshi population near Bagarvadi, thirty of the Southern Maratha Irregular Horse were sent under Lieutenant Kerr, accompanied by the First Assistant Commissioner Lieutenant Sandford, to intercept them. The party marched forty-five miles in sixteen hours over difficult rugged ground, but were seen by some of the Marathas who returned from Satara and the greater number of the men escaped to the hills. Thirteen Marathas were seized, but of the thirteen, only one was a man of consequence. All confessed that they had come together for the purpose of attacking the station at Satara. In consequence of this intelligence the magistrate asked for a detachment of European troops from Poonah which arrived towards the end of the month. On the day after the intelligence was received from Bhor, a Rajput messenger on the establishment of the

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Satara Judge's court was arrested in the lines of the 22nd Regiment native Infantry at Satara, endeavouring to corrupt a Subedar and through him all the Indian men of the regiment. The magistrate Mr. Rose was empowered to try him by special commission and he was executed on the 20th of June. On the scaffold he harangued the people present telling them that the English had less hold on the country than when they set foot in it, and urging them as the sons of Hindus and Musalmans not to remain quiet. A short time before a gang robbery had taken place near Parali behind the Satara fort. It was then reported that this gang formed a detachment from a considerable body of men who had gathered in the neighbouring forests but had dispersed on the return of the troops from Persia. It was now ascertained that Pratapsinh's agent Rango Bapuji had been living for six weeks in Parali, and that he had gathered this body of men to act with the band assembled in the Bhor country and with armed men hid in Satara The plot was mainly directed by Rango Bapuji. The intention was at the same time to attack Satara, Yavateshvar, and Mahabaleshvar, to massacre all Europeans, and to plunder the treasury and the town and to install Shahu, the adopted son of Pratapsinh, on the Gadi. Besides circulating news of the rising in Hindustan, Rango Bapuji set a foot absurd but widely believed stories; The Governor of Bombay had commissioned Rango to restore Pratapsinh's family and had ordered him to seize all Europeans who were to be released if they agreed to the arrangement and if they refused to agree were to be massacred. Meetings of conspirators had begun as far back as January 1857. Matters had failed to come to a head merely for want of concert, and the failure of one or other of the number to bring his contingent at the proper moment. At their last meeting the ringleaders had solemnly sworn over the sweetmeats which they ate together never again to fail. At the time the information was received every thing was ripe for an attack. In Satara the organisation was incomplete as at the last, conspirators were short of ammunition. In Bhor were large stores of powder, lead, and cannonballs, and in Satara 820 bullets were found ready cast in one house. According to the evidence at the trials, after the last meeting 2,000 men were ready for the attack and arrangements had been made for opening the jail and for letting out the 300 convicts. The Pant Sachiv was deeply involved in the plot [A very suggestive letter of Chimnaji Raghunath Sachiv to Rango Bapuji has been published on page 397 of 'History of Freedom Movement in India.'] and the other feudatories were believed to be no less guilty, and members of Pratapsinh's family who were living at the old palace were proved to be closely implicated. One night the horses of Shahu, Pratapsinh's adopted son and of Durgasingh, the Senapati's adopted son were saddled, that the young Rajas might head the attack. Antaji Raje Shirke, known as Bavasaheb, the native head of the Satara police, who was then drawing Rs. 600 a month, was completely corrupted by the elder Rani, and had engaged to keep the local police inactive. It also came out that during the previous year Bavasaheb had been intriguing to bring 40,000 Rohillas to Satara. The inquiry further showed that Shahaji's adopted son Venkaji Bhonsle had knowledge of the reasonable designs against the British Government. It was uncertain whether he was under the influence of Pratapsinh's family or of the great estate-holders. The impression formed by Government was that he was trimming between the two parties, fearing that unless he fell in with their designs, if Pratapsinh's party succeeded he would be in a worse position than he was under the British Government. Secret levies were being raised in all parts of the district from Bhor to the furthest part of Khanapur. Valva, on the line of communication with Kolhapur, was the seat of much intrigue. Rango Bapuji used to boast that he could bring over a thousand men from Belgany and that Kolhapur would also rise. The event proved that as regards Kolhapur his boast was well founded. Besides this, if the confessions of Pratapsinh's adopted son are to be believed, encouraged by Holkar and Rango Bapuji, the Ranis had been plotting ever since their return from Benares in 1854. The province, as it was then called, of Satara was ripe for sedition. With one exception the feudatories were without male issue, and in consequence of the non-recognition of Shahaji's adoption were afraid that at their deaths their estates would be lost to their families. Government had also decided that alienations made by the last two Rajas without the Resident's consent were to be resumed on the death of present holders. These sources of discontent had much less influence on the people than a feeling which, since their return to Satara in 1854, had sprung up in favour of Pratapsinh's family. The first news of the mutinies in Upper India came to Satara in a
private letter to an obscure Brahman. The Brahman took the letter to Pratapsinh's chief Rani and prayed for her favour when she came into power. The letter was read publicly in the native library. The receiver was warned to burn it and the matter was kept a close secret. One of the reasons for a rising on which Rango Bapuji dwelt ever since his return from England was England's embroilment with Russia. This, he said, gave the best possible chance for gathering levies and raising the people against the British power in India. He said that all the discontented people in the Deccan looked to Satara, the ancient seat of the Maratha empire, as the place which should first free itself from the British yoke.

Several arrests were made in July including the son of Rango Bapuji in Kolhapur territory. Though a reward of Rs. 500 was offered for his apprehension Rango Bapuji escaped and has never been heard of. The detachment of Europeans reached Satara at the end of June and for about a fortnight all remained quiet. On the 13th of July a desperate attack was made on the office and treasury of the Mamlatdar of Pandharpur, then in Satara, with the further object of raising the eastern districts on the Nizam's border. The attempt was made with only a few men and the attack was successfully repelled by the local police with a loss of four killed including the Mamlatdar of Pandharpur. Two of the six leaders were killed in the attack, the other four were captured and blown from guns at Satara with two of their followers. The rest were transported. On the 27th of August a special commission sat for the trial of seventeen persons concerned in the plot, including the son and another relation of Rango Bapuji [Some papers of the trial have been published in 1957, in "History of Freedom Movement in India", a Bombay Government publication on pp. 179-193 under the caption "Satara Treason Case"]. These pevsons were convicted and executed on the 8th of September. On the 6th of August, by order of Government, Shahu, the adopted son and the two Ranis of Pratapsinh, the adoptei son Balasaheb Senapati, and a cousin of Shahu were removed for confinement to Butcher's Island in Bombay harbour. This measure was urgently necessary in consequence of the uneasy state of the province owing to the rising at Kolhapur on the 31st of July. Guns were taken to and pointed on the palace in the early morning and the family were removed in closed carriages. Heavy roads made the journey tedious, but it was successful. In the same month the disarming of the district was ordered and begun. All the cannon and wall-pieces in possession of the feudalatory chiefs were taken, except two small pieces which they were allowed to keep for occasions of festivity and rejoicing. By the end of June 1858 over 32,000 small arms had been discovered, 130 guns and wall-pieces had been destroyed, and over Rs. 2,000 taken in fines for concealment of arms. No further disturbance occurred. But the insurrection at Kolhapur in December 1857 necessitated the despatch of smal parties of troops. Seventy-five were sent to Ashta then the headquarters of the Valva sub-division and twenty-five to Shirala, a strong mud fort to check any rising on the southern frontier. These troops were kept at these stations till August 1858 when they were serf to Tasganv to join 200 men of the 22nd Native Infantry lately sent there from Satara to overawe the Southern Maratha chiefs and to check the rising which it was thought might follow the annexation of the Patvadjarah chief's territories on his decease without male issue. No disturbance took place and the troops returned at the beginning of the fair season. The political prisoners Rajasbai and Gunvantaba the widows, and Shahu and Durgasingh the adopted sons of Pratapsinh and Balasaheb were kept at Butcher's Island till March 1857. In December 1857 Mr. Rose went to Butcher's Island and induced the adopted sons and Kaka Saheb a relation of Sahu's to make confession of their part in the intrigues. In March 1858 they were removed to Karachi in Sind and were kept in residences separate from the Ranis, who proved incurable intriguers.

Shahu, the adopted son of Pratapsinh, was allowed to return to Satara where he was joined by his wife Anandibai. Venkaji, Shahaji's adopted son, was removed first to Ahmadabad and then to Ahmad-nagar in 1859 and 1860 respectively. Monthly allowances of Rs. 100 were granted to Shahu, of Rs. 50 to Durgasingh, and of Rs. 30 to Kakasaheb; to the Rani Rajasbai Rs. 100 and Gunvantabai Rs. 40. Certain old servants of Pratapsinh were pensioned at a total monthly cost of Rs. 730 while others were discharged with gratuities amounting to Rs. 1,530. Yeshvant Malhar

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Chitnis., who induced the young Raja and Senapati to make their confessions, received Rs. 3,000 and certain palace servants who aided were given small gratuities. The Subhedar who resisted the rebels' overtures was invested with the third class order of merit, and Sadashiv Khandev, the Bhor Karbhari who conveyed the first information was restored to his office, presented with a dress of honour worth Rs. 600, and given a village worth Rs. 500 a year. Venkaji died in 1864, and Shahaji's widow adopted another son Rajaram, who was popularly known as Abasaheb. Since 1859 except for one or two gang robberies Satara has enjoyed a period of comparative peace. In 1874 Shahaji's widow submitted an appeal to the British Government against the East India Company's high-handed behaviour in taking possession of many of the houses belonging to her family. The appeal was drafted by the famous pleader of Bombay V. N. Mandlik with the help of G. S. Khambete of Satara. Her efforts however were not destined to bear any fruit. Within a few days after the submission of the appeal, the palace caught fire and a portion of it, known as Rang Mahal, was burnt to ashes. This gave a great shock to the lady and she died on 24th March 1874. Abasaheb her adopted son was versatile both in oriental learning as also in military exercises and was fond of patronising wrestlers. He died on 8th April 1904 leaving behind two sons Shivaji alias Annasaheb and Pratapsinhalias Bhausheb. During his life-time he was deprived of the hereditary title "Maharaj" and he was only classed as a first class sardar. He died in 1914 and his younger brother Pratapsinh succeeded to his estates. He died childless in 1925 and his widow adopted a son who was named Shahu. He took to a military career in the course of the Second World War and was very fond of hunting, in which pursuit he died of an accident in 1950. He is succeeded by his eldest son Pratapsinh.

Shahu the adopted son belonging to the other branch who had been transferred to Karachi was allowed to return to the Deccan in 1885. He stayed in Poona, became the follower of a Brahmo sect and died in 1892. His inherited property recently lapsed to the Satara branch as per rules of succession.

**SATARA DURING THE BRITISH RULE AND AFTER**

As THE NINETEENTH CENTURY ADVANCED, historical centre of gravity shifted from the doings of the royal house to the movements of those who had received the benefits of modern education. As in other parts of the country so in Satara the establishment of British rule, far from being looked upon as a curse, was welcomed by the people. Strict adherence to rules and regulations so characteristic of a bureaucratic yet constitutional Government as the British Government was, had influenced even the Chhatrapatis of Satara so much that we find Pratapsinh and his successor Shahu submitting petitions after petitions to the Court of Directors with a hope that their line might be restored. As has been said above, Rango Bapuji staked everything to plead the case of the Chhatrapatis in England but with no effect. The same policy of constitutional agitation was followed by the earlier generation of educated people to get their grievances redressed. There is a reference to the District Association submitting an application signed by hundreds of people concerned, on 18th December 1868, against a certain land legislation. ["Bhausahub Soman ": by P. P. Gokhale, p. 9.] This was followed by another association established on 26th June 1870 at a meeting held in the public library at Satara [Ibid., p. 9.]. Amongst the leaders of those days, one finds a reference to Ganesh Vasudev Joshi who later became famous in Poona by the term " Sarvajanik Kaka", who took the lead in establishing an arbitration (Lavad) court at Satara in 1876 [Ibid., p. 10.]. Interesting as it might appear, two persons of Satara, G. G. Pandit and V. M. Gokhale took the lead in 1882, to start a textile mill at Ahmadabad for the manufacture of chintz [Jagrit Satara, by P. P. Gokhale, p. 21.] Enlightened public of Satara expressed its reaction to the deposition of Malharrav Gaikvad of Baroda in 1875 and later they also came out with a petition that the editor of the " Késari" and the "Mahratta" should be excused from punishment for their journalistic activities in 1882. In the same year Raghunath Pandurang Karandikar, the famous

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pleader and leader of Satara in a speech at a public meeting extended a hearty welcome to the local self-government reform introduced by Lord Ripon. In 1885 was established the India National Congress and we find a reference to the people of Safari being actuated with a desire to establish its branches all over the district. It was felt that the grievances of the uneducated tax-paye, the peasant and the worker would thus be conveyed to the Indian National Congress which would present it to government officials in a crystallised and well defined form. Interesting as all these evens are, considerations of space prevent us from referring to each one of these in greater details. A bare chronological presentation of important events bearing testimony to the public-spiritedness in the district will tell its own tale.

In 1892, the editor of "Pratoda" was sentenced to six month imprisonment for having criticised the then forest officer Mr. Fagane. ["Bhausaheb Soman" by P. P. Gokhale, p. 13.]

In 1893 the people of Wai resolved to present an address to Dadabhai Naoroji and accordingly the local leaders went to Bombay on 16th of December for the purpose ["Bhausaheb Soman" by P. P. Gokhale, p. 13.].

In 1895 Lokmanya Tilak was presented with an address at a public meeting held in Satara on 27th of August [Ibid, p. 14.].

In 1897, R. V. Kulkarni who was working as a Kulkarni was warned by Government not to participate in any public activity. Rather than submit to the order he resigned his post [Ibid, p. 15.].

In the same year Bhaushastri Lele of Wai, a great Sanskrit Scholar of nationalistic bent of mind was sentenced to nine months of imprisonment for his criticism against Government through the columns of Modavrtta.

In 1900, was held the Bombay provincial political conference at Satara on behalf of the 'Ratepayers Association' established in the previous year. In 1903, R. C. Dutt, was presented with an address in reply to which he drew attention of the people to the greatness and glory of ancient Indian Culture [JagritSatara : by P. P. Gokhale, p. 47.].

The first phase of constitutional agitation in the form of submitting petitions to Government under the leadership of 'moderate' leaders having been chilled, due to the unresponsive attitude of the bureaucracy, people began to organise and agitate under the leadership of nationalists who were proverbially called the 'extremists'. The agitation took diverse forms such as organising Shivaji and Ganapati festivals, starting of national schools, independent of government control and inaugurating the Svaedshimovement by encouraging consumption of goods of local production. It also took the form of a field to field survey in rural areas, the object being, it must be said, more to rouse the people against foreign rule, rather than bringing about any systematic reconstruction or relief to the rayat. There was also a party of revolutionaries in Satara who were prosecuted in what is popularly called the 'Aundh Bomb Case' and the conspirators like Hinge and Dr. V. V. Athalye were sentenced to a rigorous imprisonment of eight to ten years in 1910. The political atmosphere of the period can be best described in a statement made by the then Governor General Lord Minto. Says he:

"We have a party small in numbers but of considerable influence and inspired by convictions strongly and even fanatically held, who are opposed to the circumstance of British rule. The party may be divided into two classes. The first consists of those who desire autonomy but seek to obtain it by passive resistance and the continual sapping of the foundations of loyalty by means of attacks in the press, on the platform and on more private occasions. They do not ordinarily resort to violence though many of them secretly sympathise with courage and assassination and all alike care to be unwilling to assist in the suppression of political crime."

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The second comprise those who advocate and practice methods of terrorism, directed against servants, European and Indian, "against all persons assisting justice with information, evidence etc. Youths are bounded together in societies (in 'Bengal. Bombay, C.P. etc.) with no central body to control ['Bhausaheb Soman' by: P. P. Gokhale. pp. 31-32.]. The police sometimes showed their excessive enthusiasm, and tried to incriminate popular leaders, as it happened in Satara in 1909, in a case which was investigated and ultimately set aside with a confidential remark made in their report by the Satara C.I.D. that "a false bomb case was got up to injure pleader named Phansalkar [Ibid p. 34.]. The political atmosphere that prevailed, in Satara was more or less influenced by the activities of the extremists, the moderates and to a certain extent the revolutionaries also, on the lines described above, with this peculiarity that the moderates and the extremists in Satara, with all their honest political differences often used to come together with a spirit of compromise on a common platform for social and other purposes. This is indicated by the holding of the provincial political conference in Satara in 1914 in which leaders of different shades of political opinion had participated.

Political development in Satara in post 1911 period followed closely along the lines developing elsewhere. With the rise of Mahatma Gandhi in 1920, Satara cheerfully responded to his leadership and it is pertinent to note that erstwhile revolutionaries like Dr. Athalye became strong adherents of the Gandhi School of thought and participated in the famous Civil Disobedience Movement known as 'Shiroda Satyagriha' where the people asserted right of collecting salt from the backwaters of the sea. A new leader of political thought, the late Mr. Shankarrao Javdekar, emerged at this time and revealed to the people the true significance of the Gandhi an movement. He hailed from Islampur and it may said without exaggeration that Maharashtra hardly produced in that age a man with a similar depth of political understanding.

Turning to the aspect of social awakening during this period the pride of place must be given to the Late Rav Bahadur, R. R. Kale, who was on the vanguard of such movements as the uplift of women and the abolition of caste system. He was a staunch supporter of the New English School started by the Deccan Education Society in 1899. It continued to make steady progress until at last in point of efficiency it soon rivalled and outshone the Government High School at Satara. It is on record that it was constantly hampered in its onward march by the systematic subdued opposition coming from Government officials of the Education department [Fergusson College Magazine, July 1919, pp. 17-29.]. Later, Kale gave a substantial donation of more than a lakh of rupees and laid the foundation of the Gokhale School of Economics and Politics in the premises of the Servants of India Society's Home at Poena. He also donated a big house of his own to the Girls' High School at Satara which has been named after his wife Satyabhamabai and is now managed by Maharshi Kane's Hinge Mahilashram.

Satara has ever given the lead in making pioneering efforts to start a variety of industries. As early as in 1899, ink manufacture was attempted at Vite in Satara district and Menthol and Soap production was started at Satara in 1905 ['Jagrit Satara' by: P. P. Gokhale. p. 50.]. Karad was known in the second decade of the 20th Century for having taken the lead in starting a match factor); besides these earlier efforts of an experimental character, which are only indicative of the sincerity and enthusiasm of their pioneers, the pride of place undoubtedly must go to the Western India Life Insurance Company started at Satara in 1913 by the late Annasaheb Chirmule. The company ever continued to make sound progress during the next half a century, until it was recently acquired by Government and amalgamated in the Life Insurance Corporation during the post-Independence period. Besides this, the Kirloskar Iron & Steel Manufacturing Company started in 1910 has been the most important pioneering industrial concern in southern Maharashtra. Its managers first began starting a small house-organ known as 'Kirloskar Khabar' which later developed into the most popular and most widely read magazine in Maharashtra known as simply 'Kirloskar' and was coupled with two other magazines known as Stree and Manohar. Ogale Brothers

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having acquired their early training at Taleganv Glass Works, started their own Glass Factory at Ogalevadi near Karad in 1916. They were soon able to manufacture hurricane lanterns which could successfully compete with similar foreign productions. Another industrial concern started in 1922 near Satara Railway Station is known as Cooper Engineering Ltd. It began by manufacturing iron ploughs in its initial stages and is now manufacturing diesel engines, which have a wide demand all over the country.

Vitality of Satara could be estimated from some of the educational institutions which have a peculiarity of their own. The most important of them is the Rayat Shikshan Sanstha started in 1919 by the late Bhaurav Patil, who, it may be said without exaggeration, brought about a revolution in the field of education which is only to be equalled by a similar one brought about fifty years ago by Vislinushastri Chipulkar by starting the New English School at Poona. The genesis of the ‘Patil movement’ lies in taking education to the masses by making it simpler and cheaper and breaking the conventional bonds of caste and creed. Bhaurav's was a truly liberal spirit translating the philosophy of Agarkar and giving it a concrete form in the shape of educational institutions. Never since Chhatrapati Shahu of Kolhapur had initiated an equalitarian movement towards social and educational reform could there be found anything that could match the activities of Bhaurav. He was education of the masses in carnate. The Rayat Shikshan Sanstha has now a net work of a number of boarding houses, high schools and colleges in a number of places in Satara district. Another peculiar institution started in 1920, at Wai is 'The Prajnya Patha Shala' by Narayan-shastri Marathe also known as Kevalanand. The institution concentrated upon the study of Sanskrit and Oriental Philosophy and aimed at systematising, if not codifying the labyrinth of conflicting religious commandments in the Hindu Dharma Shastras. Tarktirth Laxmanahastri Joshi is its guiding spirit at present. The institution has come out with a number of scholarly works, on matters religious. A similar spirit of oriental revival was also to be noticed at Satara where an Ayurvedic College known as AryanglaMahavidyalaya was started, thanks to the efforts of Dr. Agashe. The revivalist made their contribution in the field of historical research as is indicated by the efforts of the late Shri D. B. Parasnis who made a rich collection of rare historic documents and pictures and conducted a journal known as Iithas Sangriha for a number of years. The spirit of general awakening was carried among the masses, thanks to the efforts of the followers of Satyshodhak Samaj which sometimes allowed its enthusiasm to outrun its discretion and developed a communal turn. With all its industries Satara is largely an agricultural district where the peasantry often showed litigious tendency which not many a time took a criminal form. In recent times the ‘Quit India’ movement of 1942 found a leader for it in Satara district in Nana Patil whose simple straight and rustic flow of language and arguments often created great enthusiasm among the masses.

There were two important States, Aundh and Phaltan included in Satara district. They have been recently amalgamated in the course of the merger movement and have now become corporate parts of Satara. The former ruler of Aundh, Balasaheb Pratinidhi was a cultured ruler who was wise enough to read the signs of time and liberally shared the political responsibility with popular leaders. He was instrumental in encouraging the Kirloskars in the initial stages of their development. Shri Malojirav Nimbalkar of Phaltan outdid himself by voluntary resignation and joined the Congress movement as an ordinary citizen. He rose to the rank of becoming a Minister of State and has shown by his example as to how one could cheerfully respond to the changing times.

Standing on the threshold of the mid-twentieth century, one can look back with pride on the achievements of Satara in all fields political, religious, educational and industrial. An average Satara middle class man wears a simple dress which conceals, in him, the fire of the coming age. He can be depended upon to be a worthy citizen of democratic India. The average farmer is looking upon agricultural litigation as a thing of the past and is responding to the co-operative movement through which he hopes to be emotionally integrated with the successive five year plans that plan to raise his standard of life.

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